Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After applying legal precedent establish in Fischer v. State Board of Elections (Fischer II), the trial court found the legislative redistricting plans of H.B. 1 facially unconstitutional and issued a temporary injunction preventing the Secretary of State and Board of Elections from implementing the legislative districts created by the Bill. The Legislative Research Commission (LRC) appealed, asking the Supreme Court to overrule the constitutional standards for redistricting legislative districts delineated in Fischer II. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Bill violated the Kentucky Constitution by failing to achieve sufficient population equality and by failing to preserve county integrity. Remanded to enjoin permanently the conduct of any election under the district boundaries established by the Bill. View "Legislative Research Comm'n v. Fischer" on Justia Law

Police made a warrantless entry into an apartment occupied by Appellant Hollis King and discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia. The circuit court denied King's motion to suppress. King entered a conditional guilty plea to several drug-related offenses. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of King's motion to suppress, holding that if exigent circumstances existed when police heard sounds of movement after they knocked on the door of the apartment occupied by King, any exigency that did arise when police announced their presence was police-created and could not be relied upon as a justification for a warrantless entry. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) police may rely on exigent circumstances so long as the police do not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment, and (2) police in this case did not engage in any such conduct. The U.S. Supreme Court then remanded to determine whether exigent circumstances existed. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of King's motion to suppress and vacated King's conviction, holding that exigent circumstances did not exist when police made the warrantless entry. Remanded. View "King v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Prestonsburg Industrial Corporation (PIC) was founded in 1968 as a private, nonprofit corporation to attract business and industry to the City for economic development. To accomplish this goal, PIC would buy property, make improvements, then sell the property to various businesses. The profits were rolled back into PIC for additional purchases and improvements. In 2001, PIC purchased a parcel from the City. The county property valuation administrator then sought to tax the property. PIC claimed it was tax exempt and filed for a tax exemption from the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet. Revenue denied the application. The board of tax appeals affirmed, concluding that the property was not tax exempt under section 170 of the Kentucky Constitution, which exempts institutions of purely public charity from paying ad valorem taxes. The circuit court reversed and found the property tax exempt. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that PIC was a purely charitable organization as defined under section 170 and was thus exempt from taxation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence did not establish that PIC was a purely public charity or that its property was employed for a purely charitable purpose. Remanded. View "Hancock v. Prestonsburg Indus. Corp." on Justia Law

A circuit court jury convicted Frederick Davis of first-degree manslaughter and first-degree attempted manslaughter. Davis appealed, contending (1) the trial court erred by empanelling a new jury to determine whether to run his sentences for the two crimes concurrently or consecutively; and (2) even if the trial court properly empanelled a new jury, it employed erroneous procedures for the second penalty phase. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court acted well within its discretion to conduct a trial when it empanelled a new jury to decide whether to run Davis's sentences concurrently or consecutively, in whole or in part; and (2) the trial court appropriately conducted the second penalty phase. View "Davis v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellants Mother and Father were the natural parents of Child. Child was removed from home in 2004 and committed to the custody of the Cabinet for Health and Human Services after an abuse petition was filed. The district court adjudicated that physical abuse and neglect had occurred. Child was returned to his parents' home on certain conditions but was later removed. The district court once again adjudicated that Child had been physically abused. At a termination hearing, the trial court declined to terminate parental rights to the child, finding that the Cabinet had not met its burden of proving that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of Child and that there was no evidence Child would be abused in the future. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the circuit court, holding (1) there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision; and (2) in reversing the trial court's decision, the court of appeals improperly substituted its judgment for that of the trial court. View "D.G.R. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Claimant filed an application for workers' compensation, alleging injuries while working for Employer as a roofer. Having become a party because Employer was uninsured, the Uninsured Employers' Fund (UEF) denied the claim and stated that claimant's average weekly rate was unknown. Claimant asserted that his average weekly wage must be calculated under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.140(1)(e) because he had worked for less than thirteen weeks when the injury occurred. The ALJ applied section 342.140(1)(e) and determined that Claimant's weekly wage was $400 per week. The Workers' Compensation Board vacated the average weekly rate calculation because the record contained insufficient evidence to apply section 342.140(1)(e) properly. The Board then remanded the claim for additional proceedings to include the taking of additional proof. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board exceeded its authority under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.285(2)(c) by remanding the claim in order to provide Claimant with a second opportunity to meet his burden of proof. View "Commonwealth, Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Citizen Plaintiffs gave notice of their intent to sue Frasure Creek Mining and another coal mining company pursuant to the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act. At the close of the statutory sixty-day notice period, the state Energy and Environment Cabinet brought an enforcement action against Frasure Creek and thus invoked the statutory bar to Plaintiffs' suit. Together with its complaint, the Cabinet filed a proposed consent judgment. The trial court subsequently granted Plaintiffs' motion to intervene to allow Plaintiffs an opportunity to voice their objections to the proposed consent judgment. The Cabinet and Frasure Creek sought extraordinary relief against the circuit court, petitioning the court of appeals for writs forbidding the intervention and compelling entry of the consent judgment. They argued that the trial court's intervention order ran counter both to jurisdictional limits imposed by Congress and to state law rules and standards for granting intervention and approving consent judgments. The court of appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court was proceeding within its jurisdiction and that the Cabinet and Frasure Creek had an adequate remedy by appeal for the errors they alleged. View "Commonwealth, Energy & Env't Cabinet v. Circuit Court (Shepherd)" on Justia Law

After Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services found Appellee Patrick O'Conner's children in filth, unsanitary living conditions, and misery in Appellee's home, Appellee was indicted by a grand jury for three counts of first-degree criminal abuse. Specifically, the grand jury charged that Appellee intentionally abused his three children, each of which were under the age of twelve at the time, by placing them in a situation that could have caused physical injury or which was cruel confinement or cruel punishment. Appellee was convicted as charged. The court of appeals reversed, declaring there was insufficient evidence to indicate that Appellee's criminal actions were intentional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals did not properly defer to the jury its proper fact-finding role in this case, as the jury had sufficient evidence to reasonably conclude that Appellee was guilty of first-degree criminal abuse. Remanded for reinstatement of the trial order and judgment. View "Commonwealth v. O'Conner" on Justia Law

Following a bench trial, Appellant Raymond Clutter was convicted of murder and tampering with physical evidence and was found to be a persistent felony offender in the first degree. Clutter appealed, claiming that the trial court erred when it permitted a witness to testify about information provided by Clutter's then-attorney in pre-trial discussions with a law enforcement agent for the Commonwealth, arguing that the information constituted statements made during plea discussions and thus was inadmissible under Ky. R. Evid. 410(4). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony, as Rule 410(4) did not apply to bar the admission of the testimony. View "Clutter v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Patricia Buster entered a conditional guilty plea to four counts of complicity to first-degree rape. Appellant's conditional guilty plea preserved her right to appeal the adverse ruling of the trial court on her motion to suppress her written confession given to police officers. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress and vacated her conviction, holding that Appellant did not voluntarily waive her Miranda rights, as the police officers did not respect Appellant's invocation of her rights under the analysis set forth in Michigan v. Mosley. Remanded so that Appellant could withdraw her guilty plea. View "Buster v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law