Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Kentucky Energy and Environment Cabinet denied Kentucky Southern Coal Corporation's (KSCC) application to renew its surface and underground coal mining permit, finding that a bona fide dispute existed over KSCC's right of entry to 18.1 acres within the permit boundaries. The circuit court affirmed the Cabinet's decision, finding that the expiration of a surface lease adjudicated by another circuit court created a bona fide dispute over the rights of KSCC to mine the coal on the 18.1-acre tract. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a bona fide property dispute existed in this case, which the Cabinet had no legal authority to adjudicate; and (2) accordingly, the Cabinet did not err in denying KSCC's renewal permit. View "Ky. S. Coal Corp. v. Ky. Energy & Env't Cabinet" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of attempted murder, first-degree assault, first-degree wanton endangerment, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant appealed, arguing that his convictions for both attempted murder and first-degree assault for the same shooting constituted a double jeopardy violation. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's conviction for first-degree assault and affirmed the remainder of his convictions, holding that, in light of the particular facts of this case, Appellant's convictions for attempted murder and first-degree assault, both offenses that arose out of a single course of conduct, resulted in a double jeopardy violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 505.020. Remanded. View "Kiper v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of one count of use of a minor under the age of sixteen in a sexual performance and six counts of use of a minor under the age of eighteen in a sexual performance. Appellant was sentenced to a total of twenty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant's conviction and sentence for use of a minor under the age of eighteen in a sexual performance as to one of the victims, holding that the jury instruction as to that charge and victim violated Appellant's right to a unanimous verdict; and (2) affirmed the remainder of Appellant's convictions and sentences, holding that the trial court properly denied Appellant's motion for a mistrial. Remanded. View "Kingrey v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the murder and first-degree criminal abuse of her two-year-old son. The Supreme Court affirmed the murder conviction but reversed the abuse conviction, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the abuse conviction; (2) the trial court did not commit reversible error in playing a recorded interview in which a police detective accused the Appellant of not telling the truth nor in allowing that detective to testify that Appellant's story was inconsistent with other testimony; but (3) the jury's verdict as to first-degree criminal abuse deprived Appellant of her right to a unanimous jury verdict. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellants were convicted of a 1992 murder based on highly circumstantial evidence. Both were sentenced to life imprisonment. Now represented by The Innocence Project, Appellant sought the release of certain physical evidence recovered from the crime scene - namely, unidentified hairs found in the victim's hand - for DNA testing. The circuit court denied Appellants' request to release the evidence for DNA testing, finding that the evidence would not likely change the outcome of the trial with a reasonable certainty. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellants' motion because Appellants had shown the DNA testing might lead to the prosecution and conviction of a person heretofore uncharged and now at large. View "Hardin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor in violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 530.064(1) and sentenced to ten years in prison. The convictions stemmed from Defendant's inducement of the fourteen-year-old daughter of a recently deceased family friend to have sexual intercourse with him. Defendant appealed, arguing that section 530.064 does not apply unless the perpetrator induces the minor to commit a crime. Defendant contended that because the minor involved here was allegedly induced to submit to a crime but not to commit one, Defendant was entitled to a directed verdict on the section 530.064 charge. The court of appeals panel agreed with Defendant's reading of section 530.064 but affirmed his conviction pursuant to Young v. Commonwealth, in which the Supreme Court rejected a claim similar but not identical to Defendant's. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to a dismissal of the charge of unlawful transaction with a minor because section 530.064 is not limited to instances where the defendant has induced a minor to commit a crime but applies as well to inducements to engage in sexual activity made illegal by the minor's incapacity to consent to it. View "Hale v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Christina Wittich. Wittich's parents brought a wrongful death action against Appellant on behalf of their daughter's estate (Estate) and obtained a multi-million dollar jury verdict. Appellant appealed, naming only "the Estate of Christina Wittich" as a party to the appeal. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for failure to name the co-administrators of the Estate. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, holding that Appellant's error in the notice of appeal as not fatal to the appeal, as naming "The Estate of Christina Wittich" provided sufficient notice to the co-administrators of the Wittich Estate, conferred jurisdiction over the co-administrators, and identified the proper party to the appeal. View "Flick v. Estate of Wittich" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were a group of county employees who were members of the County Employee Retirement System, which was administered by the Kentucky Retirement Systems (KRS). Plaintiffs sued KRS and the Commonwealth, alleging that Ky. Rev. Stat. 637(1), which states that a retiree who is reemployed by the state or county shall have his retirement payments suspended for the duration of reemployment, was unconstitutional and asking for a declaration of their rights under the statute. The Commonwealth moved for dismissal on the basis of sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the Commonwealth's motion, holding that sovereign immunity does not bar a declaratory judgment action because such an action does not result in a loss of public funds or property. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the state cannot be dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity in a declaratory immunity action; and (2) nevertheless, separately naming the Commonwealth was not necessary because the interests of the state were adequately represented by KRS. View "Commonwealth v. Ky. Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

Employee filed a claim for workers' compensation, alleging that he sustained injuries while working for Restaurant. Employee gained employment with Restaurant through a staff leasing company (Company). Employee agreed to a settlement of his claim. Later, Employee moved to re-open the workers' compensation award and to join the Uninsured Employers' Fund (UEF) as a party, asserting that Restaurant and Company were no longer available to pay for his continuing medical expenses. The ALJ subsequently joined the UEF. The ALJ found Employee's condition to have worsened so he was totally disabled and that the UEF was responsible for all benefits for which Employee was entitled. The Workers' Compensation Board vacated the portion of the ALJ's opinion regarding the amount of benefits Employee would receive and otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employee's claim was properly reopened and the UEF joined as a party; (2) Employee presented sufficient evidence to show that his condition had worsened since the entry of his original workers' compensation award; and (3) although the original settlement agreement only listed Employee's lower back injury as compensable, Employee was not barred from raising a claim for his thoracic spine injury upon reopening. View "Commonwealth v. Allen" on Justia Law

After an administrative hearing by a Fayette County Public Schools tribunal, Appellee, an elementary school teacher of twenty-two years, was found guilty of "conduct unbecoming a teacher" and was suspended without pay from her employment for a period of time. The circuit court reversed. Appellants, the superintendent of the Fayette County Public Schools and the County Board of Education, appealed, arguing that the circuit court exceeded the scope of its authority by substituting its own judgment of the facts for the tribunal's findings. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the charge of "conduct unbecoming a teacher" lodged against Appellee was not sustained by the evidence and was not supported by the tribunal's findings; and (2) remand to the tribunal for further adjudication was not appropriate where the Court accepted in full the facts found by the tribunal. View "Bd. of Educ. of Fayette County v. Hurley-Richards" on Justia Law