Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to armed robbery and murder and was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. After Defendant's conviction was affirmed, Defendant filed a pro se motion seeking relief from the circuit court's judgment. The matter was allowed to lie dormant for four years until counsel filed an amendment to Defendant's original motion. The trial court denied the motion, finding that counsel's amendment was untimely and that on the merits the claims in Defendant's original motion were refuted by the record. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, although its reasoning differed from the lower court's, holding that to the extent the amended motion sought to raise a new, factually independent claim, it was subject to dismissal as untimely, and Defendant's timely claims were facially without merit. View "Roach v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant, a licensed attorney, was found in criminal contempt by the circuit court for failing to appear at a client's arraignment. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant argued on review (1) he was under no duty to appear at the arraignment because he had withdrawn from representing the client, and (2) even if he had a to duty to appear there were insufficient grounds upon which to find him in criminal contempt. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant had a duty to appear at his client's arraignment; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Appellant's failure to appear at the arraignment to be criminally contemptuous. View "Poindexter v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

While Brenda Osborne was at home alone, an airplane pilot crashed his airplane into Osborne's home. Osborne subsequently hired Attorney to assist her recovering her losses from the pilot, but when the lawsuit was finally filed, the federal court dismissed the action as barred by limitations. Osborne filed this action against Attorney asserting breach of contract, legal malpractice, and fraud and deceit. A jury found in favor of Osborne, resulting in a judgment against Attorney in excess of $5 million. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment in part but vacated a large portion of the damage award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court properly tried this case using the suit-within-a-suit method but erred when it failed to instruct the jury on Pilot's negligence, thus resulting in Osborne's failure to establish that Attorney's malpractice proximately caused her loss; (2) emotional-distress plaintiffs must first satisfy the elements of a general negligence claim; and (3) punitive damages are not recoverable against an attorney in a legal malpractice case. View "Osborne v. Keeney" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to forty years in prison. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred when it allowed into evidence the fact that Appellant owned two guns with the same model number as the weapon used in the murder crime, though neither weapon was used to commit the crime, but the error was harmless; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted hearsay testimony regarding the victim's request to borrow money from his wife, but the error was harmless in the context of this case; and (3) the trial court properly refused to allow Appellant to inform the jury he had already been tried twice for these charges and the prior two juries deadlocked. View "Harris v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Timothy and Theresa LaMarre and their two children filed a personal injury action against Michael and Kimberly Plummer and the Fort Mitchell Country Club after a golf cart Mr. Plummer was driving accelerated while Mr. LaMarre was attempting to take his seat, resulting in serious injuries to Mr. LaMarre. The suit alleged the Club was liable for Mr LaMarre's injuries as a result of Mr. Plummer's negligence in driving a golf cart while intoxicated. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Club, finding that the Dram Shop Act applied and shielded the Club from any liability in the matter. The court of appeals reversed. The Club sought discretionary review. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the circuit court's summary judgment order, holding that because the Club held an alcohol license under Kan. Rev. Stat 243.030, it was not liable for Mr. Plummer's negligence unless one of the stated exceptions under the Act was met, and none of the exceptions were met in this case. View "Fort Mitchell Country Club v. LaMarre" on Justia Law

Appellee was charged with assault in the fourth degree. Before Appellee was arrested but after an arrest warrant was issued, Appellee's attorney made an ex parte request to a different district court judge from the one who issued the arrest warrant, seeking to set the warrant aside and issue a summons. The warrant was withdrawn and a summons issued instead. The Commonwealth's request for the reinstatement of the arrest warrant was denied. Appellee later pled guilty to the charge. The Supreme Court granted the certification request of the Commonwealth to answer a question of law and answered that Kentucky law does not authorize an ex parte motion by a criminal defendant to vacate or set aside a warrant for his or her arrest with no notice or opportunity for the Commonwealth to be heard. View "Commonwealth v. Minton" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for being a persistent felony offender (PFO) 2. The PFO 2 count was based on an earlier conviction for which Defendant was granted diversion. Defendant was still on diversion when the grand jury indicted him for the later offenses. Upon Defendant's motion, the trial court dismissed the PFO 2 count because Defendant had not been finally sentenced on the previously diverted felony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a conviction for which a defendant is currently on diversion cannot be used to indict that defendant as a PFO 2 when he commits a subsequent felony offense; and (2) the sentence on the prior felony must be imposed at the time the defendant commits the subsequent crime in order for the conviction to support a PFO 2 charge. View "Commonwealth v. Derringer" on Justia Law

A circuit court jury found Appellant guilty of two counts of attempted murder and one count of being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). For these crimes, Appellant received a fifty-year prison sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony identifying Appellant as a former inmate to be presented to the jury; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence that he threatened a prison guard during apprehension to be presented to the jury; (3) the Commonwealth impermissibly exceeded the scope of Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.055 when it told the jury about Appellant's prior convictions, and accordingly, the Court vacated Appellant's sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase; and (4) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the PFO charge. View "Webb v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed from a judgment of the circuit court convicting him of attempted murder, two counts of first-degree assault, one count of first-degree wanton endangerment, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's conviction for first-degree assault, holding (1) in light of the particular facts of this case, Appellant's convictions for both attempted murder and first-degree assault for the same shooting resulted in a double jeopardy violation; and (2) none of Appellant's remaining arguments alleging prosecutorial misconduct established reversible error. Remanded for entry of a new judgment that excluded the reversed conviction. View "Kiper v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A circuit court jury found Appellant guilty of murder, first-degree wanton endangerment, first-degree criminal mischief, and driving under the influence. For these crimes, Appellant received a thirty-five year prison sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion when allowing the introduction of Appellant's pre-arrest silence during the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, but the error was harmless; (2) the trial court did not err in permitting the introduction of an accident scene video; (3) the trial court properly admitted a 911 recording; (4) any potential error that arose out of the admission of Appellant's post-collision use of profanity was harmless; and (5) the trial court did not commit palpable error in permitting the introduction of Appellant's misdemeanor theft by deception conviction during the sentencing phase of her trial. View "Baumia v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law