Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree, burglary in the third degree, and of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. Defendant was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in not instructing the jury on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of second-degree burglary, as Defendant did not request a lesser included offense of criminal trespass; and (2) Defendant's argument that the trial court improperly imposed court costs in its oral ruling at sentencing failed because the written order did not impose court costs. View "Brock v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This case arose after the settlement of Guard v. American Home Products, Inc., which was brought by Kentucky residents who had taken the diet drug known as Fen-Phen. Each Appellant was a plaintiff in the Guard case and was represented under a contingent fee contract by Appellees, a team of four attorneys. Appellants filed a complaint alleging that Appellees breached their fiduciary duties by wrongfully retaining or improperly disbursing a portion of the Guard case settlement money that should have gone to Appellants. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Appellants, finding three of the attorneys breached their fiduciary duty. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case against the three attorneys for further proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' opinion regarding the issue of the three attorneys' breach of fiduciary duty and reinstated the partial summary judgment entered against them, holding, primarily, (1) the facts established a breach of fiduciary duty that entitled Appellants to summary judgment on the three attorneys' liability as a matter of law; and (2) the court of appeals did not err by declining to review the trial court's denial of summary judgment against the fourth attorney, as the order was not appealable. View "Abbott v. Chelsea " on Justia Law

Employee was discharged from his employment for unexcused absences, chronic tardiness, and leaving work without providing a reason. Employee filed for unemployment benefits. The Division of Unemployment Insurance granted benefits, determining that Employee had not been discharged for misconduct. The Unemployment Appeals referee disagreed and set aside the decision. The Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission reversed. Employer appealed by filing a complaint against the Defendant and Employee. Because Employee never responded, the circuit court entered a default judgment against Employee and simultaneously entered an order affirming the decision of the Commission. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Employee was not required to answer Employer's complaint, default judgment was not proper under these circumstances; (2) the evidence established that Employee knowingly violated Employer's attendance policy, and thus, Employee should have been disqualified from benefits on this basis. Remanded. View "W. Ky. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Runyon" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia (PDP), second offense, pursuant to a plea agreement and received a five-year pretrial diversion. At the time Appellant entered into the diversion, the penalty for second offense PDP, a felony, was one to five years in prison. The statute was amended in April 2010, however, making the penalty for a second or subsequent offense of PDP, now a misdemeanor, ninety days to twelve months in jail. Appellant subsequently pled guilty to DUI. At her sentencing hearing, Appellant requested that the trial court continue her diversion, given that second offense PDP was now a misdemeanor, or apply the new sentence for second offense POP. The trial court voided the diversion agreement and sentenced Appellant to felony time in accordance with the prior law. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, (1) when Appellant violated the terms of her diversion agreement, the court was vested with the authority to void the contract in its entirety; but (2) because there was no final judgment entered when Appellant violated the terms of her diversion, any law that had gone into effect that would mitigate Appellant's sentence should have been applied. View "Smith v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to twenty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the post-trial revelation that the victim's wife and one of the jurors were Facebook friends did not establish grounds for a new trial, as the juror did not manifestly give a false answer regarding her Facebook relationship with the victim's wife, and merely being friends on Facebook does not, per se, establish a close relationship from which partiality on the part of a juror may reasonably be presumed; (2) Appellant's argument that the jury improperly considered penalty phase issues during the guilt phase deliberations was without merit; and (3) the trial court's exclusion of certain evidence did not afford Appellant grounds upon which his conviction should be reversed. View "McGaha v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee sought to void or reform a deed resulting from a sale of property through Appellant's real estate company. Specifically, Appellee claimed that the deed grossly misrepresented the amount of land he contracted to buy. The deed's description called for 300 acres but showed the property was being sold by tract, not acreage. Appellee learned through other sources that the property did not consist of 300 acres. After closing, a survey showed the tract contained forty-four acres. The trial court ruled in favor of Appellants, concluding that, because Appellee was aware at the time of closing that the tract did not contain 300 acres of land, no fraud existed that warranted reforming the deed. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because Appellee was aware there was a deficiency in acreage, Appellee was on notice regarding the deficiency in the property, and the common law doctrine of caveat emptor applied. View "Manning v. Lewis" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of theft of identity, theft by deception under $500, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Defendant appealed, contending that after he was taken into custody, he was not properly advised of his Miranda rights, and therefore, the trial court erred in admitting the statement he made to police. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) statements made in response to assurances of confidentiality are made in violation of Miranda and must be suppressed; (2) in this case, the officer's agreement that Appellant's statement would be confidential vitiated the previously given Miranda warnings; and (3) therefore, the trial court erred in failing to suppress the statements. Remanded. View "Leger v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, second-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). Defendant appealed, contending, among other things, that the trial court erroneously admitted prior bad acts evidence and hearsay evidence. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony of an anonymous tip that Defendant was trafficking pills because the anonymous tip evidence was inadmissible hearsay; and (2) given the extent to which the prosecutor focused on the anonymous tip in his closing argument, the erroneously admitted anonymous-tip evidence was not harmless. View "Kerr v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee brought his vehicle to Appellant's shop for repairs. When Appellant presented Appellee with his bill, Appellee refused to pay until Appellant proved he purchased the parts he claimed to have installed. Appellant retained Appellee's vehicle while he attempted to resolve the dispute. Appellee subsequently filed a criminal complaint against Appellant, and Appellant was arrested for failure to make required disposition of property. Appellee regained possession of his vehicle, and the charges against Appellant were dismissed. Appellant then filed a mechanic's lien and brought suit against Appellee to enforce the lien. The complaint also claimed damages for, inter alia, malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The trial court directed a verdict in Appellee's favor on most of Appellant's claims but concluded that Appellant asserted a valid mechanic's lien and awarded Appellant $8,000. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's orders directing verdicts on the abuse of process and malicious prosecution claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred in directing a verdict of dismissal on the malicious prosecution claim based on the advice of counsel defense; and (2) Appellant submitted sufficient evidence to survive a motion for a directed verdict on the abuse of process claim. View "Garcia v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to murder, resisting arrest, and tampering with physical evidence and was sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment. At trial, Appellant moved to suppress his confession to law enforcement officers, arguing that his Miranda waiver was involuntary, his right to counsel was invoked but denied, and his confession was coerced. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and sentence of the circuit, holding that under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant's confession was involuntary under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the product of coercive police activity. View "Dye v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law