Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Taylor Stumbo received an injury during the course of his employment with the City of Ashland. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Stumbo was permanently and totally disabled. The City appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board. The Board vacated the ALJ’s opinion and remanded for additional findings of fact regarding the extent and duration of Stumbo’s disability. The court of appeals affirmed the Board. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s finding of permanent total disability; and (2) this matter must be remanded to the ALJ to make appropriate factual findings. View "City of Ashland v. Stumbo" on Justia Law

Dr. Mosen Khani, the owner and operator of Alliance Chiropractic, LLC (Alliance), filed an application for resolution of injury claim alleging that he suffered injuries while he was moving or assisting patients. Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI), which provided workers’ compensation insurance to Alliance, provided a defense on behalf of Alliance and presented a separate defense in its own name. Both KEMI and Alliance contested Dr. Khani’s claim, arguing that his conditions were preexisting and unrelated to the alleged work injuries. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Dr. Khani had not suffered a work-related injury and dismissed his claim. The Board affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Board, concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Khani had not suffered a work-related injury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ALJ’s determination to treat Dr. Khani as a lay rather than an expert witness was not erroneous; (2) the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Khani had not suffered a work-related injury was supported by substantial evidence; and (3) there was no error in the ALJ’s failure to award temporary benefits. View "Khani v. Alliance Chiropractic" on Justia Law

Virgin Mobile USA (Virgin) began doing business in Kentucky as a commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) provider in 2002. In 2006, Virgin asked the Commercial Mobile Radio Emergency Service Telecommunications Board (the Board) to refund $286,807 it claimed it had overpaid before the CMRS service charge statutes were amended in July 2006. The Board did not promptly respond and so Virgin made no CMRS payment to the Board until it had recaptured from post-July 2006 collections the $286,807 it claimed it had erroneously overpaid. In 2008, the Board filed suit to recover the disputed amount. The circuit court entered summary judgment against Virgin for $547,945. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that as a “CMRS provider,” Virgin had a statutory duty to collect the CMRS service charge from its customers during the pre-July 2006 time frame and remit them to the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Virgin was indebted to the Board in the sum of $286,807, not $547,945; and (2) the Board was entitled to attorneys fees. View "Virgin Mobile U.S.A., L.P. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Andrea Schrecker was injured when she crossed a street where there was no crosswalk and was struck by a car. Schrecker had decided to skip her lunch break due to an absence of a co-employee that day and was going to get something to eat from a fast food restaurant across the street during her afternoon break when she was injured. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Schrecker’s injury occurred while she was within the course and scope of her employment and awarded her medical expense benefits and income benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Board concluded that the ALJ did not err in finding that Schrecker’s injury occurred in the course and scope of her employment. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Schrecker was not in the course and scope of her employment when injured because she undertook a route to seek personal comfort that exposed her to a hazard completely removed from normal going and coming activity and which was expressly prohibited by the Commonwealth and impliedly forbidden by her employer. Remanded for entry of an order dismissing Schrecker’s claim. View "US Bank Home Mortgage v. Schrecker" on Justia Law

At issue in these two cases was the applicable scope of Ky. Rev. Stat. 15.520, which sets forth specific procedural rights for police officers who are accused of misconduct and face the disciplinary processes administratively conducted by the police agency that employs them. Appellants in both cases were police officers who were subjected to administrative disciplinary actions that were initiated as a result of allegations that arose from within the police department itself. Both officers requested an administrative review procedure consistent with section 15.520. The requests were denied. Each Appellant sought review of the disciplinary actions in circuit court. The circuit courts concluded that the officers were not entitled to an administrative hearing subject to the due process provisions of section 15.520. The appeals courts affirmed, determining that section 15.520 applies only when the disciplinary action was initiated by a “citizens complaint.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 15.520 applies to both disciplinary proceedings generated by citizen complaints and those initiated by intra-departmental actions. Remanded. View "Pearce v. Univ. of Louisville" on Justia Law

Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI) was the workers’ compensation carrier for Beacon Enterprises, Inc. at the time that Julian Hoskins was injured during the course of his employment with Four Star Transportation, Inc. (Four Star). Four Star had configured its workforce pursuant to an employee leasing arrangement with a company affiliated with Beacon Enterprises, an employee leasing company. The Workers’ Compensation Board determined that Hoskins was not covered by Beacon Enterprises’ policy with KEMI because Hoskins was not an employee of Beacon Enterprises at the time of the injury. The court of appeals upheld the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.615 does not require an employee to have knowledge of his status as a leased employee or of the nature of his relationship with the employee leasing company; and (2) because the court of appeals grounded its opinion upon Hoskins’s lack of knowledge, the matter must be remanded for the court to address other issues raised by KEMI in support of the Board’s decision. View "Ky. Ininsured Employers’ Fund v. Hoskins" on Justia Law

The Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government Board of Adjustment (Board) filed a motion for a temporary injunction pursuant to Ky. R. Civ. P. 65.04 seeking to enjoin Boone Creek Properties, Inc. (Boone Creek) from operating certain commercial recreational activities on property in Fayette County. The circuit court granted the temporary injunction, finding that the activities were in violation of a zoning ordinance and a conditional use permit issued by the Board. The court of appeals concluded that the circuit court had properly granted the injunction. Boone Creek appealed, arguing that the Board failed to satisfy the “irreparable harm” prong of rule 65.04. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when a governmental entity charged with enforcement of a civil law seeks an injunction restraining an ongoing violation of the law, irreparable harm is presumed; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by granting the requested injunction. View "Boone Creek Props., LLC v. Bd. of Adjustment" on Justia Law

Flanagan’s Ale House applied for a retail liquor drink license to replace its restaurant drink license. The Louisville/Jefferson County Government (Louisville Metro) denied the application, relying on Ky. Rev. Stat. 241.075, which prohibits the issuance of a retail drink license to an applicant located in a combination business and residential area of a “city of the first class or consolidated local government” if another similar establishment is located within 700 feet of the establishment. The Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (ABC Board) affirmed. Flanagan’s appealed, arguing that section 241.075 was unconstitutional local and special legislation in violation of Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution. The Court of Appeals agreed with Flanagan’s and declared the statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 241.075 violates Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution. Remanded. View "Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov’t v. O’Shea’s-Baxter, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant represented Claimant in a workers’ compensation case. The Chief Administrative Law Judge (CALJ) entered an interlocutory order, which resulted in Claimant receiving temporary total occupational disability benefits. The claim was later returned to the active docket, and the parties reached a settlement. Appellant subsequently filed two motions for approval of attorney fees, requesting approval of $12,000 for work performed in obtaining the lump sum payment and requesting approval of $8,369 for work performed in obtaining the benefits which Claimant recovered from the interlocutory award. The CALJ granted Appellant’s motion for $12,000 but denied the motion for $8,369 in fees, concluding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.320(2)(a) caps attorney fees to a total of $12,000. On appeal, Appellant argued that an interlocutory proceeding in a workers’ compensation case should be considered separate from a claim for income benefits and therefore not subject to the statutory cap on attorneys fees established in section 342.320(2)(a). The Workers’ Compensation Board and Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the attorney fee for the entire proceeding in this matter was subject to the statutory maximum of $12,000 under section 342.320(2)(a). View "Watts v. Danville Housing Auth." on Justia Law

Appellant worked for Christopher & Banks, a retail clothing store, when she slipped and fell while walking around her car, which was parked in the employee parking lot. Christopher & Banks subsequently denied Appellant’s injury claim, concluding that Appellant’s injury was not compensable because it did not occur on the store’s operating premises. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Appellant’s injury was not compensable because it did not occur within Christopher & Banks’s operating premises. The Workers Compensation Board reversed, concluding that the evidence compelled a finding that Christopher & Banks directed its employees to park in either one of two spaces, that Appellant was parked in one of these spaces, and therefore, Appellant’s injury was within Christopher & Banks’s operating premises. The court of appeals reversed, determining that ALJ’s opinion was supported by substantial evidence and that the Board engaged in impermissible fact finding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals erroneously reversed the opinion of the ALJ, as the ALJ’s findings were supported by evidence of substance and the Board engaged in impermissible fact finding. View "Hanik v. Christopher & Banks, Inc." on Justia Law