Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Claimant filed an application for workers' compensation, alleging injuries while working for Employer as a roofer. Having become a party because Employer was uninsured, the Uninsured Employers' Fund (UEF) denied the claim and stated that claimant's average weekly rate was unknown. Claimant asserted that his average weekly wage must be calculated under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.140(1)(e) because he had worked for less than thirteen weeks when the injury occurred. The ALJ applied section 342.140(1)(e) and determined that Claimant's weekly wage was $400 per week. The Workers' Compensation Board vacated the average weekly rate calculation because the record contained insufficient evidence to apply section 342.140(1)(e) properly. The Board then remanded the claim for additional proceedings to include the taking of additional proof. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board exceeded its authority under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.285(2)(c) by remanding the claim in order to provide Claimant with a second opportunity to meet his burden of proof. View "Commonwealth, Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Appellant, TECO Mechanical Contractor, Inc., filed a complaint and petition for declaration of rights against the Labor Cabinet, asserting that Kentucky's prevailing wage law (1) violated due process by authorizing the Cabinet to assess back wages and civil penalties without a hearing; and (2) failed to specify how workers should be classified and, as a result, improperly delegated legislative or judicial authority to the Cabinet. The circuit court ruled in favor of the Cabinet, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the prevailing wage law did not violate the state or federal Constitutions, as (1) TECO failed to establish that the Cabinet's actions under the prevailing wage law deprived it of a property or liberty interest that is protected by the due process clause; and (2) the law prescribes sufficient standards to prevent the Cabinet from abusing any legislative or judicial authority granted to it under the prevailing wage law. View "Teco Mech. Contractor, Inc. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Claimant injured his shoulder during his employment. Claimant and Employer agreed to settle the matter. Claimant subsequently underwent a surgery, which Employer failed to pre-authorize. Claimant then filed several motions, including a motion to reopen. An ALJ determined (1) the surgery was reasonable and necessary; (2) Employer must pay for the procedure and related expenses; (3) the parties' settlement precluded any claim for TTD benefits relative to the surgery; and (4) Employer's failure to pre-authorize or contest the surgery within thirty days did not warrant the imposition of sanctions. The workers' compensation board reversed with respect to future TTD benefits and affirmed otherwise. The court of appeals reversed with respect to future TTD and reinstated the ALJ's decision. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the denial of a future TTD award, holding that the terms of the parties' agreement barred a future TTD claim; and (2) reversed with respect to the issue of sanctions, holding that the case must be remanded to the ALJ to reconsider the question of sanctions based on a correct understanding of Employer's obligations and any other considerations relevant to the reasonableness of its action under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.310(1) and 803 Ky. Admin. Reg. 25:012, 2(1)(a). View "Richey v. Perry Arnold, Inc." on Justia Law

Claimant Randy Lewis sought benefits for work-related lumbar spine injuries sustained in 2001 and 2002 and a work-related cervical spine injury sustained in 2005. An ALJ awarded 425 weeks of partial disability benefits at the rate of $315 per week for the lumbar injuries beginning in 2004 and 425 weeks of partial disability benefits at the rate of $498 per week beginning in 2007. Employer filed a petition for reconsideration, noting that the combined weekly benefits would equal $813 during the weeks they overlapped and that Claimant was not entitled to receive combined weekly benefits totaling more than $607, the maximum benefit that Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(a) allowed for total disability. The ALJ granted the petition and amended the claims, concluding that the separate partial disability awards did not entitle Claimant to receive at any time combined weekly benefits that exceeded the maximum for permanent total disability. The workers' compensation board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the maximum benefit permitted by section 342.703(1)(a) applies to multiple partial disability awards and does not entitle a worker to be compensated at one time for more than total disability. View "Lewis v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Appellants, a group of heirs who were entitled to receive the net proceeds of a judicial sale of four tracts of land, sued Appellees, a former master commissioner of the circuit court, a circuit court judge, and the administrative office of the courts, pursuant to the Kentucky Board of Claims Act, after the former master commissioner failed to disburse the proceeds of the sale. The Board of Claims (Board) entered a final order dismissing Appellants' claims for lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a claim involving judicial officers or court employes may proceed at the Board. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the judge's continued use of the master commissioner, without reappointment, to perform significant functions in actions in the circuit court without a bond and without surety approved by the judge as statutorily mandated, was grounds for a claim in the Board of Claims based upon alleged negligence in the performance of a ministerial duty by an officer of the state. Remanded to the Board for a determination of whether Appellants suffered damages as a proximate cause of the alleged negligence. View "Greene v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellants, a county fiscal court, a county fire district, and ten municipal corporations, appealed from a final order of the circuit court that held (1) the state labor cabinet had jurisdiction to pursue an administrative agency action against Appellants to collect, on behalf of firefighters employed by Appellants, unpaid overtime compensation; and (2) the Appellant municipalities were not cloaked with governmental or sovereign immunity from such claims. The Supreme Court granted Appellants' motion to transfer and affirmed, holding (1) the relevant statutes directing city and county governments to pay their employees in a prescribed manner necessarily implies a waiver of immunity from liability to the employees for non-payment; and (2) the labor cabinet was authorized to proceed with its action against Appellants to recover the unpaid portion of the firefighters' overtime pay for firefighters pursuant to Commonwealth, Labor Cabinet v. Hasken. View "Madison County Fiscal Court v. Ky. Labor Cabinet" on Justia Law

Appellee Brooke Nelson brought suit against elementary public school teacher Dianne Turner after allegations that Nelson's five-year-old daughter had been sexually assaulted by another student. The complaint alleged, among other causes of action, that Turner failed to report to enforcement officials the alleged sexual assault. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Turner, concluding that Turner was entitled to qualified official immunity because her action, i.e., determining whether the facts constituted abuse, was discretionary in nature. The court of appeals reversed and remanded with directions to reconsider the mandatory abuse reporting obligation of Kan. Rev. Stat. 620.030. On remand, the trial court again found qualified official immunity applicable. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the reporting requirement of the statute was mandatory and therefore ministerial, obviating any application for qualified official immunity. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the trial court properly granted Turner's motion for summary judgment because Turner's actions were discretionary in nature rather than ministerial and, therefore, she was entitled to the defense of qualified official immunity under law. View "Turner v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The court of appeals affirmed the decision in which the Workers' Compensation Board ("Board") held that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred by denying future medical benefits for claimant's work-related injury but that the evidence did not compel an award of permanent income benefits. At issue was whether substantial evidence supported an award of future medical benefits and whether the evidence compelled the ALJ to find that claimant's injury produced a permanent impairment rating and entitled him to permanent income benefits. The court held that KRS 342.020(1) entitled claimant to be awarded future medical benefits where evidence that he required no medical treatment as of the date he reached maximum medical improvement or the date that his claim was heard was an improper basis to deny future medical benefits. The court also held that the evidence the injury warranted a permanent impairment rating was not so overwhelming as to render the decision that was made unreasonable.

An administrative law judge ("ALJ") found that claimant's work for defendant's temporary employment agency was sporadic but failed to specify whether KRS 342.140(1)(d) or (1)(e) was used to calculate her average weekly wage. The Workers' Compensation Board reversed and remanded the claim and this appeal was taken from the decision by the court of appeals to affirm. The employer argued that which subsection of KRS 342.140(1) applied was a factual determination to be made by the ALJ; that the ALJ committed harmless error by failing to specify the subsection of KRS 342.140(1) used in the average weekly wage calculation; and that additional proof should not be permitted on remand. Claimant defended the court of appeals' decision but also argued in a cross-appeal that the record compelled a finding under KRS 342.140(1)(e) that her average weekly wage was $320.00. The court held that the ALJ did not commit harmless error by failing to specify the subsection relied upon and that the ALJ must analyze the evidence under KRS 342.140(1)(e) on remand. The court reversed with respect to the decision to reopen for additional proof because claimant argued from the outset that KRS 342.140(1)(e) controlled the calculation. The court also held that the record contained adequate evidence to apply the statute under the present circumstances and did not compel the finding that either party sought.

Claimant alleged a work-related cumulative trauma injury to his neck and was initially awarded workers' compensation benefits on March 28, 2002. Claimant moved to reopen the award after undergoing surgery and the administrative law judge ("ALJ") rendered another award to claimant on July 19, 2004. On March 3, 2009, claimant filed a motion to reopen. At issue was whether the ALJ properly denied as untimely the claimant's motion to reopen in order to correct a mistake of law in his workers' compensation award and denied as unauthorized his motion to reopen under CR 60.01 and CR 60.02 for the correction of a clerical error in the award. The court concluded that, although KRS 342.125(1)(c) permitted an award to be reopened based on a mistake in applying the law as it existed at the time of the award, KRS 342.125(3) limited the period for such a reopening to four years after the original award or order granting or denying benefits. The court also concluded that the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure applied to proceedings before an administrative agency only to the extent provided by regulation and neither Chapter 342 or 803 KAR 25:010 adopted Cr 60.01 or CR 60.02 with respect to workers' compensation proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.