Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed a decision in which the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the Appellant's work-related injury was only partially disabling. The appellate court denied Appellant's motion for an enlargement of time in which to file a petition for review. The court rejected Appellant's argument that CR 76.25 permits time for filing a petition for review to be enlarged before it expires. On review of the record, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter back to the appellate court, holding that CR 76.25 "serves two functions. It is both the document for invoking the court's jurisdiction to consider an appeal, and the document for stating the petitioner's grounds for seeking appellate relief."

Carol Forte taught elementary school in the Nelson County Public School System. She was killed as she was leaving the school grounds when an unsecured pole gate blown by the wind hit her car and struck her in the head. Her husband Gene first filed a tort claim in the Nelson Circuit Court against the County Board of Education. Being aware of the Board's defense of governmental immunity, Forte filed a "protective" claim with the Board of Claims, raising the same issues in his tort action in the circuit court, asking the Board of Claims to hold its action in abeyance until the circuit court decided on the immunity issue. The Board of Education responded to the claims by arguing that the Board of Claims had sole jurisdiction in the matter, and that the action was time barred and should be dismissed. Forte then filed a new action in the circuit court for review of the Board of Claims order, asking that that order be set aside. Before a response was filed, Forte filed a supplemental memorandum specifically raising the state "saving statute." The Board of Education responded with the same arguments it made before the Board of Claims. The circuit court entered an opinion vacating the Board of Claims order, and remanding the matter back the Board of Claims for a decision on the abeyance. The Board of Education appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. After the appeal was filed, the circuit court granted the Board of Education's motion for summary judgment on the grounds it had governmental immunity. On review of the record of the lower courts, the Supreme Court found that the Board of Claims did not have jurisdiction over the claim brought before it, and Forte's claim made there was premature. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision on that matter and remanded the case to the circuit court. The Court affirmed the appellate court's affirmation of the motion for summary judgment acknowledging its governmental immunity.

Paul and Pat Nash own twenty-eight acres in Campbell County. Clifford and Toby Torline own thirty-five acres. Both Nash and Torline wished to divide their parcels into tracts of five or more acres each for agricultural uses. Nash and Torline see the five-acre plots as mini-farms, but the County views the plots as residential subdivisions with large lots. The County Clerk petitions the court for guidance as to whether or not he should accept the deeds of the five-acre divisions for recording. The County maintains that two of its ordinances prohibit any division until the property owners prove to the Planning Commission that the divisions were for agricultural purposes. Nash and Torline take exception to having the burden placed on them, and argue that the County must prove the divisions were not exempt from subdivision regulations. The trial court agreed with Nash and Torline, and held that the County's ordinances violated the agricultural supremacy clause and were therefore unconstitutional. The appellate court reversed the lower court and ordered summary judgment on behalf of the County. The Supreme Court accepted discretionary review, affirmed in part the lower court's decision, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of the County. The Court found that the five-acre plots were subdivisions that required planning commission approval before recording.

Appellant GMAC Mortgage Corporation, through its attorneys Appellants Morgan & Potter, Attorneys, P.S.C. filed a disciplinary complaint against Appellee Noel Botts. Botts had represented GMAC's successor-in-interest in a foreclosure action. The trial commissioner conducted an evidentiary hearing and ultimately determined that the Kentucky Bar Association failed to prove by a preponderance, that Botts committed any of the acts or omissions charged. The Board of Governors accepted the trial commissioner's determination, and charges against Botts were ultimately dismissed. Subsequently Botts filed suit against GMAC and Morgan & Pottinger in circuit court, requesting relief from pecuniary and professional harm he allegedly suffered as a result of the disciplinary complaint. In his suit, Botts alleged wrongful use of civil proceedings, defamation and slander, abuse of process, fraud and outrageous conduct. Appellants filed numerous motions to dismiss based on claims of immunity, all of which were denied. Because Appellants claimed immunity as the basis for their motions, the order is appealable. Because the claim raises an issue of statewide importance, the Supreme Court granted Morgan & Pottinger's motion to transfer. State law holds that any statement made in the institution of, or during the course of an attorney disciplinary proceeding, is privileged so long as it is material, pertinent and relevant to that proceeding. Even if it patently fails or is entered with malice, the Kentucky "judicial statements" privilege is absolute and would still apply. The Court noted that Botts' allegations of wrongful use of civil proceedings, abuse of process, fraud and outrageous conduct are not based singly on Appellants' statements contained in the Bar Association complaint, but also on the act of filing the complaint. Whether the "judicial statements" privilege encompasses the act of filing the complaint is a matter of first impression. The Court decided that any communication or statement made to the Bar Association during the course of a disciplinary hearing or investigation, including the contents of the complaint initiating such proceedings, are absolutely privileged and extend to the act of filing the complaint. The Court remanded the case back to the circuit court for additional fact finding to address the basis of Botts' claims for fraud, defamation and slander.

The decree dissolving the Howards' marriage provided for the joint custody of their minor child, with the Wife serving as primary residential custodian. The decree stated that the Husband was voluntarily unemployed. The trial court divided the parties' marital property and determined which marital debts each party had to pay. Fifteen months after the decree, the Husband filed a motion with the trial court seeking a reduction in his child support obligation because of a change in his material circumstances retroactive to the date of his motion. At the hearing of this motion, the Wife brought her own motions, seeking to have her ex-Husband held in contempt of court for failure to pay some of the marital debts he agreed to in the divorce decree. The court found the Husband in contempt for failing to pay the agreed-to marital debts, and denied his motion to reduce his child support. The Husband appealed all of the trial court's rulings, and the appellate court affirmed them. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision on all issues.

While incarcerated in different penal systems, Appellants Joe Jones and Michael Hallum each filed RCr 11.42 motions for post-conviction relief. Following denial of these motions by the trial court, each Appellant filed a notice of appeal along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The appellate court dismissed both appeals due to each Appellant's respective failure to file the motion within the mandatory 30-day time period. Appellant Joe Jones placed his notice and motion in the prison mail system three days prior to the deadline; the motion was not filed nor the notice marked tendered until a day after the deadline. Appellant Michael Hallum placed his notice and motion in the prison mail system three days prior to the deadline; the motion was filed and notice marked tendered eight days after the deadline. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review, consolidated Appellants' cases and reversed the appellate courts' decisions. State law codifies a "prison mailbox rule" in RCr 12.04(5): if an inmate files a notice of appeal in a criminal case, the notice shall be considered filed if its envelope is officially marked as having been deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. RCr 12.04(5) was not in effect at the time Jones or Hallum delivered their motions to prison officials. The Supreme Court in its reversal of the appellate courts' decisions retroactively applied the prison mailbox rule, and remanded the cases to the trial courts for further proceedings.

Appellant Douglas Hall appeals his conviction of second-degree manslaughter, first-degree assault, first-degree burglary, first-degree robbery and a sentence of forty-five years' imprisonment. Contending that various errors occurred from the indictment stage through the penalty phase of trial, Appellant argues that his convictions should be reversed and his case remanded for a new trial. On review of the record, the Supreme Court reversed Appellant's first-degree assault conviction due to the lower court's erroneous refusal to instruct the jury on facilitation of assault, but held that Appellant is not entitled to any further relief for other alleged errors as he "received a fundamentally fair trial with any [other] errors being so minor that even their cumulative effect does not demand reversal."

Appellant-Defendant Ronald Birdsong received a twelve-year sentence following a jury conviction for robbery, second-degree and first-degree persistent felony offender. At trial, Appellant did not assert an innocence defense; rather, he argued that he did not use force or threaten the use of force during the crime to any person as required by law. Appellant moved for a directed verdict; the trial court denied it. On appeal, Appellant argued that he injured no one, and his physical aggression toward inanimate objects were not a "threat to use physical force against another person." On review, the Supreme Court granted discretionary review to decide whether aggression against objects is sufficient force to constitute second degree robbery. Finding it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to find Appellant threatened the use of force against others, the Court upheld Appellant's convictions.