Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was the apportionment of damages between two insurance companies who provided underinsured motorist (UM) coverave to a passenger injured in an automobile accident in Bowling Green. The Circuit Court ordered the companies to share the damages pro rata in proportion to their respective policy limits. Countryway Insurance appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the damages should not have been divided at all, but should have been apportioned entirely to United Financial, the insurer of the accident vehicle. To Countryway's dismay, the Court of Appeals panel decided that that argument was "half right:" the Court agreed that the damages should not have been divided, but in its view Countryway, the insurer of the injured passenger, bore full responsibility for the passenger's UM claim. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis of the controlling case-law applicable to this matter, reversed and remanded to the Circuit Court for entry of an appropriate order in favor of Countryway. View "Countryway Ins. Co. v. United Financial Casualty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Craig Smith, who suffered injuries in a motor vehicle accident, submitted an underinsured motorist coverage (UIM) claim to his insurer, Allstate Insurance Company. Allstate denied the claim because Smith’s policy did not provide for UIM coverage. Smith sued Allstate for breach of contract and a declaration of rights as to UIM coverage. The trial court granted summary judgment for Allstate because Smith had not paid a premium for UIM or requested UIM coverage. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Allstate had a duty under the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA) to advise Smith of possible UIM coverage. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, holding that Allstate had no affirmative duty under the MVRA to notify or counsel Smith on the availability of UIM coverage. View "Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident. Plaintiff filed a negligence suit against the adverse driver. Plaintiff settled the claim for the adverse driver’s automobile-liability-insurance policy limits. Before dismissing the suit, however, Plaintiff asserted a claim against his own automobile liability insurer, State Farm, for underinsured motorist benefits (UIM). Plaintiff’s insurance policy contained a limitation provision that gave Plaintiff two years from the date of the accident or date of the last basic reparation benefit payment within which to make a UIM claim. Plaintiff filed his UIM three years after the date of the accident. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm, concluding that the explicit terms of Plaintiff’s policy rendered his UIM claim untimely. The court of appeals reversed, holding that State Farm’s time limitation on UIM claims was unreasonable and therefore void. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State Farm policy provision was not unreasonable. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riggs" on Justia Law

Brent Horn, who was not an employee of B&B Contracting, LLC and did not receive compensation for his work, volunteered to drive one of the company’s trucks on a day that B&B was short-staffed. While Horn was driving a B&B truck, Bradley Stafford, a B&B employee, fell from Horn’s truck and was killed. The administratrix of Stafford’s estate brought a wrongful death action against Horn. Horn responded that the liability policy issued by Tower Insurance Company of New York insuring B&B’s trucks covered the claim against him. Tower then filed an intervening complaint seeking a declaration of rights regarding its obligation to defend and indemnify Horn. The circuit court denied coverage to Horn, concluding (1) Horn was a permissive user of B&B’s truck and thus was an insured under Tower’s policy; but (2) an employee exclusion in the policy precluded coverage for Stafford’s death because Stafford was an employee of B&B. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the policy’s severability clause rendered the employee exclusion ineffective as to Horn, who was not Stafford’s employer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the injured employee policy exclusion did not bar coverage of Horn, a permissive user. View "Tower Ins. Co. of New York v. Horn" on Justia Law

In 2010, two miners died in a mining accident while employed by Webster County Coal, LLC. That same year, another miner died in a mining accident while employed by River View Coal, LLC. Both River View and Webster County were wholly owned subsidiaries of Alliance Coal LLC, the parent company. Alliance, which had obtained a self-insurance contract, guaranteed payment of benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act in the event its subsidiaries failed to pay benefits. Webster County and River View accepted the workers’ compensation claims made on behalf of the surviving widows and children of the deceased miners, and Alliance paid the benefits. Appellants filed lawsuits against Alliance alleging that it had liability for the miners’ deaths. The trial court granted summary judgment for Alliance, concluding that it had immunity under the Act. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a parent company that completely self-insures the liability of its subsidiary is a carrier and immune from tort liability. View "Falk v. Alliance Coal, LLC" on Justia Law

Randy Ellington owned and operated R&J Cabinets as a sole proprietorship. When Ellington received a work-related injury, R&J had no employees. Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI) had previously issued a workers’ compensation policy to Ellington and R&J as “insureds.” At the same time, the policy included a specific exclusion from coverage of Ellington as the sole proprietor. KEMI denied Ellington’s claim for benefits, arguing that it was not covered because of the sole-proprietor exclusion endorsement. An administrative law judge concluded that Ellington was not covered by the policy. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the policy was ambiguous and construing it in Ellington’s favor to provide coverage for his injuries. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the policy, as issued, is not a personal policy but rather a business policy purchased by a sole proprietor, and Ellington, as the sole proprietor, was not entitled to benefits under the policy. View "Ky. Employers Mut. Ins. v. Ellington" on Justia Law

On April 24, 2008, Defendant ran a stop sign and struck Plaintiff’s vehicle, causing significant physical injuries. Plaintiff received basic reparations/personal injury protection benefits (PIP) from her insurer, Cincinnati Insurance Company (CIC). On September 21, 2011, Plaintiff filed her complaint. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. At issue on appeal was when the last payment was made by the CIC. The CIC issued a check to a physical therapist on March 17, 2009 that was either received or lost and then issued a replacement check on September 25, 2009. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court, concluding that a replacement check does not constitute making payment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the September 2009 check was the last “payment” of PIP. Remanded. View "Beaumont v. Zeru" on Justia Law

The home of Keith Conley was insured through an insurance policy issued by Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company. Conley’s son fatally murdered his girlfriend, Jessica Newsome, in Conley’s home. Gregory and Loretta Newsome brought a wrongful death action against Conley for damages arising from Jessica’s death. Kentucky Farm Bureau provided a defense to Conley for the Newsomes’ claims against him and intervened in the action seeking a declaration that the policy did not provide coverage to Conley for the claims arising from Jessica’s murder. The trial court ruled that the homeowner’s policy provided coverage for Conley’s acts. Kentucky Farm Bureau subsequently filed a Ky. R. Civ. P. 59.05 motion asking the court to alter or amend its order. The trial court denied the motion. Kentucky Farm Bureau then filed a notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that the Rule 59.05 motion was deficient due to a lack of “particularity” and therefore failed to toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, although Kentucky Farm Bureau’s Rule 59.05 motion did not strictly adhere to the particularity requirement of Ky. R. Civ. P. 7.02, the defect was not so serious that it should have been stricken. View "Ky. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Conley" on Justia Law

Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI) was the workers’ compensation carrier for Beacon Enterprises, Inc. at the time that Julian Hoskins was injured during the course of his employment with Four Star Transportation, Inc. (Four Star). Four Star had configured its workforce pursuant to an employee leasing arrangement with a company affiliated with Beacon Enterprises, an employee leasing company. The Workers’ Compensation Board determined that Hoskins was not covered by Beacon Enterprises’ policy with KEMI because Hoskins was not an employee of Beacon Enterprises at the time of the injury. The court of appeals upheld the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.615 does not require an employee to have knowledge of his status as a leased employee or of the nature of his relationship with the employee leasing company; and (2) because the court of appeals grounded its opinion upon Hoskins’s lack of knowledge, the matter must be remanded for the court to address other issues raised by KEMI in support of the Board’s decision. View "Ky. Ininsured Employers’ Fund v. Hoskins" on Justia Law

Angela Frye filed a workers' compensation claim against her employer alleging that in 2008 she suffered a work-related injury. The administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded Frye benefits related to the injury. In 2009, after the final hearing in the 2008 claim but before the ALJ took that claim under submission or rendered an opinion, Frye allegedly suffered a second work-related injury. In 2010, Frye filed a claim related to the 2009 accident. The ALJ dismissed the 2010 claim, concluding that Frye was required by Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.270(1) to file her claim for benefits related to the 2009 accident and join it to her pending 2008 claim, which she failed to do. The Workers' Compensation Board reversed, concluding that a claim is no longer pending for section 342,270(1) purposes after the date of the final hearing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in this case and under these facts, Frye's first injury claim was not pending between the date of the hearing and the date the ALJ rendered his opinion regarding that claim. Remanded.View "Saint Joseph Hosp. v. Frye" on Justia Law