Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jason Tudor claimed that he suffered work-related cumulative-trauma back injuries while employed by Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. Toyota’s third party administrator (the TPA) denied Tudor’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits based on the belief that Tudor’s condition was not work-related. Tudor then filed an application for adjustment of injury claim, alleging three cumulative-trauma injuries. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Tudor suffered a series of work-related injuries and awarded Tudor income benefits. The ALJ further found that Toyota had failed to meet its burden of proving that Tudor had not timely filed his claim. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ. The court of appeals affirmed the ALJ’s award of benefits. The Supreme Court vacated the ALJ’s opinion and award and remanded, holding (1) the ALJ’s application of Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Czarnecki was based on a misunderstanding of the record; and (2) the ALJ’s finding that Tudor was entitled to temporary total disability benefits was made prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Trane Commercial Systems v. Tipton, and therefore, the case must be remanded for consideration of the factors set forth in Tipton. View "Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Tudor" on Justia Law

Appellant, a police officer, sustained a work-related injury and sought disability benefits. The Board of Trustees of the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government Policemen’s and Firefighter’s Retirement Fund (Board) denied Appellant’s application. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Appellant filed a petition for judicial review of the Board’s decision but failed to sign or verify the petition. The Board moved to dismiss Appellant’s appeal, arguing that his petition failed to comply with the requirement of Ky. Rev. Stat. 67A.670(2) that a petition for review be “verified by the petitioner.” The circuit court denied the Board’s motion, finding that Appellant had cured the deficiency of his original pleading and therefore “substantially complied” with the statutory verification requirement. The Board filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to bar the circuit court from reviewing the Board’s decision, concluding that the deficiency in Appellant’s initial pleading deprived the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the writ, holding that a first class, second class, or special writ was not available because the circuit court was not proceeding outside its jurisdiction, there was no showing that “great injustice and irreparable injury” would ensue, and the orderly administration of justice was not imperiled by the circuit court’s ruling. View "Spears v. Hon. Pamela Goodwine" on Justia Law

Janet Owen, a former University of Kentucky (UK) employee, filed a claim for discriminatory employment practices based on a physical disability with the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights (KCHR). The KCHR dually filed Owen’s claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The KCHR later dismissed Owen’s claim. The EEOC likewise issued a dismissal and notice of rights, adopting the KCHR’s findings and informing Owen that she had the right to sue under federal law. Rather than seeking judicial review of the KCHR final order or pursuing the EEOC’s federal claim, Owen filed an original action in circuit court under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of UK, concluding that because Owen elected to pursue her claim through the administrative process, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 344.270 acts as an election of remedies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that due to a 1996 amendment to the KCRA, there is nothing remaining in the statute to bar claims filed in circuit court despite final and appealable order dismissing the exact same claim filed in the administrative agency. View "Owen v. University of Kentucky" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought workers’ compensation benefits from Defendant, a medical center, for injuries she allegedly sustained during the course of a pre-employment physical examination. Defendant denied Plaintiff’s claim on the ground that she was not an employee at the time of her injury. An administrative law judge and the Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals also affirmed, agreeing that Plaintiff was not Defendant’s employee when she submitted for physical examination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kentucky’s Workers’ Compensation Act does not cover an injury sustained during a physical examination performed as a condition precedent to employment. View "Rahla v. Med. Ctr. at Bowling Green" on Justia Law

Appellant suffered a work-related accident while employed by Appellee. Appellant filed for workers’ compensation, but before his claim could be resolved, he was fired for “performance-related issues.” An administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded workers’ compensation but declined to apply a multiplier to Appellant’s award, finding that there was no evidence that Appellant’s cessation of employment was the result of his injury. The Workers’ Compensation Board ultimately concluded that Appellant was not entitled to enhancement by the two multiplier at the time of the ALJ’s decision and that the evidence did not compel a finding that Appellant’s work-related injury led to his termination. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, as no finding had been made as to whether Appellant’s conduct at work satisfied the new standard set forth in Chrysalis House, Inc. v. Tackett regarding when the two multiplier may be awarded so as to justify the denial of the application of the two multiplier. View "Fuertes v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Glenn Hampton suffered a work-related injury during his employment with Flav-O-Rich. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found Hampton to be permanently totally disabled and awarded him permanent total disability benefits. The Workers' Compensation Board vacated the ALJ’s opinion and remanded, finding that the ALJ’s summary of the evidence and findings of fact were not sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review. Hampton filed a petition for review with the court of appeals. The court dismissed the petition as prematurely filed from a non-final Board opinion, concluding that because the Board’s opinion did not divest Hampton of a vested right and did not direct or authorize the ALJ to enter a different award on remand, it was not final and appealable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding under the test from Davis v. Island Creek Coal Co., the Board’s opinion was final and appealable. View "Hampton v. Flav-O-Rich Dairies" on Justia Law

Delena Tipton was injured during the course of her employment with Trane Commercial Systems. Trane initially paid Tipton temporary total disability (TTD) income benefits but stopped paying TTD benefits when Tipton returned to work. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Tipton’s release and return to work justified termination of TTD benefits when Tipton returned to work. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Tipton’s return to work did not terminate her entitlement to TTD benefits because Tipton did not returned to the type of work she had performed when she was injured. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the ALJ’s opinion and award, holding that there was ample substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s denial of Tipton’s request for additional TTD benefits. View "Trane Commercial Sys. v. Tipton" on Justia Law

Employee was employed by Employer for three months as a bulldozer operator. On April 16, 2012, Employee filed a workers’ compensation claim against Employer, alleging cumulative trauma and an injury date of February 7, 2012. Before his employment with Employer, Employee had worked as a bulldozer operated for other employers for approximately thirty years. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Employee sustained cumulative trauma injuries that became manifest on February 7, 2012, while he was employed by Employer, and that he was permanently and totally disabled. The Workers’ Compensation Board vacated and remanded, concluding (1) February 7, 2012 could not be the date of manifestation, and (2) Southern Kentucky Concrete Contractors, Inc. v. Campbell required apportionment of liability based upon the percentage of Employee’s impairment attributable to the three months he worked for Employer. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and reinstated the decision of the ALJ, holding (1) there was a sufficient evidentiary foundation to support the ALJ’s award; (2) the date of manifestation was February 7, 2012, as stipulated by the parties; and (3) Kentucky Southern Concrete was inapplicable. View "Hale v. CDR Operations, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1989, Appellant was injured in the course of her employment with Appellee. Appellant was awarded workers’ compensation benefits, including lifetime medical benefits for treatment of the injury. In 2012, Appellee filed this medical-fee dispute to contest the reasonableness and necessity of the treatment being provided by Appellant’s treating physician, as well as the relatedness of the treatment to the 1989 work injury. An administrative law judge found that the treatment was compensable, and the Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence compelled a finding that the treatment at issue in this medical dispute was non-compensable. View "Kingery v. Sumitomo Elec. Wiring" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Campbell County Fiscal Court adopted an ordinance replacing a monthly subscriber fee per landline telephone to fund the emergency 911 service in the County with an annual service fee levied upon each occupied individual residential and commercial unit within the county. Plaintiff, an apartment association, filed a declaratory action alleging that the ordinance was an unconstitutional and invalid exercise of the County’s authority. The trial court affirmed the ordinance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the fee imposed by the County to fund the emergency 911 service was a constitutional and statutorily valid exercise of its authority. View "Greater Cincinnati/N. Ky. Apartment Ass’n, Inc v. Campbell County Fiscal Court" on Justia Law