Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee filed suit in the circuit court against Tammie and Brooksie Horn to obtain a judgment securing his right to an easement on property owned by the Horns and property owned by Appellant. Appellant was added as a defendant to the suit. The trial court granted Appellee a sixteen-foot easement over Appellant's and the Horns' property. Appellant appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal because Appellant had failed to name two indispensable parties - Brooskie and Tammie Horn - in his appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Brooksie and Tammy Horn were each an indispensable party to the appeal; and (2) Tammie Horn was not named a party of Appellant's appeal. View "Browning v. Preece" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree sodomy and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse and was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. The victim of Appellant's alleged crimes was his step-granddaughter. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by allowing testimony from the victim's mother and father regarding changes in the child's behavior, which the mother implied were symptomatic of child sexual abuse based upon discussions she had with a clinical psychologist. Appellant alleged that this testimony amounted to inadmissible evidence of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was not admissible for the purpose of proving that the victim was sexually abused, but Appellant was not entitled to a reversal of his convictions because (1) the trial court sustained Appellant's objection to the specific testimony at issue and granted all of the relief he requested concerning the evidence; and (2) Appellant withdrew his motion for a mistrial with regard to the mother's testimony and failed to move for a mistrial as a result of the father's testimony, and therefore, Appellant's argument that he should have received a mistrial as a consequence of the evidence was not properly preserved. View "Blount v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of four counts of murder and one count of attempted murder for the murders of his four children and the attempted murder of his wife. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. At the trial, Appellant presented an insanity defense supported by expert testimony, and the Commonwealth provided an expert rebuttal witness. Appellant appealed, claiming that once he presented evidence that he was insane, the burden of disproving his insanity defense shifted to the Commonwealth, and because the Commonwealth did not meet this burden, the trial court erred in convicting him. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding that Appellant's introduction of evidence of mental illness sufficient to raise the issue of insanity as a defense did not require the Commonwealth to then disprove mental illness, and therefore, the burden of proving insanity rested on Appellant. View "Biyad v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This case arose after a person house sitting the home of her friends found an intruder in the house. Later it was discovered that twenty pieces of jewelry were missing from the master bedroom. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted guilty of second-degree burglary and for being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no palpable error in the pre-trial procedure that resulted in the identification of Defendant as the perpetrator or in the in-court identification made at trial; and (2) based upon the testimony that the jury actually heard in this case, the trial court did not err in admitting testimony regarding fingerprints pulled off evidence and regarding the thoroughness of the investigation. View "Barnes v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant and her boyfriend, Roy Rankin, were prosecuted for the death of a six-month-old. The trial court instructed the jury on one count of first-degree criminal abuse as to Defendant, but the instructions covered two different theories of how Defendant allegedly committed the crime. The first instruction allowed the jury to find Defendant guilty if she intentionally abused Cecilia. The second instruction allowed the jury to find Defendant guilty if she had intentionally permitted Rankin to abuse Cecilia. The jury found Defendant guilty under the first instruction. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the Commonwealth's proof was sufficient under at least one theory of first-degree criminal abuse, Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of criminal abuse; (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to direct abuse by Defendant, and the resulting jury verdict under that instruction was erroneous; and (3) Defendant may nevertheless be retried under the alternative theory of permitting the abuse because the jury never reached that question, and Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. View "Acosta v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Hospital purchased from Assurance Company of America a "builder's risk" insurance policy and contracted with Wehr Constructors for installation of subsurfaces and floors as part its project. After installation, a portion of the floors and subsurface done by Wehr was damaged. Hospital sought recompense under the builders risk policy. Assurance denied the claim. Meanwhile, Wehr and Hospital settled on Wehr's breach of contract claim. As part of the settlement, Hospital assigned to Wehr any claim Hospital had against Assurance arising out of the policy. Wehr, as Hospital's assignee, then sued Assurance in federal district court. Assurance moved for judgment on the pleadings, invoking the policy's anti-assignment provision and arguing that it had not consented to the assignment. The district court requested certification to answer a question of Kentucky law. The Supreme Court concluded that under Kentucky law, a clause in an insurance policy that requires the insured to obtain the insurer's prior written consent before assigning a claim for an insured loss under the policy is not enforceable or applicable to the assignment of a claim under the policy where the covered loss occurs before the assignment, and that such a clause would, under those circumstances, be void as against public policy. View "Wehr Constructors, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am." on Justia Law

In March 1991, Appellee's predecessor corporation obtained a default judgment against Appellant for over $13,000. To collect on the judgment, Appellee caused a writ of execution to issue against Appellant in April 1991. Appellee also filed judgment liens, initiated garnishment proceedings, most recently in 2005, and undertook post-judgment discovery examinations. In 2008, Appellant filed a declaration of rights action, contending that Appellee could no longer recover on the judgment against him because the fifteen-year limitations period had expired. The trial court ruled that any enforcement activity by a judgment creditor, including judgment liens and garnishments, keeps a judgment alive for purposes of the statute of limitations, and therefore, limitations did not bar Appellee's attempts to collect on the judgment. The court of appeals (1) upheld the circuit court's rulings with regard to garnishments, finding that the definition of "execution" in Ky. Rev. Stat. 413.090(1) includes a garnishment; and (2) did not reach the question of whether judgment liens are also executions for purposes of the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that garnishment proceedings and the filing of judgment liens toll the fifteen-year statute of limitations. View "Wade v. Poma Glass & Specialty Windows, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, an adult citizen, filed a petition for a declaration of rights seeking a declaration that the statutory and regulatory provisions associated with the Cabinet for Health and Family Services and its sub-unit the Department of Community Based Services' (DCBS) process for investigating allegations of child abuse were unconstitutional. Appellant also challenged the constitutionality of the Cabinet's administrative process. The underlying administrative action was held in abeyance pending the conclusion of the present proceeding. The circuit court denied the petition, finding the challenged processes to be constitutional, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals, holding that the declaratory action was not ripe for review, as the administrative proceedings being held in abeyance were not available to contextualize the operations of the statutory and regulatory process as it functions in day-to-day practice. Remanded with directions that the court hold this action in abeyance until the conclusion of the underlying administrative proceedings. View "W.B. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellants Marcus Swan and D'Andre Owens were convicted of multiple crimes related to a violent home invasion they carried out. The Supreme Court affirmed Swan's judgment of conviction and sentence in its entirety, and affirmed in part and reversed in part Owens's judgment, although his overall sentence was unaffected, holding that the trial court (1) correctly admitted into evidence the guns used in the crime; (2) properly failed to dismiss the indictment because of the destruction of other guns found in the victim's house; (3) did not err in failing to hold a hearing on Swan's right to proceed pro se or with hybrid counsel; (4) properly allowed a witness to testify in the penalty phase after having been present in the courtroom during guilt-phase testimony; (5) did not commit reversible error by evaluating the competency of a child witness in a short fashion and in the presence of the jury; (6) erred in failing to give an instruction on second-degree assault as a lesser-included offense; and (7) erred in failing to grant a directed verdict on the charge of first-degree wanton endangerment relating to Latonia Lumpkins. Accordingly, Owens's convictions for first-degree assault and first-degree wanton endangerment of Lumpkins were reversed. Remanded. View "Swan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of wanton murder and initially sentenced to forty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court vacated Appellant's sentence and remanded for a new sentencing phase. At Appellant's second sentencing phase trial, Appellant was represented by a public advocacy attorney that had represented Chris Eapmon, who had been jointly indicted with Appellant during his negotiations for a plea deal. Eapmon eventually pled guilty in exchange for his testimony against Appellant. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's twenty-eight year prison sentence, holding (1) Appellant did not suffer any identifiable prejudice arising out of counsel's representation; (2) the successive representation here did not violate Ky. R. Crim. P. 8.30; and (3) Appellant's confrontation rights were not violated at his second sentencing phase due to the use of videotaped testimony from the guilt phase of his trial. View "Steward v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law