Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After she was denied tenure, Plaintiff, a former faculty member of Northern Kentucky University, filed suit, alleging violations of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act for discriminatory employment practices on the basis of her gender. The trial court granted summary judgment for the University, concluding that Plaintiff failed to raise a prima facie claim for gender discrimination because she could not prove she was qualified for tenure and she failed to present evidence that she was treated differently from similarly situated male comparators. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the court of appeals employed an erroneous standard for reviewing Plaintiff’s claim. View "Bd. of Regents of N. Ky. Univ. v. Weickgenannt" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought workers’ compensation benefits from Defendant, a medical center, for injuries she allegedly sustained during the course of a pre-employment physical examination. Defendant denied Plaintiff’s claim on the ground that she was not an employee at the time of her injury. An administrative law judge and the Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals also affirmed, agreeing that Plaintiff was not Defendant’s employee when she submitted for physical examination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kentucky’s Workers’ Compensation Act does not cover an injury sustained during a physical examination performed as a condition precedent to employment. View "Rahla v. Med. Ctr. at Bowling Green" on Justia Law

Deborah Powell, the former women’s basketball coach at Asbury University, filed suit against the University, asserting claims of defamation, gender discrimination, and retaliation. The jury returned a verdict in the University’s favor on the defamation and discrimination claims but in Powell’s favor on the retaliation claim. The trial court awarded Powell damages and attorney's fees and costs. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a claim of unlawful employer retaliation under Ky. Rev. Stat. 344.280(1) does not require an underlying violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act; (2) there was sufficient evidence to find unlawful retaliation; (3) the admission of opinion testimony by a former employee of the university that Powell’s conduct had been “wholly innocent” was harmless; (4) the University was not entitled to an employment-at-will jury instruction; (5) the University was not entitled to a new trial for alleged defects in the jury’s damages verdict; and (6) the award of attorneys’ fees and costs was not unreasonable. View "Asbury University v. Powell" on Justia Law

Appellant suffered a work-related accident while employed by Appellee. Appellant filed for workers’ compensation, but before his claim could be resolved, he was fired for “performance-related issues.” An administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded workers’ compensation but declined to apply a multiplier to Appellant’s award, finding that there was no evidence that Appellant’s cessation of employment was the result of his injury. The Workers’ Compensation Board ultimately concluded that Appellant was not entitled to enhancement by the two multiplier at the time of the ALJ’s decision and that the evidence did not compel a finding that Appellant’s work-related injury led to his termination. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, as no finding had been made as to whether Appellant’s conduct at work satisfied the new standard set forth in Chrysalis House, Inc. v. Tackett regarding when the two multiplier may be awarded so as to justify the denial of the application of the two multiplier. View "Fuertes v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Glenn Hampton suffered a work-related injury during his employment with Flav-O-Rich. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found Hampton to be permanently totally disabled and awarded him permanent total disability benefits. The Workers' Compensation Board vacated the ALJ’s opinion and remanded, finding that the ALJ’s summary of the evidence and findings of fact were not sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review. Hampton filed a petition for review with the court of appeals. The court dismissed the petition as prematurely filed from a non-final Board opinion, concluding that because the Board’s opinion did not divest Hampton of a vested right and did not direct or authorize the ALJ to enter a different award on remand, it was not final and appealable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding under the test from Davis v. Island Creek Coal Co., the Board’s opinion was final and appealable. View "Hampton v. Flav-O-Rich Dairies" on Justia Law

Delena Tipton was injured during the course of her employment with Trane Commercial Systems. Trane initially paid Tipton temporary total disability (TTD) income benefits but stopped paying TTD benefits when Tipton returned to work. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Tipton’s release and return to work justified termination of TTD benefits when Tipton returned to work. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Tipton’s return to work did not terminate her entitlement to TTD benefits because Tipton did not returned to the type of work she had performed when she was injured. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the ALJ’s opinion and award, holding that there was ample substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s denial of Tipton’s request for additional TTD benefits. View "Trane Commercial Sys. v. Tipton" on Justia Law

Laul Deng (“Aker”) sued his former employer, Norton Healthcare, Inc., for racial discrimination in terminating his employment. Specifically, Aker alleged that Norton’s failure to reinstate him after termination of his employment was retaliation for filing a pro se discrimination complaint. The trial court granted Norton summary judgment on all of Aker’s claims. Despite acknowledging that Aker never applied for any position with Norton, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the futile-gesture doctrine excused the requirement that Aker show that he applied for a position in order to establish a prima facie claim for employment discrimination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in invoking the futile-doctrine theory sua sponte; and (2) the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Norton as a matter of law. View "Norton Healthcare, Inc. v. Deng" on Justia Law

Employee was employed by Employer for three months as a bulldozer operator. On April 16, 2012, Employee filed a workers’ compensation claim against Employer, alleging cumulative trauma and an injury date of February 7, 2012. Before his employment with Employer, Employee had worked as a bulldozer operated for other employers for approximately thirty years. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Employee sustained cumulative trauma injuries that became manifest on February 7, 2012, while he was employed by Employer, and that he was permanently and totally disabled. The Workers’ Compensation Board vacated and remanded, concluding (1) February 7, 2012 could not be the date of manifestation, and (2) Southern Kentucky Concrete Contractors, Inc. v. Campbell required apportionment of liability based upon the percentage of Employee’s impairment attributable to the three months he worked for Employer. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and reinstated the decision of the ALJ, holding (1) there was a sufficient evidentiary foundation to support the ALJ’s award; (2) the date of manifestation was February 7, 2012, as stipulated by the parties; and (3) Kentucky Southern Concrete was inapplicable. View "Hale v. CDR Operations, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1989, Appellant was injured in the course of her employment with Appellee. Appellant was awarded workers’ compensation benefits, including lifetime medical benefits for treatment of the injury. In 2012, Appellee filed this medical-fee dispute to contest the reasonableness and necessity of the treatment being provided by Appellant’s treating physician, as well as the relatedness of the treatment to the 1989 work injury. An administrative law judge found that the treatment was compensable, and the Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence compelled a finding that the treatment at issue in this medical dispute was non-compensable. View "Kingery v. Sumitomo Elec. Wiring" on Justia Law

David McCarty, the employee of an independent contractor, was killed during the installation of a garage door on a building at a coal mine site operated by Covol Fuels. McCarty’s estate brought a wrongful death action against Covol, alleging that Covol was negligent per se for violating certain coal mine safety statutes and regulations. A federal district court granted summary judgment for Covol on all claims, concluding that McCarty was not within the class of persons protected by Kentucky’s mine safety laws and that his death did not occur under the circumstances that Kentucky’s mine safety laws were intended to prevent. The Estate appealed. The Supreme Court subsequently granted the request of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to certify the law in regards to whether the statutes and regulations relied upon by the Estate were intended to protect individuals in McCarty's situation and to prevent the type of accident that caused McCarty’s death. The Supreme Court concluded that a subcontractor injured while installing a garage door on an unfinished building at a mine site may not maintain a wrongful death action against the mine operator under a negligence per se theory for alleged violations of Kentucky mining statutes and regulations. View "McCarty v. Covol Fuels No. 2, LLC" on Justia Law