Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant appealed his conviction of intentional murder and sentence of thirty-two years' imprisonment after he shot the murder victim at point-blank range in the back of her head. Appellant raised four issues on review. The court held that the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal where, under the evidence presented, it was not clearly unreasonable for a jury to find appellant guilty and that the Commonwealth introduced more than a mere scintilla of evidence that the shooting was intentional. The court also held that the trial court did not violate appellant's right to a randomly selected jury when it dismissed a qualified juror for cause because appellant waived his jury selection argument under RCr 9.34. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted testimony regarding appellant's harsh language and accusations of theft as it was offered as evidence of motive or absence of mistake or accident. The court finally held that the trial court did not err when it excluded certain testimony relating to appellant's demeanor following the shooting.

Appellant appealed convictions of complicity to manufacture methamphetamine, first-degree possession of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and first-degree persistent felony offender. At issue was whether the trial court erred by refusing to suppress all evidence discovered via a warrantless hotel room search and by failing to enter a directed verdict. The court affirmed the conviction and held that appellant did not have a reasonable privacy expectation in the hotel room where the search was conducted after the checkout time elapsed. The court also held that the trial court did not err by failing to enter a directed verdict because appellant was convicted of two previous felonies and the "concurrent sentence break" did not apply to appellant.

An administrative law judge ("ALJ") found that claimant's work for defendant's temporary employment agency was sporadic but failed to specify whether KRS 342.140(1)(d) or (1)(e) was used to calculate her average weekly wage. The Workers' Compensation Board reversed and remanded the claim and this appeal was taken from the decision by the court of appeals to affirm. The employer argued that which subsection of KRS 342.140(1) applied was a factual determination to be made by the ALJ; that the ALJ committed harmless error by failing to specify the subsection of KRS 342.140(1) used in the average weekly wage calculation; and that additional proof should not be permitted on remand. Claimant defended the court of appeals' decision but also argued in a cross-appeal that the record compelled a finding under KRS 342.140(1)(e) that her average weekly wage was $320.00. The court held that the ALJ did not commit harmless error by failing to specify the subsection relied upon and that the ALJ must analyze the evidence under KRS 342.140(1)(e) on remand. The court reversed with respect to the decision to reopen for additional proof because claimant argued from the outset that KRS 342.140(1)(e) controlled the calculation. The court also held that the record contained adequate evidence to apply the statute under the present circumstances and did not compel the finding that either party sought.

Appellant appealed from his convictions of first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse for which he received a total sentence of life imprisonment. Appellant raised numerous assignments of error, most of which were not preserved by trial counsel, for which appellant requested palpable error review under RCr 10.26. The court held that the admission of an egregious amount of inadmissible hearsay required appellant's convictions to be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Appellant appealed from an order denying its petition for a writ of prohibition where appellant sought to prohibit appellee, a Jefferson Circuit Court judge, from referring its default judgment motion to the circuit court Master Commissioner for certain factual determinations. At issue was whether appellants were entitled to a writ where appellants alleged that the Jefferson Circuit Court's routine practice of referring default judgments to the commissioner did not comport with the role of commissioners as contemplated by the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure and that the Jefferson Circuit Court's alleged practice was unique among Kentucky's circuit courts and was at odds with the equal protection guarantees of both the Kentucky and United States Constitutions. The court held that appellant was not entitled to a writ prohibiting the reference to the commissioner because appellant could obtain ordinary appellate review of its objection.

Claimant alleged a work-related cumulative trauma injury to his neck and was initially awarded workers' compensation benefits on March 28, 2002. Claimant moved to reopen the award after undergoing surgery and the administrative law judge ("ALJ") rendered another award to claimant on July 19, 2004. On March 3, 2009, claimant filed a motion to reopen. At issue was whether the ALJ properly denied as untimely the claimant's motion to reopen in order to correct a mistake of law in his workers' compensation award and denied as unauthorized his motion to reopen under CR 60.01 and CR 60.02 for the correction of a clerical error in the award. The court concluded that, although KRS 342.125(1)(c) permitted an award to be reopened based on a mistake in applying the law as it existed at the time of the award, KRS 342.125(3) limited the period for such a reopening to four years after the original award or order granting or denying benefits. The court also concluded that the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure applied to proceedings before an administrative agency only to the extent provided by regulation and neither Chapter 342 or 803 KAR 25:010 adopted Cr 60.01 or CR 60.02 with respect to workers' compensation proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Appellant was convicted of multiple sex crimes against his daughter which occurred over the course of fifteen years. Appellant raised numerous issues on appeal. The court held that appellant's conviction on Count 6 was reversed where the Commonwealth conceded that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the rape described due to the absence of testimony that sexual intercourse had begun by that point. The court also held that all other convictions were affirmed and the case was remanded for modification and re-entry of judgment.

Appellant Troy Tunstull appeals his conviction on four counts of second-degree robbery and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender, for which he was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. Appellant was tried on five counts of first-degree robbery in connection with five bank robberies in the Louisville area between April and October, 2006. The trial court granted Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on one of the five counts, and rejected his request for jury instructions to support lesser charges. The jury was ultimately instructed on lesser charges for several of the robberies, and convicted Appellant of second-degree robbery on four counts, and acquitting him of the fifth. On appeal, Appellant alleges a number of trial errors. Finding no reversible errors, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision. View "Tunstull v. Kentucky" on Justia Law

In the underlying cases, the respective property owners failed to satisfy their debt obligations to professional lending institutions, which precipitated foreclosure proceedings. The Commonwealth intervened, seeking to block the foreclosures pending resolution of the tax liens. In both cases, the lenders brought suit to assert that their respective mortgages were superior to the general tax liens filed pursuant to the state recording statutes. Kentucky is a "race-notice" state in that a mortgage, deed or deed of trust takes effect at the time it is recorded. In both cases, the tax liens superseded the lenders' liens; but the lenders argued that state law provided super priority for ad valorem taxes, not general tax liens, therefore their purchase money mortgages superseded the Commonwealth's liens. Disagreeing with the lenders' characterization of the tax liens, the Supreme Court held that the tax liens took priority over the lenders' liens, and should be afforded no special priority.

Appellant Prince Wilbert Woolfolk was convicted of first-degree rape. On the jury's recommendation, he was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. In 1984, the victim was seventeen years old and an active member in her church's choir. On the date of the crime, the victim learned from her mother that Appellant, the pastor of the church, had called to say he would pick her up from school and take her to church, presumably for a choir activity. According to the victim, Appellant took her to his office and raped her. Twenty-three years later, the victim attempted suicide. Believing that the rape may have played a part in the attempt, the victim's mother contacted police about the 1984 incident. On investigation, Appellant admitted to police that a sexual encounter with the victim occurred. In 2008, Appellant was indicted for first-degree rape. During a lunch break at trial, Appellant's defense counsel conferred to discuss how to best cross-examine the victim about her claim; to counsel's surprise, and contrary to all prior statements Appellant had made on the subject, Appellant told his counsel he raped the victim. Counsel became concerned on his ethical duty to the court should Appellant take the stand and deny the rape. Counsel contacted the Kentucky Bar Association and requested an ex parte in camera conference with the court. Counsel moved the court to order a competence examination of Appellant, and to delay proceedings pending such an examination. The court denied both requests. On appeal, Appellant claims: that the trial court erred by discouraging Appellant from exercising his constitutional right to testify; that the trial court erred by failing to order a competency evaluation; and that there was a violation of his right to a speedy trial because of the twenty-four year lapse of time between the crime and the bringing of the indictment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order a competency hearing; and though constitutional error occurred in the trial court's effort to discourage Appellant from testifying falsely, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court affirmed the lower court's conviction and sentence.