Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee, an owner of a condominium managed by the Coach House and a member of a condominium association, requested that the Board of Directors of the Coach House allow him access to the financial records and minutes of the Board's meetings spanning a two-year period. Appellant, the attorney for the Board, refused Appellee's request. Thereafter, Appellee wrote of the attorney general's (AG) office asking that it prosecute the matter involving his records request. Appellant responded by sending a letter to the AG explaining the reasons restrictions were placed on the records, including some reasons unflattering to Appellee. Appellee subsequently filed suit against Appellant for defamation. The trial court granted Appellant's motion for summary judgment, determining that Appellant's letter to the AG was a direct response to an appeal for prosecution and was thus part of a judicial proceeding. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment, holding that the communications made to the AG's office were not part of a judicial proceeding and thus were entitled to only a qualified privilege. View "Stigler v. Flint" on Justia Law

Appellant, the representative of a decedent's estate, hired attorneys David Mushlin and William Nefzger and their law firm to pursue a medical negligence claim against a hospital and several physicians. The trial court later disqualified Mushlin on the ground that Mushlin's prior representation of the hospital was sufficient to create a conflict of interest or at least the appearance of impropriety. The court also noted that Nefzger and the entire firm were conflicted because Mushlin could not effectively be screened from the case and there was a great likelihood of his having constant contact with the other attorneys who would be working on the case in his stead. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of prohibition, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to show she would suffer great injustice and irreparable injury from the trial court's order disqualifying her lawyer and his law firm from representing her. View "Robertson v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Joshua Peacher and Nereia Allen appealed from judgments of the circuit court following a joint trial in which both were convicted of murder, first-degree assault, and first-degree criminal abuse from their mistreatment of Allen's two-year-old nephew, Christopher, resulting in serious physical injuries and his death. The couple was also convicted of abuse for their mistreatment of Allen's other two-year-old nephew, Wyatt. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgments in both cases, holding (1) both Defendants received a fundamentally fair trial; (2) neither Defendant was entitled to relief because the trial court erred slightly in defining complicity for the jury; (3) Peacher was not entitled to relief because he was tried jointly with Allen; (4) neither Defendant was prejudiced by the jury instructions pertaining to murder and first-degree assault of Christopher; and (5) Allen was not entitled to a directed verdict or to the dismissal of any of the charges against her. View "Peacher v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant and Appellees were engaged in a commercial real estate transaction. Appellant was unable to secure adequate financing to close the transaction, and Appellees retained his earnest money deposit. Appellant filed suit, and the circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Appellees. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) given that there was an ambiguity in the language of the contract regarding whether the earnest money clause constituted a proper liquidated damages provision, summary judgment in this case was inappropriate; (2) there was a question of genuine fact as to whether the amount of the earnest money deposit was reasonable or so unreasonably large that it was unenforceable on the grounds that public policy would deem it to be a penalty; and (3) if the deposit is deemed to be an unenforceable penalty, a constructive trust should have been established in order to protect the funds. View "Patel v. Tuttle Props., LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of intentional murder and sentenced to death. The deaths occurred as a result of a shooting during which Appellant claimed he was acting in self-defense. Defendant appealed, raising multiple issues in support of reversal of his convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court committed reversible error in (1) admitting testimony from a policy detective that Appellant's behavior after the shooting was inconsistent with someone who had actually acted in self-defense, thereby implying that from his experienced observations Appellant had fabricated his self-defense claim; (2) admitting evidence of Appellant's post-arrest invocation of his right to remain silent; (3) failing to strike for cause a potential juror who was the sibling of the victim's advocate directly connected to the case; and (4) excluding evidence of the victims' statements immediately before the shooting. Remanded for a new trial. View "Ordway v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of numerous counts of incest, rape, and sodomy for his sexual relationships with his two minor stepdaughters, M.P. and C.P. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions, remanded to the trial court for resentencing on Appellant's incest convictions as to victim M.P., and vacated all imposed court costs and the partial public-defender fee, holding (1) ex post facto principles, which impact due process, required resentencing for Appellant's incest convictions as to victim M.P.; and (2) the trial court erred in levying court costs and partial public-defender fees on Defendant because he was indigent, and the court erred in ordering a review of court costs and public defender fees upon his release from prison. View "Miller v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of a misdemeanor and probated for the two-year statutory maximum on the condition that he attend counseling recommended by the Office of Probation and Parole. The Office recommended that Appellant enroll in the state's three-year sex offender treatment program. At a hearing, the trial court ordered briefing on the question of whether probation could be extended beyond the two-year limit for misdemeanors. The court then extended Defendant's probation until he completed the sex offender treatment program. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding (1) Defendant could not be required to complete a program that extended beyond his period of probation; (2) because Defendant completed his probation, he was discharged from it as a matter of law; and (3) to the extent the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether Defendant's probation should be revoked, its judgment was reversed. View "Miller v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This case arose from the sale of a truck by Appellant to Appellee. The parties executed a document titled "customer sales order" formalizing the deal that contained a binding arbitration provision. The provision failed to require the arbitration to be held in Kentucky but stated that the Federal Arbitration Act (Act) governed its interpretation and enforcement. After the truck was delivered, Appellee filed suit against Appellant, alleging fraud and intentional misrepresentation. The trial court denied Appellant's motion to compel arbitration under the arbitration clause. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Kentucky courts have no jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration agreement unless the agreement provides that the arbitration will occur in Kentucky. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant made a prima facie showing of an agreement requiring arbitration of the dispute between the parties; and (2) because that agreement stated that the Act controls, the circuit court had jurisdiction to enforce it, unless Appellee could meet its burden to show there was no valid agreement. View "MHC Kenworth-Knoxville/Nashville v. M & H Trucking, LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty-five years imprisonment and imposed a $200 public defender fee and $180 in court costs. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the portion of the judgment imposing a public defender fee and court costs, holding that the trial court did not err in assessing the costs and fee against Defendant, but it erred in ordering review of Defendant's ability to pay upon release, as the decision to impose costs and fees based on a defendant's ability to pay must be made by the trial court upon sentencing; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "Goncalves v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of first-degree robbery. Defendant was a minor at the time he committed the felonies, and because the offenses involved a firearm, Defendant was automatically transferred to the circuit court as a youthful offender to be tried as an adult. The trial court determined Defendant should be granted probation on his ten-year sentence. The trial court subsequently revoked Defendant's probation and sentenced him to the Department of Corrections (DOC) to serve his sentence. The DOC classified Defendant as a violent offender, a status that restricted Defendant's parole eligibility. Defendant filed a declaration of rights action, arguing that the DOC erred in classifying him as a violent offender because he was a youthful offender. The circuit court agreed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Violent Offender Statute applied to youthful offenders for purposes of parole eligibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the parole-eligibility limitations of the Violent Offender Statute apply to youthful offenders; and (2) therefore, the DOC correctly classified Defendant as a violent offender subject to that statute's parole-eligibility restrictions. View "Edwards v. Harrod" on Justia Law