Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The parents of fourteen Jefferson County schoolchildren brought this action claiming Ky. Rev. Stat. 159.070 grants their children a statutory right to attend the public school nearest their home. The Jefferson County Board of Education and the Kentucky School Boards Association asserted the student assignment within a school district in Kentucky was a matter that the legislature has committed to the sound discretion of the local school board. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the ruling of the circuit court, holding that Kentucky public school students have no statutory right to attend a particular school. View "Jefferson County Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

This was a medical malpractice claim for the wrongful death of Rosalie Stamper. At issue on appeal was a discovery violation question about the use of deposition testimony of a treating physician, who was originally a defendant in the case but was dismissed prior to trial. The trial court allowed the physician's deposition to be played to the jury, including a portion about Defendant's compliance with the standard of care, even though Plaintiff argued that the physician had not been identified as an expert witness and no Ky. R. Civ. P. 26 information had been provided about his testimony. The jury found for Defendant. The court of appeals reversed, finding the Defendant had not complied with the language or spirit of Rule 26. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the trial court erred when in admitting the testimony without considering the effect of the requirements of Rule 26 and without considering the admissibility of the proposed "expert" testimony as to standard of care; but (2) the error was harmless. View "Hashmi v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to forty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding (1) while the trial court erred by admitting two handguns Appellant owned, which were similar to the murder weapon but were not used to commit the crime, the error was harmless; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted hearsay testimony, specifically the victim's request to borrow money from his wife, but the error was harmless in the context of the case; and (3) the trial court did not err when it refused to allow Appellant to inform the jury he had been tried twice previously for this offense and both prior juries deadlocked. View "Harris v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Kathy and Curtis Rice were married approximately four months before separating and filing for divorce. While they were separated but still married, Curtis died in a work-related accident. Jackie Griffin, Curtis's mother and the administratrix of his estate, claimed Kathy was barred by Ky. Rev. Stat. 392.090(2) from receiving an interest in Curtis's estate. The statute provides that a spouse who voluntarily leaves the other and "lives in adultery" forfeits his or her right to and interest in the other's estate and property. Based on Griffin's proof at trial that Kathy had sexual intercourse with another man the night prior to Curtis's death, the trial court held that Kathy forfeited her interest in Curtis's estate pursuant to section 392.090(2). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutory language "lives in adultery" requires more than a single instance of adultery. View "Griffin v. Rice" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to determine whether a state employee, after receiving notice of her employer's intent to dismiss her, waived her right to a pre-termination hearing by repeatedly engaging in conduct that delayed the hearing. The Kentucky Personnel Board concluded that the employee did not waive her right to a pre-termination hearing, and that her dismissal therefore violated her right to due process. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the employee was not deprived of her constitutional rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to her dismissal, as the employee constitutionally waived her right to a hearing by applying for FMLA leave in a deliberate attempt to delay the pre-termination hearing, after previously postponing the hearing twice, which constituted a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of that hearing. View "Dep't of Revenue v. Wade" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with assault in the fourth degree. Before Defendant was arrested, Defendant's attorney made an ex parte request to a different district court judge from the one who issued the warrant, requesting to set the warrant aside and issue a summons. The warrant was withdrawn and a summons issued instead. The Supreme Court granted the certification request of the county attorney to answer a question of law surrounding the practice of ex parte communications by criminal defense lawyers with judges after warrants have been issued. The Court then certified the law to state that Kentucky law does not authorize as ex parte motion by a criminal defendant to vacate or set aside a warrant for his or her arrest with no notice or opportunity for the Commonwealth to be heard. View "Commonwealth v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Appellee pled guilty to fraudulent insurance acts by complicity. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the circuit court sentenced Appellee to a five-year probated sentence and ordered restitution to Amica Mutual Insurance Company in the amount of $48,597 - the full amount distributed by Amica after Appellee's house burned down. The court of appeals vacated the order of restitution and remanded to the trial court to make specific findings of the monetary damages suffered as a result of the insurance fraud, without regard to the proceeds distributed as a result of the property damage or alternate housing and living expenses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a trial court is authorized to order restitution for damages not suffered as a direct result of the criminal acts for which the defendant has been convicted when, as part of a plea agreement, the defendant freely and voluntarily agrees to the restitution condition; and (2) therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Appellee to reimburse Amica for the entire $48, 597. View "Commonwealth v. Morseman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted discretionary review of two probation revocation cases to consider whether the trial court may proceed to hold evidentiary hearings to revoke or modify probation when the grounds for revocation or modification are new, unresolved criminal charges against the probationer. The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court is not required to delay probation revocation or modification hearings awaiting resolution of the criminal charges that arise during the probationary period; (2) when the probationer is faced with probation revocation or modification and a criminal court trial based on the same conduct that forms the basis of new criminal charges, the probationer's testimony at the probation revocation hearing is protected from use at any later criminal trial in Kentucky state courts; and (3) the probationer's testimony at the revocation hearing can be used for impeachment purposes or rebuttal evidence in the trial of the new charges. View "Barker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee was injured during the course of his employment. When his workers' compensation benefits ceased, Appellee applied for and received unemployment insurance benefits. The Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission determined that Kan. Rev. Stat. 341.090, which permits the use of an "extended base period" that captures earnings leading to equitable unemployment benefits, required that the extended base period may include only the four calendar quarters that immediately precede the base period. Pursuant to this extended base period, Appellee was awarded benefits of $149 per week. The circuit court reversed. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the extended base period need not be limited to the four quarters that immediately precede the base period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission properly applied the statute in calculating Appellee's unemployment benefits. View "Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the method for excluding impairment from a non-compensable disability when calculating a worker's permanent disability benefit under the post-1996 version of Kan. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(b). The ALJ calculated a benefit based on the claimant's entire post-injury permanent impairment rating and then subtracted an amount equal to a benefit based on his pre-existing active impairment rating. The workers' compensation board reversed, determining that the present version of section 342.730(1)(b) requires the calculation of income benefits to be based only on the permanent impairment rating caused by the injury being compensated. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that pre-existing impairment must be excluded when calculating a total disability award under section 342.730(1)(b). View "Tudor v. Indus. Mold & Mach. Co." on Justia Law