Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A circuit court jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree fleeing or evading police, fourth-degree assault, possession of marijuana, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years' imprisonment and fined Appellant $600. The Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant's convictions and sentences for first-degree fleeing or evading and first-degree PFO, holding that the trial court's jury instruction on the fleeing or evading charge were erroneous; and (2) held that the trial court erred by imposing fines upon Appellant after previously finding him to be indigent and therefore vacated those portions of his sentences imposing fines. View "Wright v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Hospital purchased from Insurer a "builders risk" insurance policy which included a provision requiring Hospital to obtain Insurer's written consent before assigning a claim for an insured loss. Hospital contracted with Constructors for floors and subsurface work, which was later damaged. Hospital claimed a loss and sought recompense under the builders risk policy, but Insurer denied the claim. Hospital later assigned Constructors any claim or rights Hospital had against Insurer arising out of the insurance policy. Constructors, as Hospital's assignee, brought suit in federal court against Insurer seeking to recover payment due under the builder's risk policy. The Supreme Court granted the certification request of the federal court to answer a question of state law and concluded that, under Kentucky law, a clause in an insurance policy that requires the insured to obtain the insurer's prior written consent before assigning a claim for an insured loss under the policy is not enforceable or applicable to the assignment of a claim under the policy where the covered loss occurs before the assignment, and that such a clause would, under those circumstances, be void as against public policy. View "Wehr Constructors, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted review of this case to consider how to interpret Kentucky's grandparent-visitation statute consistently with the constitutional principles articulated in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, Troxel v. Granville, and whether the trial court in this case appropriately interceded to grant the grandmother visitation with the child despite the objection of the child's mother. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's grant, holding (1) a grandparent petitioning for child visitation contrary to the wishes of the child's parent can overcome the presumption that a fit parent is presumed to act in the best interest of the child only with clear and convincing evidence that granting visitation to the grandparent is in the child's best interest; and (2) the trial court here, in granting visitation to the grandmother, relied on pre-Troxel case law that inappropriately placed grandparents on equal footing with parents when determining visitation. Remanded. View "Walker v. Blair" on Justia Law

This was a medical malpractice action brought by the administrator of the Estate of Mindi Tucker, who died of complications from an infection that developed after a caesarian delivery of her child. Her obstetrician was Dr. Susan Brunch, a member of Women's Care Physicians of Louisville, P.S.C. (collectively, Defendants). The claim of medical negligence centered on the failure to administer the antibiotic Cefotan during the delivery process, which the Estate alleged would have prevented the infection. The trial court ruled in favor of Defendants. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in not allowing expert testimony on the meaning of the doctor's standing order regarding the antibiotic, and whether the Estate should have been allowed to impeach the doctor's expert witness with the deposition of another physician. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in (1) not allowing the expert testimony; and (2) not allowing impeachment of the doctor's expert witness by the use of the other physician's deposition, as the deposition did not impeach the expert. View "Tucker v. Women's Care Physicians of Louisville, P.S.C." on Justia Law

Appellant appealed from an opinion of the court of appeals which affirmed an order of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's petition for review of a decision of the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission (KUIC). In addition to denying Appellant unemployment benefits, the KUIC ordered Appellant to reimburse $12,785 in benefit payments he had already received. The circuit court dismissed Appellant's petition for review because it did not comply with the verification requirement contained in Ky. Rev. Stat. 341.450(1), and thus the court concluded that its jurisdiction was not invoked within the twenty-day limitations period provided for filing such an action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellant failed to comply with the verification provision of section 341.450(1), the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the controversy; and (2) Appellant did not comply with the verification requirement, as his attorney's signature on the petition did not constitute "certification." View "Taylor v. Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to, among other offenses, five counts of first-degree robbery. First-degree robbery is a "violent offense" under Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401, and under that statute, a person convicted of a violent offense does not become eligible for parole until he has served the lesser of eighty-five percent of the sentence imposed or twenty years. Appellant moved for relief from his guilty plea, claiming he was not apprised of the parole ramifications of his sentence. The trial court summarily denied Appellant's motion, and an unanimous panel of the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) counsel renders deficient assistance under Commonwealth v. Padilla and Strickland v. Washington when his guilty plea advice does not accurately reflect the parole consequences under the violent offender statute; but (2) the deficient performance alleged in this case did not entitle Appellant to relief because it could not have resulted in any prejudice. View "Stiger v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Petitioner's second trial on charges of capital kidnapping, attempted murder, arson, and receiving stolen property ended when the trial court declared a mistrial for the Commonwealth's violation of a pretrial order. Petitioner petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from retrying him, arguing that a retrial would violate the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. Although Petitioner would not suffer irreparable injury if the retrial were to proceed, Petitioner argued that the administration of justice would suffer great and irreparable injury if the retrial took place. The Supreme Court declined to issue the writ, holding that the writ of prohibition was not an available remedy, as Petitioner offered nothing to persuade the Court that he would suffer any injury that could not be corrected on appeal. View "St. Clair v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The circuit court sentenced him to thirty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) granting a continuance was a proper exercise of judicial discretion; (2) the trial court did not err by not permitting Appellant to cross-examine the victim regarding her failure to appear on the first trial date; (3) the trial court did not err by permitting the victim to testify concerning her fear of contracting a disease from Appellant; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial; (5) Appellant was correctly found competent to stand trial; (6) no error resulted as a result of the prosecutor's comments; and (7) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excusing a juror for cause. View "Slone v. Commonwealth " on Justia Law

This case began when Appellants brought an action against Appellee, a medical center, alleging medical malpractice in a surgical procedure. The first trial ended in a verdict favorable to Appellants. The trial court denied Appellee's subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) but granted Appellee's request for a new trial. The second trial resulted in a verdict even more favorable for Appellants. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed Appellants' claim, concluding that the trial court erred by failing to grant Appellee's motion for JNOV and granting the new trial instead. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it ordered the new trial and denied Appellee's request for JNOV. View "Savage v. Three Rivers Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Appellant was tried on two counts of first-degree sodomy and was convicted of one count. The trial court imposed a sentence of forty-five years incarceration. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court erred in denying an independent psychological evaluation or competency hearing of the alleged victim; and (2) the hearing conducted by the trial court to determine if various allegations of prior sexual conduct made by the alleged victim were admissible was insufficient, and the trial court erred in ruling that several of the allegations were not demonstrably false without reviewing all of the evidence. View "Perry v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law