Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this workers' compensation case, an ALJ determined that injuries Claimant sustained in an automobile accident while returning to Kentucky from yearling sales held in New York came within the course and scope of his employment with Defendant, Gaines Gentry Thoroughbreds. The workers' compensation board and court of appeals affirmed. Gaines Gentry appealed, arguing that the ALJ erred by awarding benefits because Claimant's injury was not work-related under the dual purpose, positional risk, or traveling employee doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ALJ reasonably found that Gaines Gentry instructed Claimant to travel to New York in a van with its yearlings in order to attend to them; and (2) the ALJ properly concluded under he circumstances that an accident that occurred while Claimant was returning to Kentucky to resume his usual duties for Gaines Gentry was work-related. View "Gaines Gentry Thoroughbreds, LLC v. Mandujano" on Justia Law

Claimant worked for Employer as an underground coal miner. Claimant filed claims for work-related injuries and filed an occupational hearing loss claim. An ALJ tripled the income benefits awarded for Claimant's injury and hearing loss claims. The ALJ then determined that Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.703(1)(d) limited the combined weekly benefits to a maximum of $473, seventy-five percent of the state's average weekly wage. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ's decision to triple the income benefits but reversed the maximum combined weekly benefit sua sponte and remanded with directions to correct the amount. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence showed that Claimant's hearing loss caused him to lack the physical capacity to perform the type of work performed at the time of injury, and therefore the evidence supported a triple benefit for the hearing loss claim; and (2) the Board did not exceed its authority by ordering the ALJ's misapplication of section 342.703(1)(d) to be corrected, as benefits under section 342.730(1)(c)(1) are limited to 100 percent rather than seventy-five percent of the state's average weekly wage. View "Sidney Coal Co. v. Kirk" on Justia Law

Claimant filed an application for workers' compensation, alleging injuries while working for Employer as a roofer. Having become a party because Employer was uninsured, the Uninsured Employers' Fund (UEF) denied the claim and stated that claimant's average weekly rate was unknown. Claimant asserted that his average weekly wage must be calculated under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.140(1)(e) because he had worked for less than thirteen weeks when the injury occurred. The ALJ applied section 342.140(1)(e) and determined that Claimant's weekly wage was $400 per week. The Workers' Compensation Board vacated the average weekly rate calculation because the record contained insufficient evidence to apply section 342.140(1)(e) properly. The Board then remanded the claim for additional proceedings to include the taking of additional proof. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board exceeded its authority under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.285(2)(c) by remanding the claim in order to provide Claimant with a second opportunity to meet his burden of proof. View "Commonwealth, Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Appellees conducted a renovation project near Appellant's place of work. Appellant filed a complaint against Appellees, alleging that Appellees negligently caused her to have occupational asthma and other injuries arising out of the renovation work. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, after which Appellants filed a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Ky. R. Civ. P. 60.02(a). The trial court granted the motion and then "re-granted" summary judgment in favor of Appellees. The court of appeals granted Appellees' motions to dismiss Appellant's appeal as untimely, finding that the trial court improperly granted Appellant's Rule 60.02 motion, and thus, the appeal became untimely because the thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal ran from the initial summary judgments rather than the latter summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a Rule 60.02 order granted under subsections (a)-(e), such as this one, may be considered in a motion to dismiss; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Rule 60.02 relief to Appellant. Remanded for consideration of the merits of the summary judgment rulings. View "Younger v. Evergreen Group, Inc." on Justia Law

After Michael Beglin's wife, Jennifer, died during surgery at University Hospital, Michael sued the hospital. The jury found that the hospital, through its employees and agents, acted negligently in causing the death of Jennifer and awarded compensatory and punitive damages to Michael. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment awarding compensatory damages and determined that the trial court properly gave a missing evidence instruction, but (2) vacated the punitive damages award, holding that the trial court erred in giving a punitive damages instruction under the circumstances of this case, and the court of appeals erred in affirming the judgment for punitive damages. Remanded for entry of a new judgment. View "Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Beglin" on Justia Law

Claimant injured his shoulder during his employment. Claimant and Employer agreed to settle the matter. Claimant subsequently underwent a surgery, which Employer failed to pre-authorize. Claimant then filed several motions, including a motion to reopen. An ALJ determined (1) the surgery was reasonable and necessary; (2) Employer must pay for the procedure and related expenses; (3) the parties' settlement precluded any claim for TTD benefits relative to the surgery; and (4) Employer's failure to pre-authorize or contest the surgery within thirty days did not warrant the imposition of sanctions. The workers' compensation board reversed with respect to future TTD benefits and affirmed otherwise. The court of appeals reversed with respect to future TTD and reinstated the ALJ's decision. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the denial of a future TTD award, holding that the terms of the parties' agreement barred a future TTD claim; and (2) reversed with respect to the issue of sanctions, holding that the case must be remanded to the ALJ to reconsider the question of sanctions based on a correct understanding of Employer's obligations and any other considerations relevant to the reasonableness of its action under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.310(1) and 803 Ky. Admin. Reg. 25:012, 2(1)(a). View "Richey v. Perry Arnold, Inc." on Justia Law

Claimant Randy Lewis sought benefits for work-related lumbar spine injuries sustained in 2001 and 2002 and a work-related cervical spine injury sustained in 2005. An ALJ awarded 425 weeks of partial disability benefits at the rate of $315 per week for the lumbar injuries beginning in 2004 and 425 weeks of partial disability benefits at the rate of $498 per week beginning in 2007. Employer filed a petition for reconsideration, noting that the combined weekly benefits would equal $813 during the weeks they overlapped and that Claimant was not entitled to receive combined weekly benefits totaling more than $607, the maximum benefit that Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(a) allowed for total disability. The ALJ granted the petition and amended the claims, concluding that the separate partial disability awards did not entitle Claimant to receive at any time combined weekly benefits that exceeded the maximum for permanent total disability. The workers' compensation board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the maximum benefit permitted by section 342.703(1)(a) applies to multiple partial disability awards and does not entitle a worker to be compensated at one time for more than total disability. View "Lewis v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

On April 1, 2005, Employee was injured during the course of his employment. Due to the injury, Employee never returned to work. Employee received workers' compensation benefits from April 2, 2005 through April 14, 2007. When the workers' compensation benefits ceased, Employee applied for unemployment insurance benefits. The Unemployment Insurance Commission based Employee's unemployment benefits on an extended base period comprised of the first three quarters of 2005 and the fourth quarter of 2006. Employee appealed, arguing that the extended base period should be based upon the four calendar quarters of the year 2004 because those were the most recent four quarters which fairly reflected the wages he earned prior to his injury. The circuit court reversed. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was the proper interpretation of "extended base period" as defined in section 341.090(2). The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the decision of the Commission, holding that the Commission properly applied the statute as written by the General Assembly in calculating Employee's unemployment benefits. View "Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Doctors' Associates, Inc. (DAI) owns the "Subway" trademark and franchises the right to operate Subway sandwich shops nationwide. A claimant sought workers' compensation benefits for a work-related injury sustained while working for an uninsured Subway franchisee. The DAI and Uninsured Employers' Fund (UEF) were later joined as parties. The sole issue submitted for a decision by the ALJ was whether DAI was a contractor and, thus, liable to the employee of its uninsured subcontractor. The ALJ dismissed the UEF's claim against DAI, ruling that Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.610, which provides that a contractor can be liable to the employee of its uninsured subcontractor, imposed no liability on DAI because the statute did not encompass franchise relationships. The workers' compensation board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the ALJ committed by legal error by concluding that the legislature did not intend for section 34.610 to encompass the franchisor-franchisee relationship simply because the statute failed to mention the relationship. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the ALJ erroneously interpreted section 342.610, but (2) the error did not require reversal of the ALJ's ruling because the ALJ properly analyzed the facts of the case under the statute. View "Doctors' Assocs. v. Uninsured Employers' Fund " on Justia Law

After a surgery at University Hospital, Jennifer Beglin passed away. Appellee, Michael Beglin, brought suit against the Hospital. A jury found that the Hospital, through its employees and agents, acted negligently in causing the death of Jennifer. The trial court then entered judgment awarding compensatory and punitive damages. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court properly gave a missing evidence instruction in connection with the unexplained disappearance with an occurrence report because (i) the trier of fact is entitled to such an instruction when it may be reasonably believed that material evidence within the exclusive control of a party was lost without explanation, and the trier of fact may find that the evidence was intentionally and in bad faith destroyed or concealed by the party possessing it, and (ii) the instruction did not unduly affect the general verdict or punitive damages award; but (2) the trial court erred by giving a punitive damages instruction under the circumstances in this case. Remanded. View "Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Beglin" on Justia Law