Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Matthew Stanford volunteered with the US Army Cadet Corp. (USACC). Stanford also participated in a program administered by Bluegrass Area Development District (Bluegrass). While accompanying the USACC cadets on a field trip, Stanford fell from a zip line and suffered a permanent injury that rendered him a quadriplegic. An ALJ granted Stanford benefits, finding Stanford was primarily an employee of USACC, who served as a subcontractor for Bluegrass, and accordingly, Bluegrass would be responsible for the payments because USACC did not carry workers' compensation insurance. The Workers' Compensation Board concluded (1) Bluegrass could not be held responsible for paying Stanford's benefits, and instead, USACC was liable, and (2) Stanford was working as a USACC employee at the time of the accident. The court of appeals affirmed and ordered the Uninsured Employers' Fund to reimburse Bluegrass for the medical expenses Bluegrass paid on behalf of Stanford. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bluegrass shared responsibility with USACC as Stanford's employer and may be held responsible to pay his workers' compensation benefits. Remanded for a recalculation of which employer - Bluegrass or USACC - was liable for what proportion of Stanford's benefits. View "Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Stanford" on Justia Law

A tractor trailer owned by Fuel Transport and driven by its employee, Troy Vanderpool, overturned on a highway. Roger Russell was driving his vehicle with Topsie Gibson as his passenger when he collided with the truck and trailer. Gibson subsequently died from her injuries. Gibson's estate (Estate) sued Vanderpool for ordinary negligence and Fuel Transport for vicarious liability in negligent entrustment and gross negligence for failing to properly maintain the truck involved in the accident. A jury found in favor of the Estate and awarded compensatory damages against both defendants and punitive damages against Fuel Transport. The court of appeals set aside the award of punitive damages, finding that the record did not support the finding of gross negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding that Fuel Transport's negligent maintenance of the truck caused the accident. The Court also found Fuel Transport's contentions on cross-appeal to be without merit. View "Gibson v. Fuel Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellee, an owner of a condominium managed by the Coach House and a member of a condominium association, requested that the Board of Directors of the Coach House allow him access to the financial records and minutes of the Board's meetings spanning a two-year period. Appellant, the attorney for the Board, refused Appellee's request. Thereafter, Appellee wrote of the attorney general's (AG) office asking that it prosecute the matter involving his records request. Appellant responded by sending a letter to the AG explaining the reasons restrictions were placed on the records, including some reasons unflattering to Appellee. Appellee subsequently filed suit against Appellant for defamation. The trial court granted Appellant's motion for summary judgment, determining that Appellant's letter to the AG was a direct response to an appeal for prosecution and was thus part of a judicial proceeding. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment, holding that the communications made to the AG's office were not part of a judicial proceeding and thus were entitled to only a qualified privilege. View "Stigler v. Flint" on Justia Law

Appellant, the representative of a decedent's estate, hired attorneys David Mushlin and William Nefzger and their law firm to pursue a medical negligence claim against a hospital and several physicians. The trial court later disqualified Mushlin on the ground that Mushlin's prior representation of the hospital was sufficient to create a conflict of interest or at least the appearance of impropriety. The court also noted that Nefzger and the entire firm were conflicted because Mushlin could not effectively be screened from the case and there was a great likelihood of his having constant contact with the other attorneys who would be working on the case in his stead. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of prohibition, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to show she would suffer great injustice and irreparable injury from the trial court's order disqualifying her lawyer and his law firm from representing her. View "Robertson v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

While Brenda Osborne was at home alone, an airplane pilot crashed his airplane into Osborne's home. Osborne subsequently hired Attorney to assist her recovering her losses from the pilot, but when the lawsuit was finally filed, the federal court dismissed the action as barred by limitations. Osborne filed this action against Attorney asserting breach of contract, legal malpractice, and fraud and deceit. A jury found in favor of Osborne, resulting in a judgment against Attorney in excess of $5 million. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment in part but vacated a large portion of the damage award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court properly tried this case using the suit-within-a-suit method but erred when it failed to instruct the jury on Pilot's negligence, thus resulting in Osborne's failure to establish that Attorney's malpractice proximately caused her loss; (2) emotional-distress plaintiffs must first satisfy the elements of a general negligence claim; and (3) punitive damages are not recoverable against an attorney in a legal malpractice case. View "Osborne v. Keeney" on Justia Law

Timothy and Theresa LaMarre and their two children filed a personal injury action against Michael and Kimberly Plummer and the Fort Mitchell Country Club after a golf cart Mr. Plummer was driving accelerated while Mr. LaMarre was attempting to take his seat, resulting in serious injuries to Mr. LaMarre. The suit alleged the Club was liable for Mr LaMarre's injuries as a result of Mr. Plummer's negligence in driving a golf cart while intoxicated. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Club, finding that the Dram Shop Act applied and shielded the Club from any liability in the matter. The court of appeals reversed. The Club sought discretionary review. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the circuit court's summary judgment order, holding that because the Club held an alcohol license under Kan. Rev. Stat 243.030, it was not liable for Mr. Plummer's negligence unless one of the stated exceptions under the Act was met, and none of the exceptions were met in this case. View "Fort Mitchell Country Club v. LaMarre" on Justia Law

This case interpreted Ky. Rev. Stat. 620.050, which provides civil and criminal immunity to the reporters of suspected child dependency, neglect, and abuse. On the basis of that immunity, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants, Norton Hospitals, Neonatal Intensive Care Experts II, and Dr. Ketan Mehta, in a civil suit filed by Brandi Peyton for medical malpractice, negligence, and emotional distress, among other claims. Peyton alleged negligence in generating, interpreting, and reporting toxicology reports that showed Peyton had a high blood alcohol concentration the evening before giving birth to a baby. The court of appeals reversed, opining that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to who initiated the toxicology screening, which, in the court's view, affected the availability of immunity under sections 620.050(1) and 620.050(14). The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) the trial court did not err in finding that there was no issue of material fact as to whether Appellants acted in good faith under Ky. Rev. Stat. 620.030 in reporting the toxicology reports; and (2) Appellants were therefore entitled to immunity under section 620.050(1) as a matter of law. Remanded. View "Norton Hosps., Inc. v. Peyton" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a medical negligence and wrongful death lawsuit against Hospital after Appellant's husband, who had been admitted to a psychiatric unit in Hospital where suicide precautions were taken, hung himself and died. The circuit court court ordered the disclosure of various documents that Hospital claimed were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The court of appeals found the documents were privileged and granted Hospital's requested writ of prohibition stopping the circuit court from order the disclosure of the documents. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' order, holding that the writ was erroneously granted, as Hospital failed to show that the privilege applied. View "Collins v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

A circuit court awarded Appellant $120,864 in his simple negligence action against Appellee, House of Imports, after he fell down a set of stairs at the retailer's business establishment. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court committed palpable error in permitting expert testimony of building code violations without instructing the jury as to the applicability of the code. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated that of the trial court, holding that the trial court did not palpably err in admitting expert testimony of building code violations without a concomitant jury instruction as to the applicability of the code. View "Wright v. House of Imports, Inc. " on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the method for excluding impairment from a non-compensable disability when calculating a worker's permanent disability benefit under the post-1996 version of Kan. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(b). The ALJ calculated a benefit based on the claimant's entire post-injury permanent impairment rating and then subtracted an amount equal to a benefit based on his pre-existing active impairment rating. The workers' compensation board reversed, determining that the present version of section 342.730(1)(b) requires the calculation of income benefits to be based only on the permanent impairment rating caused by the injury being compensated. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that pre-existing impairment must be excluded when calculating a total disability award under section 342.730(1)(b). View "Tudor v. Indus. Mold & Mach. Co." on Justia Law