Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was injured while working for Employer, which had an insurance policy issued by Zurich American Insurance Company. The policy included an underinsured motorist (UIM) endorsement. After settling with the tortfeasor, Appellant sought damages from the UIM coverage in the Zurich policy. After Zurich refused Appellant’s claim, Appellant sued Zurich. Ultimately, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Zurich on the grounds that the UIM coverage included in the policy was the result of a mutual mistake in the making of the insurance contract. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting Appellant’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of UIM coverage, holding that reformation of the insurance contract on the grounds of mutual mistake was improper because (1) the facts did not establish that at the time the insurance contract was formed, the minds of the contracting parties met with the common intent to execute a policy that excluded UIM coverage; and (2) Zurich did not assert the mistake or deny the existence of UIM coverage until after Appellant had released the tortfeasor. View "Nichols v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against a rehabilitation hospital where her husband was staying after Plaintiff became entangled in some wires strung along the side of her husband's bed and fell, fracturing her kneecap. The trial court granted summary judgment to the hospital, concluding that the hospital owed no duty of care to Plaintiff because the wires were an open and obvious condition. Before the court of appeals affirmed, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Kentucky River Medical Center v. McIntosh, which modified Kentucky premises-liability law. The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the court of appeals on a second appeal, holding (1) the foreseeability and duty analysis employed by the court of appeals in reaching its decision was incompatible with modern tort law trends; and (2) the analysis is now such that a court no longer makes a no-duty determination but, rather, makes a no-breach determination, which places the reasonable-foreseeability analysis in the hands of the jury. Remanded. View "Shelton v. Ky. Easter Seals Soc'y, Inc." on Justia Law

Following the death of their father in an accident in which the van he was driving struck a retaining wall, Appellees retained a law firm and attorneys (collectively, Appellants) to pursue a wrongful death action against the company charged with maintaining the van. The circuit court dismissed the suit after the defendant successfully excluded two of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses. Two years later, Appellees filed a professional negligence action against Appellants. The trial court granted Appellants' motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellees were not in privity with Appellants and thus lacked standing to sue for professional negligence. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) there was a material factual issue in dispute as to whether Appellees were represented by Appellants or were led to believe they were being represented by them, and (2) even if there was no privity, the children were owed professional duties because they were the intended beneficiaries of the underlying wrongful death action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there were issues of material fact regarding the attorney-client relationship; and (2) the attorneys owed duties to the children, who were real parties in interest to the wrongful death action. View "Pete v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Appellee sued Dick's Sporting Goods after she slipped and fell to the floor at one of Dick's stores, claiming the store was negligent in maintaining its premises. Dick's denied that it owed any duty to Appellee because the condition of the floor was open and obvious. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dick's. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment, as Dick's had an affirmative duty to maintain its store premises in a reasonably safe condition and whether Dick's breached that duty was a question for the jury to decide. Remanded. View "Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Webb" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between a condominium association (the Council) and one of its co-owners (Ballard) regarding the need to replace and who should bear the cost of replacement of a two-story wall of windows in Ballard's condominium. Ballard filed suit against the Council seeking damages for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, among other claims. The Council, meanwhile, replaced the wall of windows and filed a lien statement and lis pendens to serve as notice that it was asserting a lien against Ballard's condominium. The Council counterclaimed. Ballard amended her complaint to assert, inter alia, a slander of title claim. After a jury trial, the trial court awarded judgment to Ballard and ordered the Council to release its lis pendens notice and statement of lien from Ballard's condominium. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Ballard's slander of title claim was properly submitted to the jury; and (2) the court of appeals correctly determined that the Council did not have a fiduciary duty to Ballard, and therefore, the fiduciary claim should have been dismissed rather than a new trial ordered. Remanded. View "Ballard v. 1400 Willow Council of Co-Owners, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose after the settlement of Guard v. American Home Products, Inc., which was brought by Kentucky residents who had taken the diet drug known as Fen-Phen. Each Appellant was a plaintiff in the Guard case and was represented under a contingent fee contract by Appellees, a team of four attorneys. Appellants filed a complaint alleging that Appellees breached their fiduciary duties by wrongfully retaining or improperly disbursing a portion of the Guard case settlement money that should have gone to Appellants. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Appellants, finding three of the attorneys breached their fiduciary duty. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case against the three attorneys for further proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' opinion regarding the issue of the three attorneys' breach of fiduciary duty and reinstated the partial summary judgment entered against them, holding, primarily, (1) the facts established a breach of fiduciary duty that entitled Appellants to summary judgment on the three attorneys' liability as a matter of law; and (2) the court of appeals did not err by declining to review the trial court's denial of summary judgment against the fourth attorney, as the order was not appealable. View "Abbott v. Chelsea " on Justia Law

Appellee brought his vehicle to Appellant's shop for repairs. When Appellant presented Appellee with his bill, Appellee refused to pay until Appellant proved he purchased the parts he claimed to have installed. Appellant retained Appellee's vehicle while he attempted to resolve the dispute. Appellee subsequently filed a criminal complaint against Appellant, and Appellant was arrested for failure to make required disposition of property. Appellee regained possession of his vehicle, and the charges against Appellant were dismissed. Appellant then filed a mechanic's lien and brought suit against Appellee to enforce the lien. The complaint also claimed damages for, inter alia, malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The trial court directed a verdict in Appellee's favor on most of Appellant's claims but concluded that Appellant asserted a valid mechanic's lien and awarded Appellant $8,000. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's orders directing verdicts on the abuse of process and malicious prosecution claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred in directing a verdict of dismissal on the malicious prosecution claim based on the advice of counsel defense; and (2) Appellant submitted sufficient evidence to survive a motion for a directed verdict on the abuse of process claim. View "Garcia v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

Kenneth Crum, who was horseback riding at the time, was struck and severely injured by a vehicle driven by Raymond Ousley. At the time, Ousley was test-driving the vehicle, an uninsured car titled to Rhonda Ward. Crum sued Ousley for personal injuries and later joined Ousley's auto liability insurer, Kentucky Farm Bureau, for no-fault benefits. Kentucky Farm and Crum settled the negligence claims against Ousley for $25,000. Later, the trial court declared by final order that Kentucky Farm was also required to pay basic reparation benefits (BRBs) to Crum for the motor vehicle accident. The trial court then entered a final order declaring coverage for Crum and ordering Kentucky Farm also to pay Crum the no-fault benefits. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Kentucky law did not allow Crum to recover and Ousley's policy excluded Crum. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a pedestrian struck by an uninsured vehicle being driven by an ininsured driver can recover no-fault benefits from the driver's insurance company; and (2) therefore, Crum was entitled to receive BRBs from Kentucky Farm. View "Samons v. Ky. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Krystal Meredith was twenty years old and thirty-seven weeks pregnant when she began to experience abdominal pain. Krystal visited the Norton Hospital emergency three times in the next three days and was treated by Dr. James Haile. She was sent home following the first two visits but was admitted to the hospital after the third. Subsequent blood work revealed an ongoing infection. After Krystal gave birth to a healthy daughter under the care of Dr. Luis Velasco, it was discovered Krystal had a ruptured appendix and abscess. Krystal later developed acute respiratory distress syndrome and died. Plaintiffs, Krystal's parents, filed suit against Dr. Haile, Dr. Velasco, and the Hospital for wrongful death and loss of parental consortium. A jury found in favor of Defendants, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court twice erred in refusing to strike jurors for cause, and the error was not harmless. Remanded. View "Grubb v. Norton Hosps., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Christina Wittich. Wittich's parents brought a wrongful death action against Appellant on behalf of their daughter's estate (Estate) and obtained a multi-million dollar jury verdict. Appellant appealed, naming only "the Estate of Christina Wittich" as a party to the appeal. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for failure to name the co-administrators of the Estate. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, holding that Appellant's error in the notice of appeal as not fatal to the appeal, as naming "The Estate of Christina Wittich" provided sufficient notice to the co-administrators of the Wittich Estate, conferred jurisdiction over the co-administrators, and identified the proper party to the appeal. View "Flick v. Estate of Wittich" on Justia Law