Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government (LJCMG) entered into a contract with Omni Louisville, LLC (Omni) in 2014, which included the demolition of Liberty Hall. In 2019, the Metro Council directed the Historic Landmarks and Preservation Districts Commission to review Liberty Hall for landmark status. Despite the Commission's vote to designate Liberty Hall as a landmark, the Metro Council overturned this decision in 2021, citing various reasons including the building's association with racism and lack of architectural significance.The Louisville Historical League, Inc. (LHL) sought review in the Jefferson Circuit Court, which found that the Metro Council had violated procedural due process, concluding that the decision was predetermined due to the 2014 contract with Omni. The court held that the hearing was a pretext and that the decision was tainted by blatant favoritism and conflict of interest.The Kentucky Court of Appeals addressed the issue of jurisdiction, concluding that LHL failed to allege particularized injury or aggrievement, thus depriving the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals held that strict compliance with statutory requirements was necessary for jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals, clarifying that the requirement to plead particularized injury or aggrievement pertains to particular-case jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction. The Court held that the judiciary has inherent constitutional authority to review administrative decisions for arbitrariness, and compliance with statutory requirements affects particular-case jurisdiction. The Court also reversed the Jefferson Circuit Court's conclusion of procedural due process violations, affirming the Metro Council's decision to overturn the landmark designation of Liberty Hall. View "Louisville Historical League, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government" on Justia Law

Officer Henry Volentine, a deputy of the Hardin County Office of Sheriff (HCOS), initiated a traffic stop of Maurice Green on October 14, 2014, after noticing Green's vehicle had an expired license plate belonging to a different vehicle. Green initially pulled over but then drove off, prompting Volentine to pursue him. During the pursuit, Volentine believed Green had committed assault and wanton endangerment by nearly hitting two pedestrians. The pursuit ended in a head-on collision with Susan Sheehy’s vehicle, leading to the present litigation.The Hardin Circuit Court denied Volentine’s and HCOS’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified and governmental immunity. The court found that Volentine did not have a reasonable basis to believe a violent felony had occurred to justify the pursuit and that his actions were not in good faith. The court also determined that Volentine violated ministerial duties by failing to terminate the pursuit when it posed an extreme safety hazard and by not obtaining approval from a supervisor to continue the pursuit.The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that Volentine was entitled to qualified official immunity and that HCOS was entitled to governmental immunity. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Volentine’s belief that he witnessed a felony was reasonable and that his actions during the pursuit were discretionary.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that Volentine was not entitled to qualified official immunity because he failed to abide by ministerial duties and lacked good faith in exercising his discretion to initiate the pursuit. Consequently, HCOS’ governmental immunity was waived by operation of KRS 70.040. The case was remanded to the Hardin Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "SHEEHY V. VOLENTINE" on Justia Law

Blake Jeffreys was arrested during a sting operation after unknowingly communicating with an undercover police officer and arranging to meet at a hotel for sex in exchange for $120. On May 14, 2021, Jeffreys pled guilty to promoting human trafficking. The Jefferson Circuit Court sentenced him to one year in prison, probated for five years, and ordered him to pay a $10,000 fee under KRS 529.130. Jeffreys requested the trial court waive the payment under KRS 534.030(4), but the court declined. Jeffreys appealed, arguing the fee was an unconstitutional excessive fine and should be waived.The Court of Appeals rejected Jeffreys' arguments and affirmed the trial court's decision. Jeffreys sought discretionary review from the Kentucky Supreme Court, focusing solely on the argument that the fee should be waived. The Kentucky Supreme Court granted the motion for review.The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that KRS 529.130 imposes a human trafficking victims service fee, not a fine, and is not subject to waiver under KRS 534.030(4). The court also found that KRS 453.190, which defines a "poor person" for the purpose of waiving court costs, does not apply to the fee imposed under KRS 529.130. However, the court noted that Jeffreys could seek a show cause hearing under KRS 534.020(3)(a)1 to potentially reduce or waive the payment based on his ability to pay. The court emphasized that the trial court should consider various factors, including the defendant's financial status and dependents, when determining the ability to pay. View "JEFFREYS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Jaime Morales, a Sheriff’s Deputy with the Scott County Sheriff’s Office, was shot and paralyzed during a law enforcement operation to apprehend a bank robbery suspect in September 2018. Morales filed a negligence suit against several employees of the City of Georgetown and the Georgetown Police Department, alleging that their actions led to his injuries. The case centers on whether the government defendants are immune from suit.The Scott Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, ruling that they were immune from Morales’s claims. The court found that Officer Joseph Enricco and Lieutenant James Wagoner were entitled to qualified official immunity for their discretionary actions, and that the City and the Georgetown Police Department were immune from vicarious liability and negligence claims.The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that some of Lt. Wagoner’s actions were ministerial and not protected by qualified official immunity. The court also found that the City and the Georgetown Police Department could be held vicariously liable for Lt. Wagoner’s ministerial actions and directly liable for their own negligence.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case. The court held that Officer Enricco’s decision to fire his weapon was discretionary and protected by qualified official immunity. However, it found that Lt. Wagoner had a ministerial duty to formulate a plan to apprehend the suspect and to enforce certain training requirements, making him potentially liable for negligence. The court also ruled that the City and the Georgetown Police Department could be held liable for Lt. Wagoner’s ministerial actions but were immune from direct negligence claims related to training and personnel selection. View "MORALES V. CITY OF GEORGETOWN, KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

In this case, the Courier Journal requested multiple public records from the Shively Police Department (SPD) under the Open Records Act, following a fatal car crash involving a police chase. The requested records included dispatch reports, 911 calls, audio communications, dashcam and bodycam footage, and incident reports. SPD denied the request, citing the "law enforcement exemption" under KRS 61.878(1)(h), arguing that the records pertained to an ongoing criminal case and their release would harm the investigation.The Jefferson Circuit Court initially ruled in favor of SPD, granting summary judgment on the basis that the law enforcement exemption applied. The court found that SPD had met its burden of proof under the exemption, and thus, the records were exempt from disclosure. The Courier Journal appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that SPD had not sufficiently demonstrated that the records were exempt under the law enforcement exemption, the personal privacy exemption, or KRS 17.150(2). The appellate court vacated the summary judgment in favor of SPD and remanded the case for further proceedings, recommending an in camera review of the requested records.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that SPD failed to provide a concrete risk of harm associated with the release of the records, as required by the law enforcement exemption. The court also clarified that KRS 17.150(2) governs the disclosure of records post-prosecution and does not override the harm requirement of the law enforcement exemption. Additionally, the court found that SPD did not adequately justify withholding the records under the personal privacy exemption. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "SHIVELY POLICE DEPARTMENT V. COURIER JOURNAL, INC." on Justia Law

Darrie Rushin was indicted on multiple charges, including first-degree burglary and first-degree sodomy. He pled guilty to amended charges and was sentenced to seven years in prison, followed by a five-year period of postincarceration supervision. After completing his initial sentence, Rushin was released but later reincarcerated for violating the terms of his supervision.Rushin requested the Department of Corrections (DOC) to review his sentence calculation, arguing he was wrongfully denied sentence credits that would reduce his reincarceration period. The DOC denied his request, and his subsequent administrative appeal was also denied. Rushin then filed a motion in his underlying criminal case seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed his claim on separation-of-powers grounds. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court improperly dismissed the petition but affirmed on other grounds, holding Rushin was not entitled to relief as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that inmates reincarcerated for violating postincarceration supervision terms are entitled to earn statutory sentence credits under KRS 197.045 during their reincarceration. The court reasoned that the initial term of imprisonment and the subsequent period of postincarceration supervision are parts of a single sentence. The court emphasized that statutory sentence credits apply to all inmates unless explicitly excluded by statute. Consequently, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. View "RUSHIN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Hunter Smith, a phlebotomist employed by Laboratory Corp of America (Labcorp), sustained a work-related back injury on January 27, 2021, when a shelving unit fell on his head. This incident led to acute lower back injuries requiring surgery. Despite the surgery, Smith continued to experience significant pain and other symptoms. Medical evaluations by Dr. Gregory Lanford and Dr. Jules Barefoot assessed a 24% permanent impairment rating, attributing 19% to the work injury and 5% to pre-existing conditions. Dr. Michael Best, however, disagreed, attributing all of Smith's back issues to pre-existing conditions and assessing a 10% impairment rating.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) awarded Smith permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits, accepting Dr. Best's 10% impairment rating but attributing 5% to the work injury. The ALJ also awarded benefits for Smith's psychological condition based on a 20% impairment rating by Dr. Robert Sivley, despite Labcorp's contention that this rating was improperly based on a conditional impairment rating.Labcorp appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board, arguing that the ALJ improperly relied on Dr. Sivley's rating and should have accepted Dr. Trivette's 0% rating. Smith cross-appealed, arguing that the ALJ misapplied the AMA Guides and should not have admitted Dr. Best's report. The Board affirmed the ALJ's decision, and both parties appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which also affirmed the Board's decision.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court held that the ALJ's reliance on Dr. Sivley's impairment rating was justified and that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence. The Court found no compelling reason to disturb the ALJ's findings, as they were not clearly erroneous. View "LABORATORY CORP. OF AMERICA V. HUNTER SMITH" on Justia Law

The case involves four appellants who are parole-eligible inmates serving life sentences in the Kentucky Department of Corrections. They were denied any further opportunity at parole for the remainder of their sentences by the Kentucky Parole Board. The appellants challenged the Board's authority to issue a "serve-out," arguing that it violates the constitutional separation of powers.The Franklin Circuit Court concluded that the Board was within its statutory authority to issue a serve-out on a life sentence and granted summary judgment to the Board. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, reasoning that the legislature had not prohibited the Board from authorizing serve-outs on life sentences.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The court held that the Board has the power to issue a serve-out to an inmate serving a life sentence. The court reasoned that while the current statutory scheme may not explicitly authorize the Board to grant serve-outs, the relevant legislative and administrative history indicates that the legislature has condoned the Board’s use of this power. The court also held that the Board's power to issue a serve-out does not violate the constitutional separation of powers. The court concluded that a serve-out is authorized by the legislature and is not constitutionally impermissible. View "CONN V. KENTUCKY PAROLE BOARD" on Justia Law

In November 2013, Ahmad Rashad Davis was indicted for Medicaid fraud and theft by deception for defrauding Medicaid of $14,505.36 by falsifying timesheets over two years. In May 2014, the Commonwealth of Kentucky and Davis entered into a plea agreement in which Davis agreed to plead guilty to Medicaid fraud, and in exchange, the Commonwealth recommended to the trial court that Davis's theft by deception charge be dismissed. The trial court accepted Davis's guilty plea and sentenced him to one year of imprisonment, probated for three years or until restitution was paid in full, and dismissed the theft by deception charge. In December 2021, Davis filed a petition to expunge the theft by deception charge. The Commonwealth objected, arguing that the charge was dismissed in exchange for Davis's guilty plea to Medicaid fraud, making it ineligible for expungement under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 431.076(1)(b). The circuit court granted Davis's petition without holding a hearing, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review and reversed the decisions of the lower courts.The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that a circuit court can look beyond the sentencing court's final judgment to determine whether a dismissal was granted in exchange for a guilty plea to another charge. The court ruled that the circuit court erred in failing to do so in Davis's case. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and vacated the circuit court's order granting expungement. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. DAVIS" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board determining that Richard Lane's notice to his former employer, Tennco Energy, Inc., that he was asserting a subsequent claim against it was timely, holding that there was no error.In 2019, Lane filed a coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP) claim against Tennco Energy, Inc. An administrative law judge dismissed the claim after determining that Lane had failed to give timely notice of the claim pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 341.316(2). The Board reversed, concluding that a prior CWP claim that Lane had previously settled against a former employer had no bearing on Lane's duty to notice Tennco when he asserted a subsequent claim against it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that remand was required for additional findings of fact under this opinion. View "Tennco Energy, Inc. v. Lane" on Justia Law