Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was indicted for the robbery and murder of Caesaro Gomez. Appellant, who was sixteen years old at the time of the crimes, was tried as a youthful offender and found guilty by a circuit court jury of murder, first-degree robbery, and intimidating a participant in the legal process. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to strike for cause; (2) Appellant's argument regarding the validity of Ky. R. Crim. P. 9.40 was unpreserved for appellate review; and (3) the trial court did not err in sentencing Appellant. View "Grider v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced as a second-degree persistent felon to a twenty-year term of imprisonment for first-degree possession of a controlled substance, firearm enhanced and to a concurrent ten-year term of imprisonment for possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. Defendant appealed, contending that a parole officer's incomplete and inaccurate testimony regarding sentence credits potentially available to parolees rendered the penalty phase of his trial fundamentally unfair. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence, holding that to the extent, if any, that the parole officer's lack of detail about credits against a parolee's sentence could be deemed erroneous, the error was not palpable, and therefore, Defendant was fairly sentenced. View "Cox v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder, first-degree wanton endangerment, first-degree criminal mischief, and driving under the influence. Appellant was sentenced to thirty-five years imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the trial court (1) abused its discretion in permitting the Commonwealth to introduce Appellant's entire statement refusing a breathalyzer test, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) did not err by permitting the introduction of an accident scene video; (3) did not err in admitting a 911 recording taken shortly after the collision leading to Appellant's convictions; and (4) may have potentially erred in failing to exclude Appellant's post-collision use of profanity, but any error was harmless. Lastly, the Commonwealth committed a discovery violation by introducing a prior misdemeanor conviction without disclosing to the defense its intent to do so, but the error was not prejudicial. View "Baumia v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At dispute in this case was passway located in Robertson County. Appellants, several individuals, contended that the passway was a private drive, whereas Appellees, Robertson County and one individual, contended that the passway was a county road. Appellants unsuccessfully petitioned the county fiscal court to abandon, or discontinue, the county road system. Appellants then filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment that the disputed section was not a lawfully adopted county road. The circuit court treated Appellants' action as a de novo action for declaratory judgment, giving no deference to prior findings of the fiscal court action. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Appellants' action could be brought in the circuit court only as an appeal from a decision of the fiscal court refusing to order the abandonment of the county road, not as a declaratory judgment action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellants properly invoked the declaratory judgment process of Ky. Rev. Stat. 413.040 to challenge the legal status of the disputed passway and that the action could not be characterized as an appeal from a fiscal court decision because no appealable event had occurred. View "Whitley v. Robertson County" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a conditional Alford guilty plea to first-degree sexual abuse under Ky. Rev. Stat. 510.110(1)(d) and was sentenced to one year's imprisonment. In accordance with his plea, Appellant admitted he did engage in sexual contact with the complainant but maintained that the act was consensual. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding (1) "lack of consent" was not an element of first-degree sexual abuse under section 510.110(1)(d), and (2) the statute was not vague or overbroad. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) "lack of consent" is an element of first degree sexual abuse under the statute, and it was satisfied by the fact that the complainant was unable to consent; and (2) Appellant lacked standing to make his vagueness and overboard challenges to the statute, and even if he had standing, his arguments would be without merit. View "Stinson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of Class A felony incest and sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. Appellant appealed, alleging, among other claims of error, that the trial court issued erroneous jury instructions that denied him a unanimous verdict, and that retrial of the incest charge would violate his rights guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's conviction, holding (1) Appellant was denied his right to a unanimous verdict due to the instruction given to the jury on Defendant's incest charge; and (2) because the jury's conviction of Appellant did not operate as an implied acquittal for Class A felony incest, Appellant's retrial for Class A felony incest was not proscribed by the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. Remanded. View "Rodriguez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree rape, one count of first-degree criminal trespass, and one count of intimidating a participant in a legal proceeding. Appellant was sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly declined Appellant's motion for separate trials; (2) the trial court properly denied Appellant's directed verdict motion; (3) the trial court properly denied Appellant's Batson motion; (4) the trial court did not violate Appellant's constitutional rights by excluding evidence and limiting cross-examination; (5) the prosecutor's voir dire questions and closing argument did not result in palpable error; and (6) the parole restrictions of the violent offender statute applied to Appellant. View "Newcomb v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was a juvenile who admitted giving hydrocodone to another student. Defendant's confession was made directly in answer to questions from the school assistant principal, who was working with a deputy sheriff (School Resource Officer or SRO), also present. The SRO did not read Defendant his Miranda rights before the questioning. Defendant was subsequently charged with possessing and dispensing a controlled substance, a felony, in a juvenile petition. After unsuccessfully filing a motion to suppress, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge. Defendant subsequently appealed the denial of his motion. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a student is entitled to the benefit of the Miranda warnings before being questioned by a school official in conjunction with a law enforcement officer, the SRO, when he is subject to criminal charges. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statements Defendant made before law enforcement when he was questioned by the assistant principal must be suppressed because he was in custody and was not given the Miranda warnings. View "N.C. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree manslaughter, first-degree tampering with physical evidence, third-degree alcohol intoxication, and third-degree criminal trespass and was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions and corresponding sentence, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) failing to suppress statements obtained during an initial interrogation of Appellant at police headquarters; (2) failing to suppress subsequent incriminating statements made by Appellant during his hospitalization; (3) denying Appellant's motion to suppress evidence of hair comparisons and taking judicial notice that hair comparison evidence is scientifically reliable; and (4) summarily imposing a consecutive six-month sentence for criminal contempt of court. View "Meskimen v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Employee sustained injuries in the course of his employment with Four Star Transportation. Despite being hired by Four Star, Employee was initially considered an employee of Better Integrated Services. Better Integrated leased Employee to Beacon Enterprises, which then leased Employee to Four Star. Beacon had an insurance policy with Kentucky Employers' Mutual Insurance (KEMI). An ALJ determined (1) Employee's injury entitled him to benefits and a permanent partial disability award, and (2) KEMI's policy covered Employee's injury. The Workers' Compensation Board reversed, finding Employee was not covered under the KEMI policy due to the fact he was unaware that Four Star was leasing him from different entities, including Beacon. The court of appeals affirmed. The Uninsured Employers' Fund appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employee could not be considered Beacon's employee because he did not enter into a contract for hire with Beacon; (2) the Board did not act arbitrarily in finding that the ALJ's opinion was not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the Board and lower court's decision was not based on Better Integrated and Beacon's failure to comply with Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.615. View "Ky. Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Hoskins" on Justia Law