Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court in this case granted review to decide whether the City of Florence violated the Open Meetings Act when it agreed in private discussions to settle a pending lawsuit in a zoning matter when the settlement itself was voted on in an open meeting. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Open Meetings Act specifically allows for private discussions of pending or proposed litigation, the City did not violate the Open Meetings Act, where the final, binding vote on the settlement was conducted at a public meeting. View "Cunningham v. Whalen" on Justia Law

Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth, whereby he agreed to a sentence of five years' imprisonment. In addition, the circuit court imposed a $1,000 fine, which the Commonwealth later conceded was improper because Defendant was indigent. Defendant appealed the portion of the judgment imposing the fine. The court of appeals reversed the fine but left the five-year plea agreement intact. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the fine may be properly vacated while letting the plea agreement stand. The Court affirmed, holding that the fine in this case may be reversed without invalidating the plea agreement because the imposition of the fine was not part of the agreement but was instead left to the discretion of the circuit court. View "Commonwealth v. Reed" on Justia Law

Several weeks after Defendant was convicted of first-degree sodomy he moved for a new trial based upon an unsworn, unauthenticated note purportedly written by a member of the jury panel that convicted him. The note stated that the jury had been influenced by information not presented in evidence and that the writer had been pressured into voting to convict. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a hearing to ascertain the validity of the claim, and if true, whether the prejudicial effect of the occurrence would entitle Defendant to a new trial. The Supreme Court granted review and reversed, holding (1) an unauthenticated and unsworn letter from a lone juror, without more, is insufficient to trigger the process for further inquiry into the validity of a jury verdict by motion for a new trial; and (2) therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Abnee" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of eight counts of first-degree sodomy, one count of use of a minor in a sexual performance, and one count of first-degree sexual abuse, for which he received a total sentence of seventy years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commonwealth introduced an egregious amount of inadmissible character evidence in this case that was meant to prejudice the jury against Defendant; (2) the Commonwealth improperly bolstered the alleged victims' testimony; and (3) the cumulative effect of these prejudicial errors rose to the level of palpable error and deprived Appellant of a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "Chavies v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a guilty verdict, Defendant was convicted of one count of murder and three counts of wanton endangerment in the first degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty-five years' imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing (1) there was insufficient proof to support a charge of murder because the Commonwealth failed to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant was not privileged to act in self-defense; and (2) certain conduct of the Commonwealth attorney during his cross-examination of Appellant amounted to reversible prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court vacated the convictions and remanded, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could find Appellant guilty of murder; but (2) the prosecutor's conduct in certain instances was improper, and the prosecutorial misconduct in this case was reversible error. View "Caudill v. Kentucky" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with several offenses. Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to all charges, and the district court set his bail at $10,000. At the preliminary hearing, the district court made a finding of probable cause and then increased Defendant's bail to $100,000. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in circuit court, arguing that his bond was increased without the benefit of a formal hearing as required by statute. The circuit court granted the petition, ordering that Defendant's bond be reduced to $10,000 unless the district court held a hearing or the case was transferred to circuit court. After the director of metro corrections filed an appeal, the grand jury returned an indictment against Defendant on the charges, and the circuit court set Defendant's bond at $10,000 in an arraignment order. The court of appeals then dismissed the director's appeal as moot. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this case was not moot because the issue was one capable of repetition yet evading review; and (2) the district court may increase the amount of a defendant's bail following a preliminary hearing, where the only change in circumstances is the court's finding of probable cause. View "Bolton v. Irvin" on Justia Law

Under Kentucky's dog-bite liability statutes, the owner of a dog is strictly liable for damages caused by the dog. This case presented the questions whether a landlord can be liable under the statutory scheme's broad definition of "owner" and whether that liability can extend to injuries caused by a tenant's dog off the leased premises. In this case the attack occurred across the street from the rented property. The trial court granted summary judgment for the landlords under Ireland v. Raymond, which held that a landlord's liability for attacks by a tenant's dog does not extend to attacks that occur off the leased premises. The court of appeals affirmed, also relying on Ireland. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a landlord can be an "owner" of a tenant's dog for the purposes of liability under certain circumstances; (2) any such liability extends only to injuries caused on or immediately adjacent to the premises; and (3) for that reason, the landlord in this case was not liable under the statutes. View "Benningfield v. Zinsmeister" on Justia Law

Appellants, attorney Barbara Bonar and her law firm, claimed entitlement to a portion of the attorney's fees awarded in a class action settlement. Bonar and Appellees, a law firm and attorneys, initiated the class action as co-counsel. Before the settlement was negotiated, Bonar withdrew. Bonar claimed she was forced to withdraw. Following a bench trial, the circuit court concluded Bonar was not entitled to any of the attorney's fees because her withdrawal was voluntary. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the weight of the evidence supported the conclusion that Bonar withdrew from the case voluntarily, and therefore, Bonar was not entitled to any portion of the attorney's fees awarded to class counsel; (2) the trial court did not improperly limit discovery; and (3) the trial court did not violate Bonar's right to a fair trial by commenting on Bonar's conduct. View "B. Dahlenburg Bonar, P.S.C. v. Waite, Schneier, Bayless & Chesley Co., LPA" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned an ALJ's decision to award the claimant temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for his work-related shoulder injury from the date he left work, May 10, 2007, until May 8, 2009. The ALJ also awarded permanent income and medical benefits for the injury but denied claims for cervical and lumbar spine injuries. A court of appeals majority reversed, concluding that the opinion and award failed to contain findings adequate to make clear whether the ALJ considered and understood all of the evidence relevant to the date when TTD began. The Supreme Court (1) reversed to the extent that the ALJ made the finding of fact required by Kan. Rev. Stat. 342.0011(11)(a); but (2) affirmed to the extent the Court was unable to determine whether the ALJ simply misstated May 10, 2007 as being the date the claimant testified he stopped working due to the effects of his injury, misunderstood the evidence concerning his reason for missing work on May 10, 2007, or chose May 10, 2007 based on other evidence. Remanded to the ALJ to clarify that portion of the decision. View "Arnold v. Toyota Motor Mfg." on Justia Law

Russell D. Alred, judge of the 26th judicial circuit of Kentucky, became the focus of a lengthy investigation by the judicial conduct commission, culminating in formal charges consisting of twenty allegations of misconduct in office. Following an adversarial hearing on these charges, the commission found official misconduct on nine of the charges and ordered Judge Alred removed from office. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the order of the commission as to eight counts of official misconduct and the commission's decision to remove Judge Alred from office, holding that there was good cause to remove Judge Alred from his judicial office for misconduct; but (2) reversed the commission's findings and legal conclusions as to Count V, holding that the commission's findings regarding Count V were not supported by sufficient evidence. View "Alred v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law