Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Michael Dunn was convicted of five counts of first-degree sodomy. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not err when it refused to suppress the condom seized from Appellant's property during a search by law enforcement officers, and the court properly admitted the condom into evidence; (2) the trial judge did not err by not granting Appellant's motion for a bill of particulars, and Appellant was not denied proper notice by the offenses listed in the indictment; (3) the trial judge properly denied Appellant's motion asking the court to allow evidence of the victim's previous sexual behavior; (4) the trial judge did not err in finding certain portions of the victim's psychotherapy records were not exculpatory and in declining to provide the documents to the parties; (5) the trial court did not err by not granting Appellant's motion for a change of venue; and (6) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in not excusing two jurors whose family members were victims of sexual abuse. View "Dunn v. Commonwealth " on Justia Law

General Electric (GE) obtained a judgment against Intra-Med for breach of contract. Thomas Schultz was the president and sole shareholder of Intra-Med. After collecting only a portion of the judgment, GE intervened in another lawsuit and filed a third-party complaint against Schultz seeking to pierce the corporate veil and hold him personally liable for the judgment against Intra-Med. The trial court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of GE, allowing GE to pierce Intra-Med based upon the instrumentality theory of veil piercing. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding (1) none of Schultz's affirmative defenses negated the fact that he admittedly used corporate funds and property as his own to GE's detriment, and (2) Schultz's admissions fulfilled the requirements for piercing the corporate veil and supported the trial court's judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly granted GE's motion for judgment on the pleadings, as Schultz's admissions did not conclusively establish harm, fraud, or unjust loss, the three elements that must be established to warrant a piercing of the corporate veil under the instrumentality theory. View "Schultz v. Gen. Elec. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Bradley Day was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse. The court of appeals affirmed Day's conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred by telling the jury the penalty range for a lesser included offense during the guilt phase of trial, and the error was not harmless. The Court also addressed other issues raised in the appeal that were capable of recurring on re-trial, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by (1) admitting evidence of Day's move to another state as "flight evidence," and (2) admitting evidence for clothing the victim wore at the time of the evidence. Remanded. View "Day v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellants had worked for thirty-seven and thirty-four years, respectively, in underground coal mines. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed decisions to dismiss both Appellants' applications for benefits because the "consensus readings" of their X-rays interpreted them to be negative for coal workers' pneumoconiosis. On review, two separate court of appeals' panels held that the "consensus procedure" required by Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.316 for proving the existence of coal workers' pneumoconiosis and the clear and convincing standard the statute required to rebut such a consensus were unconstitutional because such provisions denied the claimants and other workers who suffered from coal workers' pneumoconiosis equal protection under the law by placing a more stringent burden of proof on them than those who suffered from pneumoconiosis from other sources. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases and affirmed, concluding that there was no rational basis or substantial and justifiable reason for the disparate treatment of coal workers in this instance, and the arbitrary distinction requiring coal workers to meet a higher standard of proof in pneumoconiosis cases than other workers violated the equal protection guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. View "Vision Mining, Inc. v. Gardner" on Justia Law

Larrell Porter pled guilty to trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree, being a persistent felony offender in the second degree, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The plea was pursuant to the second plea deal offered by the Commonwealth, the first of which Porter rejected when he refused to comply with a condition attached to the plea deal, namely that he waive his right to view video recordings of the drug buys. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Porter's motion to withdraw his voluntary and knowing guilty plea; (2) the condition in the initial plea offer did not violate Porter's discovery rights or his due process rights; (3) the Commonwealth acted properly when it conditioned the first plea deal on waiver of Porter's right to view the video; and (4) the Commonwealth need not reoffer the previously rejected original plea deal. View "Porter v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant James Miller was convicted of possession of a controlled substance in the first degree and being a persistent felony offender in the first degree, for which he received a twenty-year sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commonwealth's introduction of Appellant's prior uncharged acts of misconduct during the penalty phase did not constitute palpable error; (2) the presence of an armed corrections officer did not violate Appellant's rights to a fair trial and due process; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to strike the jury for not representing a fair cross-section of the community. View "Miller v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of the Court of Justice, brought an action against the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), alleging violation of her due process rights and of the state's whistleblower statute in the termination of her employment. The circuit court dismissed her claims as being barred under the doctrine of res judicata because the issues in question had already been decided in federal court. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the portion of the circuit court judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims founded on the potential violation of her due process rights under the state Constitution where there was nothing in the record below, or in the federal action, indicating there was a finding of whether Plaintiff's position with the AOC was tenured or at will, and if tenured, whether she was afforded her rights under the administrative procedures of the AOC; and (2) reversed the order of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiff's claim under the Kentucky whistleblower statute on the basis of issue preclusion where the final decision of the federal courts was deprived of one of the required tests in order for issue preclusion to apply to the state court action. Remanded. View "Miller v. Admin. Office of the Courts" on Justia Law

On April 1, 2005, Employee was injured during the course of his employment. Due to the injury, Employee never returned to work. Employee received workers' compensation benefits from April 2, 2005 through April 14, 2007. When the workers' compensation benefits ceased, Employee applied for unemployment insurance benefits. The Unemployment Insurance Commission based Employee's unemployment benefits on an extended base period comprised of the first three quarters of 2005 and the fourth quarter of 2006. Employee appealed, arguing that the extended base period should be based upon the four calendar quarters of the year 2004 because those were the most recent four quarters which fairly reflected the wages he earned prior to his injury. The circuit court reversed. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was the proper interpretation of "extended base period" as defined in section 341.090(2). The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the decision of the Commission, holding that the Commission properly applied the statute as written by the General Assembly in calculating Employee's unemployment benefits. View "Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

When Appellant Thomas Jones pled guilty to third-degree rape and other charges, the trial court imposed a twenty-year prison sentence and ordered him to pay $288,000 in restitution, $175 in court costs, and a jail fee of $5,126. Appellant appealed to challenge the pecuniary aspects of the sentence imposed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the assessment of court costs, as the Commonwealth conceded that aspect of the judgment was improper; and (2) reversed the judgment insofar as it imposed restitution because the imposition of restitution in this case violated Appellant's right to due process and was palpable error. Remanded to determine the issue of restitution. View "Jones v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant David Hoff was convicted by a jury of eight counts of first-degree rape and eight counts of incest and was given a life sentence. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding (1) because the extensive use of inadmissible hearsay and the impermissible bolstering of the victim's testimony was highly prejudicial to Appellant and rose to the level of manifest injustice, reversal was required; (2) it was error to allow a detective to testify that the victim's testimony at trial was consistent with her previous statements; and (3) it was error to admit evidence of Appellant's uncharged crimes or bad acts without proper notice or proper showing of relevance. Remanded. View "Hoff v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law