Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this appeal was the question of an agent's authority to bind his or her principal to an arbitration agreement presented with other documents upon the principal's admission to a long-term care facility. Agent in this case was the daughter and executrix of the deceased Principal. Agent brought a claim for negligence against the long-term care facility where Principal spent the last years of her life. Invoking an arbitration agreement executed in conjunction with Principal's admission to the nursing home, Defendants moved the trial court to dismiss the complaint. The trial court denied the motion, holding that Agent, who executed the admissions agreement on behalf of Principal, had no authority to agree to arbitration. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the agreement was enforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the optional arbitration agreement Agent purported to execute on Principal's behalf was beyond the scope of Agent's authority and was therefore unenforceable. View "Ping v. Beverly Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

Claimant sustained a work-related injury in 2003, for which he was awarded temporary total disability (TTD) benefits followed by 425 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits. In 2007 Claimant sustained another injury. After finding the effects of the 2003 injury caused Claimant's 2007 injury, an ALJ increased Claimant's partial disability benefit at reopening and tripled the entire income benefit awarded for his injury. The workers' compensation board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the finding of increased impairment as well as the finding that Claimant lacked the physical capacity at reopening to perform the type of work performed at the time of his injury; and (2) the combined effects of the impairment present at the time of the initial award and the additional impairment present at reopening entitled Claimant to triple benefits based on the whole of his disability for the balance of the compensable period. View "James T. English Trucking v. Beeler" on Justia Law

An ALJ determined that Claimant sustained a work-related hearing loss and that Kan. Rev. Stat. 342.7305(4) placed the entire liability for income and medical benefits with Appellant, the last employer with whom Claimant was last injuriously exposed to hazardous noise. The workers' compensation board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record contained substantial evidence that testing revealed a pattern of hearing loss compatible with that caused by hazardous noise exposure and contained substantial evidence that Claimant sustained repetitive exposure to hazardous noise in the workplace, including his final employment with Appellant; and (2) Kan. Stat. Rev. 342.7305(4) does not permit apportioning liability among employers in such cases. View "Greg's Constr. v. Keeton" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned an ALJ's decision to award the claimant temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for his work-related shoulder injury from the date he left work, May 10, 2007, until May 8, 2009. The ALJ also awarded permanent income and medical benefits for the injury but denied claims for cervical and lumbar spine injuries. A court of appeals majority reversed, concluding that the opinion and award failed to contain findings adequate to make clear whether the ALJ considered and understood all of the evidence relevant to the date when TTD began. The Supreme Court (1) reversed to the extent that the ALJ made the finding of fact required by Kan. Rev. Stat. 342.0011(11)(a); but (2) affirmed to the extent the Court was unable to determine whether the ALJ simply misstated May 10, 2007 as being the date the claimant testified he stopped working due to the effects of his injury, misunderstood the evidence concerning his reason for missing work on May 10, 2007, or chose May 10, 2007 based on other evidence. Remanded to the ALJ to clarify that portion of the decision. View "Arnold v. Toyota Motor Mfg." on Justia Law

This matter involved the ability to recover attorney's fees based on a contingency fee arrangement when an attorney withdraws from representation of the client for what the lawyer believes is a valid cause. The district court found Attorney was not entitled to recover his attorney's fees based on a quantum meruit claim but awarded him funds to cover calculated expenses from his representation of Appellee in a personal injury case with a contingency fee contract. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a disagreement with a client over whether to accept a settlement offer is not good and sufficient cause for an attorney to withdraw with expectation of a quantum meruit fee. View "Lofton v. Fairmont Specialty Ins. Managers, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a district court acted outside the scope of its jurisdiction when it issued an order requiring a guardian to provide all financial records related to a court-ordered accounting and to make restitution to a guardianship account. The circuit court denied a petition for writ of prohibition prohibiting the district judge from enforcing his orders. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court and remanded the case back for entry of a writ of prohibition, opining that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the charge was one of mismanagement of funds and beyond the scope of the court's powers. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court's order requiring the circuit court to enter a writ of prohibition was improper, as the district court is granted exclusive jurisdiction to manage and settle guardianship accounts and was acting soundly within its jurisdiction in this case. View "Dist. Court (Karem) v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Appellants Tanya and Jeffrey Childers filed this action against Appellees, Dr. Sandra Geile and Marshal Emergency Services Associates, PSC, claiming severe emotional distress caused by the outrageous and intentional or reckless conduct of Dr. Geile when she told them Tanya had miscarried their child when in fact she had not. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether summary judgment for Appellees was proper because a claim for intentional infliction of emotion distress cannot be maintained when the same facts support a traditional tort claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress did not apply to these facts, and summary judgment was proper because the doctor's conduct was properly the subject of a traditional tort claim. View "Childers v. Geile" on Justia Law

Under Kentucky's dog-bite liability statutes, the owner of a dog is strictly liable for damages caused by the dog. This case presented the questions whether a landlord can be liable under the statutory scheme's broad definition of "owner" and whether that liability can extend to injuries caused by a tenant's dog off the leased premises. The Supreme Court held that (1) landlord can be the owner of a tenant's dog for the purposes of liability under certain circumstances, but any such liability extends only to injuries caused on or immediately adjacent to the premises; and (2) for that reason, the landlord in this case could not be liable under the statutes. View "Benningfield v. Zinsmeister" on Justia Law

When calculating the income benefit for he claimant's work-related injury, the ALJ apportioned sixty-three percent of the twenty-one percent permanent impairment rating that existed at maximum medical improvement (MMI) to a pre-existing active condition, which was non-compensable. The court of appeals affirmed the workers' compensation board's decision to vacate the calculation on the ground that the ALJ should have subtracted the pre-existing active impairment rating that existed immediately before the injury from the impairment rating that existed at MMI and based the income benefit on the remainder. The employer appealed, arguing that nothing prevented the ALJ from apportioning the impairment rating at MMI based on permissible inferences drawn from the medical evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the board and court of appeals applied the correct methodology for determining the impairment rating upon which to base income benefits. View "Audi of Lexington v. Elam" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(6) entitled UPS Airlines to receive credit against its liability under section 342.730(1) for the payment of loss of license benefits that were the product of a collective bargaining agreement between UPS Airlines and the Independent Pilots Association (IPA), of which Claimant was a member. Claimant, a UPS pilot, sustained a work-related injury and underwent surgery. UPS paid the entire premium for the loss of license insurance plan. UPS subsequently sought leave to credit Claimant's loss of license benefits against its liability for income benefits. Reversing an ALJ's decision, the workers' compensation board found that section 342.730(6) did not entitle UPS to a dollar-for-dollar credit against Claimant's past due and future income benefits for all benefits paid under the loss of license plan. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed to the extent that UPS was not entitled to a dollar-for-dollar credit; but (2) reversed with respect to the conclusion that loss of license benefits were not funded exclusively by the employer for the purposes of section 342.730(6) because they were bargained-for benefits, holding that section 342.730(6) does not entitle UPS to credit the overpayment of voluntary benefits against future income benefits. Remanded. View "UPS Airlines v. West" on Justia Law