Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On April 24, 2008, Defendant ran a stop sign and struck Plaintiff’s vehicle, causing significant physical injuries. Plaintiff received basic reparations/personal injury protection benefits (PIP) from her insurer, Cincinnati Insurance Company (CIC). On September 21, 2011, Plaintiff filed her complaint. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. At issue on appeal was when the last payment was made by the CIC. The CIC issued a check to a physical therapist on March 17, 2009 that was either received or lost and then issued a replacement check on September 25, 2009. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court, concluding that a replacement check does not constitute making payment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the September 2009 check was the last “payment” of PIP. Remanded. View "Beaumont v. Zeru" on Justia Law

Joseph Toler, who had been employed with Sud-Chemie, Inc. for approximately twenty-five years, was discharged after co-workers reported that Toler made racist comments in the workplace. Toler filed a complaint for defamation against Sud-Chemie and his coworkers, arguing that the employees had fabricated the allegations resulting in his termination. The trial court directed a verdict for Sud-Chemie and one of the coworkers, citing a qualified privilege to defamation. The jury then returned a verdict for the remaining coworkers because either the statements made about Toler were true or they were not made with malice. The court of appeals (1) affirmed the jury’s verdict, but (2) reversed the directed verdict, concluding that a plaintiff is only required to present a prima facie defamation case to defeat a qualified-privilege defendant’s directed-verdict motion. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) directed verdict in favor of Sud-Chemie was appropriate, as a plaintiff in a defamation action opposing a qualified-privilege defendant’s directed-verdict motion must produce some evidence of the defendant’s actual malice to survive a directed verdict; and (2) the jury’s verdict was sound. View "Toler v. Sud-Chemie, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against Defendants after sustaining serious injuries in an automobile collision. In the first trial, the jury was instructed on the “sudden emergency” doctrine and returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for a retrial, holding that the sudden emergency doctrine did not apply. On remand, the second jury was not instructed on the sudden emergency doctrine and, contrary to the first trial, was also not instructed Defendants had a duty to stay in the right lane. The second jury also returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court should have granted Plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict in the second trial and ordered the case to be retried only on the issues of damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the law-of-the-case doctrine did not preclude the court of appeals from determining whether a directed verdict should have been granted after the second trial; and (2) the court of appeals did not err in holding that the trial court should have directed verdict in Plaintiff’s favor, nor did the court misstate material facts in its opinion. View "Wright v. Carroll" on Justia Law

Luvetta Goff died as a result of complications from surgery performed by Appellants at the University of Kentucky Hospital. Goff’s estate filed an action against Appellants, alleging wrongful death and medical malpractice. This appeal arose from a discovery dispute regarding an alleged incident report generated by a surgical nurse concerning the surgery. Appellants petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition preventing the trial court from ordering production of the report, arguing that it fell within the federal privilege created by the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005. The court of appeals granted the writ but concluded that the Act’s privilege was limited. The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals regarding the protective scope of the privilege under the Act, holding that information normally contained in an incident report is not privileged under the Act and may be discovered, following an in camera review, and its information compelled. Remanded to the trial court for an in camera review. View "Tibbs v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants alleging fraud, defamation, abuse of process, breach of fiduciary duty, and other claims. Plaintiff also requested declaratory judgment, accounting, and injunctive relief. Pursuant to the parties’ prior agreement, which included an arbitration clause, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on all counts with the exception of claims involving defamation and abuse of process. Because Defendants appealed, the trial court refrained from ruling on Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. Consequently, Plaintiff petitioned the court of appeals, without success, for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed. Plaintiff also appealed the trial court’s order compelling arbitration. Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ appeals were consolidated. The court of appeals affirmed the entirety of the trial court’s order compelling arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of Plaintiff’s appeal because Plaintiff attempted to appeal from a non-final order; and (2) the court of appeals correctly determined that the abuse of process and defamation claims fell outside the agreement to arbitrate. View "Linden v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured while working as a carman for CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT). Appellant sued CSXT under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), asserting that his injuries were, in part, the result of CSXT’s negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment on Appellant’s negligence claims in favor of CSXT. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) issues of material fact existed as to whether Appellant’s injuries resulted in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of CSXT, and the issues were within the common knowledge and experience of the jury; and (2) therefore, summary judgment was improper. View "Caniff v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Lebron Gaither was eighteen years old when he began working as a confidential informant for the Kentucky State Police (KSP). Lebron was tortured and killed while working as a confidential informant. Gaither’s Estate filed a wrongful death claim against the KSP, alleging that Gaither’s death was caused by KSP officers in the negligent performance of ministerial duties within the course and scope of heir employment. The Board identified four instances of KSP conduct that it found to be the negligent performance of ministerial acts and awarded Gaither’s estate $168,729. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the actions of the KSP officers that led to Gaither’s death were discretionary acts, not ministerial acts, and were therefore subject to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Surpeme Court reversed, holding that, while some of the acts of the KSP leading up to Gaither’s death were discretionary acts, the KSP's decision to use Gaither as a confidential informant after his identity had been compromised was the negligent performance of a ministerial act. View "Gaither v. Justice & Pub. Safety Cabinet" on Justia Law

Barbara Allgeier sustained serious injuries as a passenger on a bus operated by MV Transportation, Inc. Allgeier filed suit against MV, alleging that her injury was caused by the bus driver’s negligence for which MV was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior and that MV was negligent in hiring and supervising the bus driver. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Allgeier. Allgeier was awarded medical expenses in the amount of $74,630 and $4,100,000 as compensation for pain and suffering. The court of appeals affirmed the award of compensatory damages and reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Allgeier’s punitive damage claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals (1) did not err in affirming evidentiary rulings of the trial court relating to the bus driver’s past alcoholism; (2) did not err by reinstating Allgeier’s punitive damages claim; and (3) did not err by remanding the case for trial upon the issue of punitive damages alone instead of a complete retrial upon all issues presented in the original trial. View "MV Transp., Inc. v. Allgeier" on Justia Law

A Law Firm had an escrow account with a Bank and authorized an employee to sign checks on the account by herself. The employee began embezzling money from the Firm’s various escrow accounts by engaging in a scheme called “check-kiting,” which involved the employee writing and depositing checks between the Bank account and the Law Firm’s account at another bank. More than three years after the last activity on the Bank account the Law Firm sued the Bank, raising four claims, including violations of the Uniform Commercial Code and common-law causes of action. The court of appeals concluded that the claims were barred by the one-year repose period of Ky. Rev. Stat. 355.4-406. The Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds, holding that the claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations under Ky. Rev. Stat. 355.4-111. View "Mark D. Dean, P.S.C. v. Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co." on Justia Law

Judith Burton filed a complaint against Dr. Philip Trover, a radiologist, and the Trover Clinic Foundation (TCF), Dr. Trover’s employer, alleging (1) Dr. Trover misread CT scans of her lungs, thereby delaying the diagnosis of her lung cancer, and (2) TCF was vicariously liable for Dr. Trover’s alleged negligence and was negligent itself in credentialing. Burton died before tried, and her Estate revived the complaint with respect to TCF, which impleaded Dr. Trover. A jury entered a verdict for Dr. Trover, and the trial court dismissed all of the Estate’s claims. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred by not allowing the Estate to cross-examine Dr. Trover regarding the status of his Kentucky medical license, and the error was not harmless. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its its discretion by excluding the license-status evidence, given the potential for confusing the issues to be tried and the strong likelihood that it would cause unfair prejudice. View "Trover v. Estate of Burton" on Justia Law