Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Osie Goodgame, Jr., a Kentucky resident, worked for Consol of Kentucky, Inc. in both Kentucky and Virginia. After Goodgame resigned, he filed an injury claim alleging that, while employed by Consol, he suffered cumulative trauma injuries to his extremities and spine. An administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissed Goodgame’s claim, finding that Goodgame had not filed it within the applicable statute of limitations and that Kentucky had no jurisdiction over any injury Goodgame may have suffered in Virginia. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s finding regarding jurisdiction but vacated the ALJ’s finding regarding the statute of limitations, concluding that the ALJ had not conducted the proper analysis in determining Goodgame’s date of injury for statute of limitations purposes. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding (1) Kentucky does not have extraterritorial jurisdiction over any claim arising from a Virginia injury; but (2) this claim must be remanded to the ALJ so she can determine when Goodgame was advised that he suffers from a work-related cumulative trauma injury and then determine if Goodgame filed his claim within two years of that date. View "Consol of Kentucky, Inc. v. Goodgame" on Justia Law

Mary Banker filed a retaliatory discharge claim against the University of Louisville Athletic Association, Inc. (ULAA), alleging that ULAA discharged her for engaging in a protected activity under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. A jury found in favor of Banker and awarded attorney fees. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for dismissal of Banker’s claim, holding that Banker had not met her burden of proof. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals injected its interpretation of the facts and did not view the proof in light most favorable to Banker, and the evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that ULAA’s stated reasons for discharging Banker were pretextual; (2) the trial court's award of lost wages was in error; and (3) the trial court’s attorney fee award was reasonable and a proper exercise of its discretion. Remanded. View "Banker v. Univ. of Louisville Athletic Ass’n, Inc." on Justia Law

Beverly Miller’s employment with the COJ (Court of Justice) ended when she was terminated in 2001. Miller filed suit, claiming that she was a tenured employee of the COJ and therefore, before she was terminated, she was entitled to the due process provided in the COJ Personnel Policies. Miller also filed a whistleblower claim under Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.102. The circuit court (1) granted summary judgment to Miller as to her claims based upon her being a tenured employee; and (2) granted summary judgment to the Administrative Office of the Courts on Miller’s claim under the Kentucky Whistleblower Statute. The Supreme Court (1) reversed as to Miller’s tenured employee claims, holding that, as a matter of law, Miller was not a tenured employee and was not entitled to termination due process under the COJ Personnel Policy; and (2) affirmed as to the dismissal of Miller’s claims under section 61.102, holding as a matter of law that Miller did not report or disclose previously concealed or non-public information that would entitle her to protection under the statute. View "Admin. Office of Courts v. Miller" on Justia Law

Julie Camps worked as a full time paramedic for the Garrard County Fiscal court and was concurrently employed as a paramedic with Clark County EMS. Camps later quit her job with Clark County, intending to obtain another paramedic job closer to her home. While working for Garrard County, Appellant suffered an acute ankle sprain requiring reconstructive surgery. Camps filed for workers’ compensation based on an average weekly wage (AWW) calculation including her wages from both counties. An administrative law judge concluded that Camps’s AWW was limited to the wages she earned working for Garrard County. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed based on its interpretation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.140(5), concluding that Camps’s Clark County wages should be included in her AWW calculation because she worked for Clark County during the relevant look-back period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, because Camps was no longer under a contract for hire with Clark County at the time of her injury, she was not entitled to claim both her Garrard County and Clark County wages in her AWW calculation. View "Garrard County Fiscal Court v. Camps" on Justia Law

Appellant injured his left shoulder while working for Appellee. Appellant underwent three shoulder surgeries and returned to work on light duty between the surgeries. After Appellant returned to work without restrictions, Appellee terminated his employment for bumping into a pole while operating a forklift. An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied Appellant’s request for temporary total disability (TTD) benefits while Appellant was on light duty and declined to award the two multiplier under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(c)(2) and Chrysalis House, Inc. v. Tackett after finding that Appellant was not terminated due to his disabling shoulder injury. The Workers’ Compensation Board and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the denial of TTD benefits, as the evidence did not compel a contrary finding; and (2) reversed and remanded with respect to the two multiplier, as the circumstances in this case led the Court to reconsider its holding in Chrysalis House and its construction of section 342.730(1)(c)(2). View "Livingood v. Transfreight, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant suffered a work-related injury and filed a claim for benefits. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Appellant was entitled to benefits. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the ALJ properly excluded unemployment compensation benefits when calculating Appellant’s average weekly wage (AWW). The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s finding that unemployment benefits should not be included in the AWW calculation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s finding regarding unemployment benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that unemployment benefits are not wages under Ky. Rev. Stat. 341.140(6). View "Jewell v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

In 2010, two miners died in a mining accident while employed by Webster County Coal, LLC. That same year, another miner died in a mining accident while employed by River View Coal, LLC. Both River View and Webster County were wholly owned subsidiaries of Alliance Coal LLC, the parent company. Alliance, which had obtained a self-insurance contract, guaranteed payment of benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act in the event its subsidiaries failed to pay benefits. Webster County and River View accepted the workers’ compensation claims made on behalf of the surviving widows and children of the deceased miners, and Alliance paid the benefits. Appellants filed lawsuits against Alliance alleging that it had liability for the miners’ deaths. The trial court granted summary judgment for Alliance, concluding that it had immunity under the Act. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a parent company that completely self-insures the liability of its subsidiary is a carrier and immune from tort liability. View "Falk v. Alliance Coal, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against her former manager and then amended her complaint to assert direct claims against Appellees, her employer and related corporate entities. The trial court entered a summary judgment dismissing the claims against Appellees as being time barred. The summary judgment left the manager as the sole remaining defendant but did not recite any of the finality language provided in CR 54.02(1). Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the summary judgment. The circuit court subsequently entered a nunc pro tunc order purporting to interject, retroactively, the necessary finality language into the summary judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the nunc pro tunc order could not have retroactively conferred finality upon an order that was not originally designated as final and that the “relation forward” doctrine of Johnson v. Smith did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the filing of a notice of appeal divested the circuit court of jurisdiction over this case and transferred that jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals, and therefore, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter the nunc pro tunc order, and its attempt to bestow finality upon the summary judgment was ineffective; and (2) the relation forward doctrine did not apply. View "Wright v. Ecolab, Inc." on Justia Law

Randy Ellington owned and operated R&J Cabinets as a sole proprietorship. When Ellington received a work-related injury, R&J had no employees. Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI) had previously issued a workers’ compensation policy to Ellington and R&J as “insureds.” At the same time, the policy included a specific exclusion from coverage of Ellington as the sole proprietor. KEMI denied Ellington’s claim for benefits, arguing that it was not covered because of the sole-proprietor exclusion endorsement. An administrative law judge concluded that Ellington was not covered by the policy. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the policy was ambiguous and construing it in Ellington’s favor to provide coverage for his injuries. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the policy, as issued, is not a personal policy but rather a business policy purchased by a sole proprietor, and Ellington, as the sole proprietor, was not entitled to benefits under the policy. View "Ky. Employers Mut. Ins. v. Ellington" on Justia Law

Appellee was injured when a horse she was exercising at Gardens Glen Farm (Appellant) rolled over on her. Appellee negotiated a lump sum settlement with Appellant, which reflected a twenty-nine percent impairment rating and a return to work factor of 1.5509453. Appellee later moved to reopen, alleging that her occupations disability was worsening. The motion was sustained. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Appellee showed a worsening of her condition and calculated credit for money paid to Appellee pursuant to the settlement. Appellant appealed, arguing that the ALJ erred by refusing to give it a dollar for dollar credit based on the lump sum settlement. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ did not err in calculating the credit owed to Appellant. View "Gardens Glen Farm v. Balderas" on Justia Law