Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Osie Goodgame, Jr., a Kentucky resident, worked for Consol of Kentucky, Inc. in both Kentucky and Virginia. After Goodgame resigned, he filed an injury claim alleging that, while employed by Consol, he suffered cumulative trauma injuries to his extremities and spine. An administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissed Goodgame’s claim, finding that Goodgame had not filed it within the applicable statute of limitations and that Kentucky had no jurisdiction over any injury Goodgame may have suffered in Virginia. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s finding regarding jurisdiction but vacated the ALJ’s finding regarding the statute of limitations, concluding that the ALJ had not conducted the proper analysis in determining Goodgame’s date of injury for statute of limitations purposes. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding (1) Kentucky does not have extraterritorial jurisdiction over any claim arising from a Virginia injury; but (2) this claim must be remanded to the ALJ so she can determine when Goodgame was advised that he suffers from a work-related cumulative trauma injury and then determine if Goodgame filed his claim within two years of that date. View "Consol of Kentucky, Inc. v. Goodgame" on Justia Law

Julie Camps worked as a full time paramedic for the Garrard County Fiscal court and was concurrently employed as a paramedic with Clark County EMS. Camps later quit her job with Clark County, intending to obtain another paramedic job closer to her home. While working for Garrard County, Appellant suffered an acute ankle sprain requiring reconstructive surgery. Camps filed for workers’ compensation based on an average weekly wage (AWW) calculation including her wages from both counties. An administrative law judge concluded that Camps’s AWW was limited to the wages she earned working for Garrard County. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed based on its interpretation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.140(5), concluding that Camps’s Clark County wages should be included in her AWW calculation because she worked for Clark County during the relevant look-back period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, because Camps was no longer under a contract for hire with Clark County at the time of her injury, she was not entitled to claim both her Garrard County and Clark County wages in her AWW calculation. View "Garrard County Fiscal Court v. Camps" on Justia Law

Appellant injured his left shoulder while working for Appellee. Appellant underwent three shoulder surgeries and returned to work on light duty between the surgeries. After Appellant returned to work without restrictions, Appellee terminated his employment for bumping into a pole while operating a forklift. An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied Appellant’s request for temporary total disability (TTD) benefits while Appellant was on light duty and declined to award the two multiplier under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(c)(2) and Chrysalis House, Inc. v. Tackett after finding that Appellant was not terminated due to his disabling shoulder injury. The Workers’ Compensation Board and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the denial of TTD benefits, as the evidence did not compel a contrary finding; and (2) reversed and remanded with respect to the two multiplier, as the circumstances in this case led the Court to reconsider its holding in Chrysalis House and its construction of section 342.730(1)(c)(2). View "Livingood v. Transfreight, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2004, AT&T Corp. filed refund claims with the Finance and Administration Cabinet arguing that, under Ky. Rev. Stat. 139.505, AT&T was entitled to refunds for tax years 2002 and 2003. The Cabinet granted a partial refund for AT&T’s 2002 claim. In 2008, AT&T filed refund claims for tax years 2004 through 2008. In 2011, AT&T filed a declaration of rights action bringing administrative and as-applied constitutional challenges to the amendments to section 139.505. The circuit court dismissed the case, determining that AT&T’s challenges must be adjudicated by the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals (KBTA) before the court would address AT&T’s facial constitutional challenges. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the facial constitutional issue was one that the KBTA could not decide, but that the other claims were properly dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and reinstated the trial court’s order of dismissal, holding that there were several administrative issues that must be resolved prior to addressing the constitutional claims. View "Commonwealth v. AT&T Corp." on Justia Law

Appellant suffered a work-related injury and filed a claim for benefits. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Appellant was entitled to benefits. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the ALJ properly excluded unemployment compensation benefits when calculating Appellant’s average weekly wage (AWW). The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s finding that unemployment benefits should not be included in the AWW calculation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s finding regarding unemployment benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that unemployment benefits are not wages under Ky. Rev. Stat. 341.140(6). View "Jewell v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Randy Ellington owned and operated R&J Cabinets as a sole proprietorship. When Ellington received a work-related injury, R&J had no employees. Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI) had previously issued a workers’ compensation policy to Ellington and R&J as “insureds.” At the same time, the policy included a specific exclusion from coverage of Ellington as the sole proprietor. KEMI denied Ellington’s claim for benefits, arguing that it was not covered because of the sole-proprietor exclusion endorsement. An administrative law judge concluded that Ellington was not covered by the policy. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the policy was ambiguous and construing it in Ellington’s favor to provide coverage for his injuries. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the policy, as issued, is not a personal policy but rather a business policy purchased by a sole proprietor, and Ellington, as the sole proprietor, was not entitled to benefits under the policy. View "Ky. Employers Mut. Ins. v. Ellington" on Justia Law

Appellee was injured when a horse she was exercising at Gardens Glen Farm (Appellant) rolled over on her. Appellee negotiated a lump sum settlement with Appellant, which reflected a twenty-nine percent impairment rating and a return to work factor of 1.5509453. Appellee later moved to reopen, alleging that her occupations disability was worsening. The motion was sustained. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Appellee showed a worsening of her condition and calculated credit for money paid to Appellee pursuant to the settlement. Appellant appealed, arguing that the ALJ erred by refusing to give it a dollar for dollar credit based on the lump sum settlement. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ did not err in calculating the credit owed to Appellant. View "Gardens Glen Farm v. Balderas" on Justia Law

Taylor Stumbo received an injury during the course of his employment with the City of Ashland. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Stumbo was permanently and totally disabled. The City appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board. The Board vacated the ALJ’s opinion and remanded for additional findings of fact regarding the extent and duration of Stumbo’s disability. The court of appeals affirmed the Board. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s finding of permanent total disability; and (2) this matter must be remanded to the ALJ to make appropriate factual findings. View "City of Ashland v. Stumbo" on Justia Law

Dr. Mosen Khani, the owner and operator of Alliance Chiropractic, LLC (Alliance), filed an application for resolution of injury claim alleging that he suffered injuries while he was moving or assisting patients. Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI), which provided workers’ compensation insurance to Alliance, provided a defense on behalf of Alliance and presented a separate defense in its own name. Both KEMI and Alliance contested Dr. Khani’s claim, arguing that his conditions were preexisting and unrelated to the alleged work injuries. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Dr. Khani had not suffered a work-related injury and dismissed his claim. The Board affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Board, concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Khani had not suffered a work-related injury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ALJ’s determination to treat Dr. Khani as a lay rather than an expert witness was not erroneous; (2) the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Khani had not suffered a work-related injury was supported by substantial evidence; and (3) there was no error in the ALJ’s failure to award temporary benefits. View "Khani v. Alliance Chiropractic" on Justia Law

Virgin Mobile USA (Virgin) began doing business in Kentucky as a commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) provider in 2002. In 2006, Virgin asked the Commercial Mobile Radio Emergency Service Telecommunications Board (the Board) to refund $286,807 it claimed it had overpaid before the CMRS service charge statutes were amended in July 2006. The Board did not promptly respond and so Virgin made no CMRS payment to the Board until it had recaptured from post-July 2006 collections the $286,807 it claimed it had erroneously overpaid. In 2008, the Board filed suit to recover the disputed amount. The circuit court entered summary judgment against Virgin for $547,945. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that as a “CMRS provider,” Virgin had a statutory duty to collect the CMRS service charge from its customers during the pre-July 2006 time frame and remit them to the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Virgin was indebted to the Board in the sum of $286,807, not $547,945; and (2) the Board was entitled to attorneys fees. View "Virgin Mobile U.S.A., L.P. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law