Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of complicity to murder and first-degree complicity to robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) denying Appellant's motions for mistrial after the Commonwealth repeatedly referenced two of Appellant's three co-indictees' guilty pleas in the presence of the jury; (2) admitting eighteen jail letters written between Appellant and a co-indictee as relevant evidence; (3) holding that Appellant's co-indictee had not waived his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, thus not implicating Appellant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense due to the co-indictee's refusal to testify; and (4) denying Appellant's motion for mistrial after the jury briefly accessed inadmissible evidence during deliberations. View "Mayse v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Claimant was working for Employer when she was seriously injured. Claimant, a janitor, became trapped in a stalled elevator and fell several stories down the shaft when Employer's security staff attempted to rescue her. An administrative law judge (ALJ) enhanced Claimant's worker's compensation award based on Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.165(1), which penalizes an employer for an intentional failure to follow a safety protocol. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Claimant was not entitled to an award enhancement because there must be a finding that Employer "ignored or willfully overlooked a safety hazard that was reasonably foreseeable." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in order to warrant enhancement under section 342.165(1), the employer must be found to have intentionally disregarded a safety hazard that even a lay person would recognize as likely to cause serious physical harm; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ's finding that Employer intentionally disregarded a safety hazard in this case. View "Hornback v. Hardin Memorial Hosp." on Justia Law

Comprehensive Home Health Services filed a certificate of need (CON) with the Cabinet for Health and Family Services to expand its home health services into Whitley County. Two Existing Providers requested a hearing to oppose the application. The hearing officer approved of the CON after disallowing certain evidence proffered by the Existing Providers. The circuit court reversed, finding that the Cabinet's decision to grant the CON was arbitrary and ruling that the evidence allowed at the remand hearing should be "limited to the scope of the October 25, 2006 hearing." The Existing Providers appealed, contending that the circuit court's order would limit the evidence on remand to an outdated state health plan (SHP). The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the current SHP, not the one in place at the time of the original hearing, must guide the decision on remand. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) allowing consideration of changed circumstances and the current SHP on remand was not contrary to principles of administrative law and fulfilled the purpose of the CON statute; and (2) the court of appeals properly interpreted CON statutes and regulations to require consideration of the current SHP and calculations. View "Comprehensive Home Health Servs., Inc. v. Prof'l Home Health Care Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of theft by deception and being a second-degree persistent felony offender. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that a hearing with testimony would be necessary to determine the proper amount of restitution. Defendant did not object to this. The trial court then entered final judgment sentencing Defendant to imprisonment. Ten days later, the court ordered restitution. Defendant did not object to the court's power to order restitution during the restitution hearing. Defendant subsequently moved to vacate his conviction and the restitution order. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals vacated the restitution order, concluding that the trial court lost subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the restitution order ten days after the entry of the final judgment sentencing Defendant to imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the question of restitution, and Defendant waived any other claims regarding restitution by failing to raise that issue to the trial court. View "Commonwealth v. Steadman" on Justia Law

Defendants entered conditional guilty pleas to second-degree trafficking in a controlled substance. Defendants' convictions arose from dealing in Suboxone, the trade name of a drug containing buprenorphine. Before the trial court, Defendants challenged the scientific evidence used in classifying buprenorphine as a Schedule III controlled substance. Defendants argued that the Cabinet for Health and Family Services wrongly reclassified buprenorphine in 2002 from a Schedule V to Schedule III controlled substance, which change came about as a result of a change in federal law. The trial court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rule on a challenge to the Cabinet's scheduling of a controlled substance following federal action. The court of appeals remanded with directions to name the Attorney General and Cabinet as parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did have jurisdiction here, as a trial court may take judicial notice of the federal regulation used by the Cabinet and make a determination whether the findings comport with the requirements of Kentucky law; and (2) the Attorney General and Cabinet were not necessary parties in this case. View "Commonwealth v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery, first-degree sodomy, first-degree rape, kidnapping, and tampering with physical evidence. The trial court sentenced Defendant to terms of imprisonment with the sentences to be served consecutively, not to exceed sixty years. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court erred in ordering his sentences to be served consecutively because they exceeded fifty years in violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.110 and 532.080(6)(a). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the only limitation on the aggregate length of consecutive sentences for defendants whose highest class of crime is a Class A or B felony is the seventy-year cap found in section 532.110(1)(c), and because the highest class of crime Defendant was convicted of was a Class B felony, Defendant's sentence was lawful. View "Castle v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a lawsuit against the company that marketed the anti-obesity drug combination known as Fen-Phen. Plaintiffs claims were transferred from Kentucky to a similar action pending in Alabama, where Plaintiffs were represented by Attorneys. After Plaintiffs' claims were settled, Plaintiffs brought this action against Attorneys, claiming that Attorneys wrongfully withheld from each Plaintiff a substantial portion of the settlement award. The circuit court dismissed the action, concluding that Plaintiffs' complaint was untimely filed under the applicable statute of limitations. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs were not prejudiced by the court of appeals' affirmation of a summary judgment dismissing the claims of all fifty Plaintiffs where the motion before the trial court related to only one particular plaintiff; (2) the court of appeals erred in applying the Alabama statute of limitations rather than Kentucky's, but Appellants' suit was untimely under the applicable Kentucky statutes; (3) Plaintiffs' claims of misrepresentation were subject to the one-year limitation period for professional service malpractice rather than the general five-year limitation period; and (4) the application of the statutes of limitations was not an issue to be resolved by a jury. View "Abel v. Austin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of third-degree assault, third-degree criminal mischief, and of being a first-deree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not palpably err in failing to provide the jury with an instruction based upon the voluntary act concept embodied in Ky. Rev. Stat. 501.030(1); (2) palpable error did not occur when the trial court failed to instruct on the burden of proof in relation to Appellant's insanity defense instruction; (3) the final sentencing was fair and did not deny Appellant of the benefit of Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.070; and (4) the persistent felony offender enhanced twenty-year sentence imposed in this case did not violate the Kentucky Constitution. View "Thornton v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a Pennsylvania resident who was injured in Kentucky. Plaintiff's daughter, with whom Plaintiff resided, was driving the vehicle involved in the accident. Plaintiff brought suit against her insurance carrier, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, for underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage under a policy issued in Pennsylvania and covering a vehicle that Plaintiff registered and used exclusively in Pennsylvania. The trial court and court of appeals concluded that Pennsylvania law governed the dispute between Plaintiff and State Farm, but the two courts reached different results. The trial court concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to UIM coverage because her policy disallowed coverage when she was injured in an underinsured vehicle owned or regularly used by a "resident relative." The court of appeals found Kentucky public policy would prohibit enforcement of the policy provision and concluded Plaintiff was entitled to UIM coverage despite the plain language of her policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Pennsylvania law applied to this dispute; and (2) there was no prohibition on the type of UIM exclusion at issue in this case. View "State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hodgkiss-Warrick" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree and of being a persistent felony offender (PFO) in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) striking a potential juror for cause based on his religious views; (2) allowing the jury to re-watch videotapes while in the jury deliberation room; (3) failing to instruct the jury on the offense of criminal facilitation to trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree; and (4) denying Appellant's request for a second-degree PFO jury instruction. View "Springfield v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law