Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Follow a jury trial, Ronnie Anderson was convicted of assault in the first degree and found to be a persistent felony offender in the second degree. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed Anderson's conviction on the charge of assault in the first degree, holding that there was insufficient evidence of a serious physical injury, a necessary element of the crime, and therefore, the trial court violated Anderson's right to due process. The Court also held that the trial court correctly denied Anderson's motion to suppress statements he made on his cell phone prior to interrogation because they were voluntary, were not elicited by police, and were admitted in accord with the dictates of Miranda. Remanded. View "Anderson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Miguel Rivera, a fifteen-year-old unauthorized alien, sought workers' compensation benefits from Abel Verdon Construction for injuries sustained when he fell through a hole in the second floor of a home that Verdon was constructing. The ALJ found Rivera to be Verdon's employee and awarded Rivera partial disability benefits. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed Rivera's partial disability award. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting Verdon's argument that the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) preempts the application of Ky. Rev. Stat. 342, which provides workers' compensation coverage to employees without regard to the legality of the employment relationship, to this claim based on the claimant's status as an unauthorized alien. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an employment relationship existed between Rivera and Verdon and that the IRCA does not preempt a workers' compensation law that covers unauthorized aliens. View "Abel Verdon Constr. & Acuity Ins. v. Rivera " on Justia Law

Appellee Brooke Nelson brought suit against elementary public school teacher Dianne Turner after allegations that Nelson's five-year-old daughter had been sexually assaulted by another student. The complaint alleged, among other causes of action, that Turner failed to report to enforcement officials the alleged sexual assault. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Turner, concluding that Turner was entitled to qualified official immunity because her action, i.e., determining whether the facts constituted abuse, was discretionary in nature. The court of appeals reversed and remanded with directions to reconsider the mandatory abuse reporting obligation of Kan. Rev. Stat. 620.030. On remand, the trial court again found qualified official immunity applicable. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the reporting requirement of the statute was mandatory and therefore ministerial, obviating any application for qualified official immunity. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the trial court properly granted Turner's motion for summary judgment because Turner's actions were discretionary in nature rather than ministerial and, therefore, she was entitled to the defense of qualified official immunity under law. View "Turner v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Claimant Anthony Traugott, a Kentucky resident, filed an application for benefits alleging that he injured his left arm in Missouri while working for defendant-employer under a contract of hire. The employer was headquartered in Rhode Island and had no office in Kentucky. The employer denied the claim on the grounds that Kentucky lacked extraterritorial jurisdiction over the matter under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.670. The ALJ dismissed the claim based on findings that the claimant's employment was not principally localized in Kentucky and that the contract for hire was not made in Kentucky. The claimant appealed, and the Workers' Compensation Board affirmed, noting that the claimant failed to petition for reconsideration and that the record contained substantial evidence to support the ALJ's legal decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal, the claimant maintained that the court erred by failing to find that contract for hire was made in Kentucky. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding the record contained no evidence to support claimant's argument. View "Traugott v. Va. Transp." on Justia Law

Appellant Jason Lee Mullikan was convicted of several crimes, including wanton endangerment for chasing two men with a Samurai sword. Mullikan raised nine grounds on appeal, and the Supreme Court only found one had merit, the issue of whether testimony in the penalty phase describing facts and circumstances underlying Mullikan's prior convictions was unduly prejudicial and merited a new penalty phase. After acknowledging that it had previously failed to provide a discernable and workable rule of law to follow when introducing evidence of prior crimes at the sentencing stage, the Supreme Court held that the evidence of prior convictions allowable under Kan. Rev. Stat. 532.055(a) is limited to conveying to the jury the elements of the crimes previously committed. Therefore, the Court held that the evidence in this case at the penalty phase was unduly prejudicial because it was not only inadmissible hearsay, but went beyond the statutory language of Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.055(2)(a). The Court affirmed the convictions but remanded for a sentencing trial consistent with this opinion. View "Mullikan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Brian Moore was convicted of the 1979 robbery, kidnapping, and murder of Virgil Harris and sentenced to death. Appellant pursued post-conviction DNA testing under Kan. Rev. Stat 422.285 in the circuit court. The circuit court denied Appellant's motion for release of evidence for independent testing, finding that it did not have the authority to grant DNA testing that exceeds the limitations of the statute. On appeal, Appellant sought additional DNA testing beyond that ordered below, or, in the alternative, to vacate his conviction and sentence for several reasons, including the post-trial loss of evidence that was to be tested for DNA. The Supreme Court concluded that (1) Appellant did not demonstrate that his conviction and sentence should be vacated, but (2) the circuit court erred in reading its power to order certain DNA testing to be limited by statute. The Court also found that Commonwealth's cross-appeal on several issues to be without merit. For those reasons, the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Moore v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant William Meece appealed from a judgment of the circuit court sentencing him to consecutive twenty-year terms of confinement on two convictions of robbery and burglary and to death for each of three convictions for murder. Meece sought review of forty-five listed issues, some of which were either not raised in the lower court or were not preserved for review. However, where the death penalty was imposed, the Supreme Court reviewed allegations for those quasi errors. The Court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the circuit court, holding in part that (1) there was no abuse of discretion regarding the evidence admitted at trial; (2) there was no abuse of discretion regarding excluded evidence; (3) the procedural issues during trial raised by Meece did not involve an abuse of discretion; (4) the trial court's jury instructions were not erroneous and the trial court did not err in connection with the penalty phase instructions; (5) the death penalty is constitutional and appropriate in Meece's case; and (6) Meece received a fair trial and there was no cumulative effect that mandated reversal. View "Meece v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Nathan McDaniel, Jr. was convicted of murder arising from a beating death. During the trial, Appellant moved to strike two jurors for cause. One juror had worked with the victim's wife and the other juror had worked with the victim, and neither juror could say unequivocally that they could be fair and impartial in their deliberations. Appellant's motion was denied. The defense then used one of its peremptory strikes to strike the jurors. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to strike the jurors for cause. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that (1) a trial court abuses its discretion when it seats a juror who is truly equivocal with regard to his or her ability to render an impartial judgment; and (2) given the equivocal responses provided by both jurors in this case, the trial court abused its discretion when it overruled Appellant's motion to strike for cause. View "McDaniel v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this case the Kentucky Supreme Court considered whether to adopt the "economic loss rule," which prevents the commercial purchaser of a product from suing in tort to recover for the economic losses arising from the malfunction of the product itself. The case involved a claim to insurers for a damaged piece of machinery. The insurers sued the manufacturers to recover the amount paid, claiming several causes of action including negligence, strict liability, and negligent misrepresentation. The trial court held the economic loss rule barred the tort claims. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's adoption and application of the rule. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the economic loss rule applies to claims arising from a defective product sold in a commercial transaction, and that the relevant product is the entire item bargained for by the parties and placed in the stream of commerce by the manufacturer; and (2) the economic loss rule applies regardless of whether the product fails over a period of time or destroys itself in a calamitous event, and the rule's application is not limited to negligence and strict liability claims but also encompasses negligent misrepresentation claims. View "Giddings & Lewis, Inc. v. Industrial Risk Insurers" on Justia Law

Roger Elliott, who served as a district court judge for almost twenty-five years and who was a member of the Senior Status Judge Program, was indicted on one count of theft of labor already rendered. Elliott entered an Alford plea to the charge. The circuit court entered an order granting Elliott a pretrial diversion. The judicial conduct commission then issued an order of public reprimand. As a condition of the reprimand, Elliott agreed to resign from the judge program and not seek to re-enter it. As a follow-up to resolve the temporary suspension of his bar license, Elliott and the office of bar counsel agreed to a negotiated sanction. Elliott requested that the Supreme Court enter an order suspending him from the practice of law for two years with one year probated and one year to serve, effective from the date of the order, on conditions that Elliott continue compliance with the terms and provisions of his pretrial diversion contract and that he incur no new disciplinary charges during the probationary period. The Court concluded that the sanctions were appropriate. View "Elliott v. Ky. Bar Assoc." on Justia Law