Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Sarah Dudley filed suit against real parties in interest Erdagon Atasoy, M.D., and Kleinert Kutz and Associates for alleged negligent diagnosis, care, and treatment related to Dudley's adverse reaction to an injection in her shoulder. In a discovery request, the real parties in interest sought appellant's medical records, including her psychiatric records. Appellant filed a motion for a protective order to prevent her psychiatric records from being subject to discovery. Judge Olu Stevens denied appellant's motion, finding that her physical and mental condition was at the heart of her claims. Appellant then filed for a writ of prohibition against Judge Stevens to prevent the discovery of her psychiatric records. The court of appeals denied appellant's petition. Appellant appealed, arguing that her records were subject to the psychotherapist-patient privilege under Ky. R. Evid. 507(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that appellant waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege because she asserted her mental condition as part of her claim and that Judge Stevens did not err by denying appellant's motion for a protective order. View "Dudley v. Jefferson Circuit Court (Stevens)" on Justia Law

Appellant Adam Barker was found guilty in the circuit court of manslaughter in the second degree. Barker appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in giving a provocation qualifier of the self-defense instruction because there was insufficient evidence to support the instruction. The Supreme Court failed to reach the merits of Barker's argument because the Court found the language of the provocation instruction constituted palpable error in this case. According to Ky. Rev. Stat. 503.060(2), a person forfeits his right to the defense of self-protection when the defendant has the intention of causing death or serious physical injury to the victim and the defendant actually provokes the victim to use physical force. Because the instruction given in this case required the victim, Zachary Scarpellini, or the victim's friend, Shawn Reilly, to have had the intent to cause death or serious injury to Barker, the instruction was fatally flawed as it failed to properly set out the elements of the statute. The Court held that because there was a substantial possibility there would have been a different verdict with a proper instruction, a manifest injustice occurred. The Court reversed Barker's conviction for manslaughter and remanded the case. View "Barker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant, a mother of an infant child, appealed a decision denying her petition for a writ of prohibition where she sought the writ to bar appellee from proceeding with the adjudication of an action filed in family court by real party in interest, C.H.E., to determine the paternity of the child. At issue was whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a claim brought under KRS Chapter 406 to establish the paternity of a child born to a married woman and conceived while she maintained sexual relations with her husband. The court held that the allegations of C.H.E.'s pleadings were supported as a preliminary matter by evidence that satisfied the jurisdictional threshold of KRS Chapter 406 and vested him with standing as a putative father under KRS 406.021 with the right to plead and an opportunity to prove that he was the father of the child. The court also held that the trial court was acting within its subject matter jurisdiction and properly denied appellant's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of appellant's petition for a writ of prohibition.

Appellant appealed a denial of his petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to CR 60.02 when he was convicted of killing and robbing two victims. At issue was whether a special judge was unconstitutionally appointed to preside over his case and alternatively, appellant was not given proper notice of the appointment. Also at issue was whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel and in denying his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel of RCr 11.42 counsel. Further at issue was whether there were reasons of an extraordinary nature to justify post-conviction relief under CR 60.02. The court held that the chief justice properly delegated his appointive authority as it related to the Senior Status Judge Program to a chief senior status judge and the chief senior status judge properly exercised his authority in appointing the senior status judge. Because the court fully considered the constitutional issue raised by appellant and he obtained the relief he requested under his lack of notice argument, the court did not reverse the judgment merely upon lack of notice. The court also held that the trial court properly denied appellant's claim based upon the ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel where appellant was barred from prosecuting his claim under CR 60.02. The court also declined to revisit the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel of RCr 11.42 counsel in light of Hollon v. Commonwealth. The court further held that, upon the merits, appellant was not entitled to CR 60.02 relief on the remaining grounds of his motion where the CR 60.02 motion was an impermissible successive RCr 11.42 motion.

Appellant appealed his maximum sentence of twenty years imprisonment for the crimes of second-degree robbery and tampering with physical evidence as a second-degree persistent felony offender. At issue was whether the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of prior parole violations during the sentencing phase. The court affirmed the judgment and held that trial court properly admitted the parole violations under KRE 404(b) where they were offered for the purpose of truth-in sentencing. The court also held that appellant had inherent knowledge, constructive notice, that his prior acts could be used against him and therefore, no further specific notice was required.

Appellee was convicted of a first offense violation of Kentucky's Sex Offender Registration Act ("SORA"), KRS 17.510(11), and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. At issue was whether appellee was required to register for his 1993 conviction of sodomy in the third-degree under the 1994 SORA or any amendments thereto. The court held that appellee was never required to register under any version of SORA and, therefore, could not be guilty of the crime of failing to register. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and sentence and ordered the release of appellee.

Appellants appealed the court of appeals' denial of a writ of mandamus or prohibition requiring media access to a juror contempt hearing where the suit arose from a hearing held by the circuit judge, appellee, to address a juror's alleged disobedience of that court's admonition to avoid publicity about the case. At issue was whether the court of appeals properly denied the writ for mootness and properly denied a writ of mandamus or prohibition on grounds of mootness. The court reversed the denial of the writ and held that the suit was moot but an exception to the mootness doctrine allowed appellants to pursue a writ when the suit was capable of repetition but evaded review. The court also held that appellants were entitled to a writ stating that criminal contempt hearings were to be afforded public access where the public's interest in a criminal contempt proceeding was essentially the same as its interest in any criminal trial. The court also noted that public access was not required, however, for the court's jury management functions, which were to be kept separate from contempt proceedings.

Appellant appealed his conviction of wanton murder when he killed his girlfriend's three-month old son. At issue was whether the trial court erred by rejecting appellant's request for an instruction on the offense of first-degree manslaughter under KRS 507.030 where appellant maintained that the proof at trial permitted a rational juror to believe not that he acted wantonly, but that he intended to injure the child and while doing so, unintentionally killed him. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the circuit court did not err by rejecting appellant's instruction where evidence of appellant's unrestrained attack upon the infant did not support a distinction between an intent to injure the child and a wanton disregard of the child's life.

The court of appeals affirmed the decision in which the Workers' Compensation Board ("Board") held that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred by denying future medical benefits for claimant's work-related injury but that the evidence did not compel an award of permanent income benefits. At issue was whether substantial evidence supported an award of future medical benefits and whether the evidence compelled the ALJ to find that claimant's injury produced a permanent impairment rating and entitled him to permanent income benefits. The court held that KRS 342.020(1) entitled claimant to be awarded future medical benefits where evidence that he required no medical treatment as of the date he reached maximum medical improvement or the date that his claim was heard was an improper basis to deny future medical benefits. The court also held that the evidence the injury warranted a permanent impairment rating was not so overwhelming as to render the decision that was made unreasonable.

The parties were divorced in September 2005 by the circuit court which incorporated into the judgment a settlement agreement awarding maintenance to appellee. Appellant's motion to modify the maintenance award in July 2008 was denied by the trial court and appellate court pursuant to Dame v. Dame. At issue was whether the twenty-year-old Dame case should be overruled where the Dame court stated that it had no jurisdiction to modify an agreement fixing a set amount of maintenance to be paid either in a lump sum or in a specific amount over a definite period of time. The court overruled Dame and held that a maintenance award in a fixed amount to be paid over a definite period of time was subject to modification under KRS 403.250(1). Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of appellant's motion to modify the maintenance award and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.