Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A circuit court jury found Appellant Derryl Blane guilty of several drug-related offenses and of being a first-degree Persistent Felony Offender (PFO). The Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant's conviction for trafficking in marijuana, eight ounces or more, holding that the trial court erred when, after granting Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of trafficking in marijuana within 1,000 yards of a school, it permitted the Commonwealth to amend the indictment to trafficking in marijuana, eight ounces or more; (2) reversed Appellant's conviction for first-degree PFO as to Count I of the indictment, as the facts necessary to convict Appellant of being a first-degree PFO as to Count I were incapable of being proved; (3) affirmed Appellant's remaining convictions; and (4) remanded for a new penalty phase, as the penalty phase introduction of the original dismissed charges from Appellant's prior convictions was erroneous. View "Blane v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellees conducted a renovation project near Appellant's place of work. Appellant filed a complaint against Appellees, alleging that Appellees negligently caused her to have occupational asthma and other injuries arising out of the renovation work. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, after which Appellants filed a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Ky. R. Civ. P. 60.02(a). The trial court granted the motion and then "re-granted" summary judgment in favor of Appellees. The court of appeals granted Appellees' motions to dismiss Appellant's appeal as untimely, finding that the trial court improperly granted Appellant's Rule 60.02 motion, and thus, the appeal became untimely because the thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal ran from the initial summary judgments rather than the latter summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a Rule 60.02 order granted under subsections (a)-(e), such as this one, may be considered in a motion to dismiss; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Rule 60.02 relief to Appellant. Remanded for consideration of the merits of the summary judgment rulings. View "Younger v. Evergreen Group, Inc." on Justia Law

After Michael Beglin's wife, Jennifer, died during surgery at University Hospital, Michael sued the hospital. The jury found that the hospital, through its employees and agents, acted negligently in causing the death of Jennifer and awarded compensatory and punitive damages to Michael. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment awarding compensatory damages and determined that the trial court properly gave a missing evidence instruction, but (2) vacated the punitive damages award, holding that the trial court erred in giving a punitive damages instruction under the circumstances of this case, and the court of appeals erred in affirming the judgment for punitive damages. Remanded for entry of a new judgment. View "Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Beglin" on Justia Law

Appellant, TECO Mechanical Contractor, Inc., filed a complaint and petition for declaration of rights against the Labor Cabinet, asserting that Kentucky's prevailing wage law (1) violated due process by authorizing the Cabinet to assess back wages and civil penalties without a hearing; and (2) failed to specify how workers should be classified and, as a result, improperly delegated legislative or judicial authority to the Cabinet. The circuit court ruled in favor of the Cabinet, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the prevailing wage law did not violate the state or federal Constitutions, as (1) TECO failed to establish that the Cabinet's actions under the prevailing wage law deprived it of a property or liberty interest that is protected by the due process clause; and (2) the law prescribes sufficient standards to prevent the Cabinet from abusing any legislative or judicial authority granted to it under the prevailing wage law. View "Teco Mech. Contractor, Inc. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Robert Smith was convicted of first-degree robbery and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender and was sentenced to thirty-two years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Smith's conviction and sentence, holding that the first-degree robbery instruction violated the unanimous verdict requirement by including a theory not supported by the evidence, but because there was no possibility that any juror voted to convict Smith under the unsupported theory the error was harmless; and (2) vacated a surplus provision included in the judgment that stated, "Defendant's court costs and fines are credit time served," as the statement had no readily determinable meaning and served no purpose. Remanded for entry of a new judgment excluding the provision. View "Smith v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A jury found Appellant Johnny Smith guilty of first-degree robbery and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). Appellant received a thirty-year prison sentence, was assessed court costs and fines, and was ordered to pay restitution. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Appellant's convictions and the PFO determination, holding that Appellant's constitutional rights to a speedy trial were not violated and that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict; (2) affirmed the trial court's restitution order; and (3) reversed the trial court's order requiring Appellant to pay court costs and fines. Remanded for a determination of whether Appellant was a "poor person" under Ky. Rev. Stat. 453.190(2), and whether he would be unable to pay court costs now or in the foreseeable future. View "Smith v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Claimant injured his shoulder during his employment. Claimant and Employer agreed to settle the matter. Claimant subsequently underwent a surgery, which Employer failed to pre-authorize. Claimant then filed several motions, including a motion to reopen. An ALJ determined (1) the surgery was reasonable and necessary; (2) Employer must pay for the procedure and related expenses; (3) the parties' settlement precluded any claim for TTD benefits relative to the surgery; and (4) Employer's failure to pre-authorize or contest the surgery within thirty days did not warrant the imposition of sanctions. The workers' compensation board reversed with respect to future TTD benefits and affirmed otherwise. The court of appeals reversed with respect to future TTD and reinstated the ALJ's decision. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the denial of a future TTD award, holding that the terms of the parties' agreement barred a future TTD claim; and (2) reversed with respect to the issue of sanctions, holding that the case must be remanded to the ALJ to reconsider the question of sanctions based on a correct understanding of Employer's obligations and any other considerations relevant to the reasonableness of its action under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.310(1) and 803 Ky. Admin. Reg. 25:012, 2(1)(a). View "Richey v. Perry Arnold, Inc." on Justia Law

Desean Maynes pled guilty to third-degree burglary pursuant to a plea agreement. The trial court approved the agreement subject to the condition that Maynes pay the statutory costs of $130 to the circuit court clerk. Maynes objected to the imposition of costs, arguing that having found him an indigent defendant in need of a public defender, the court was required to waive costs. The trial court rejected those arguments, and the court of appeals affirmed. After considering the applicable statutes, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the trial court was authorized under Kentucky law to impose court costs, as (1) the appointment of counsel to a criminal defendant does not preclude an order requiring the defendant to pay court costs according to his ability to do so; (2) upon a defendant's conviction, Ky. Rev. Stat. 23A.205 requires imposition of court costs unless the defendant qualifies as a "poor person"; and (3) because Maynes entered a plea agreement whereby he was to be released from custody, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that Maynes pay the statutorily mandated court costs pursuant to section 23A.205. View "Maynes v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Billy Mash was convicted in the circuit court of one count of first-degree sodomy and was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) denying Appellant's motion to set aside the jury panel and set a new trial, as Appellant did not establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section of the community requirement; (2) allowing the Commonwealth to use a peremptory strike against the one African-American juror on the panel, as the trial court conducted the proper analysis under Batson v. Kentucky; (3) denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict, as there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; and (4) denying Appellant's request for an instruction on the lesser included offense of sexual abuse in the first degree, as there was no evidentiary foundation for an instruction on sexual abuse. View "Mash v. Commonwealth " on Justia Law

Claimant Randy Lewis sought benefits for work-related lumbar spine injuries sustained in 2001 and 2002 and a work-related cervical spine injury sustained in 2005. An ALJ awarded 425 weeks of partial disability benefits at the rate of $315 per week for the lumbar injuries beginning in 2004 and 425 weeks of partial disability benefits at the rate of $498 per week beginning in 2007. Employer filed a petition for reconsideration, noting that the combined weekly benefits would equal $813 during the weeks they overlapped and that Claimant was not entitled to receive combined weekly benefits totaling more than $607, the maximum benefit that Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(a) allowed for total disability. The ALJ granted the petition and amended the claims, concluding that the separate partial disability awards did not entitle Claimant to receive at any time combined weekly benefits that exceeded the maximum for permanent total disability. The workers' compensation board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the maximum benefit permitted by section 342.703(1)(a) applies to multiple partial disability awards and does not entitle a worker to be compensated at one time for more than total disability. View "Lewis v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law