Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The family court granted the petition of Appellant, Samantha Daugherty, and issued a domestic violence order (DVO) against Appellee, John Telek, to remain in effect for three years. Telek appealed. The court of appeals held that the family court lost jurisdiction to issue the DVO because it failed to conduct the DVO hearing within fourteen days after the issuance of an emergency protective order as required by Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.740(4). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the family court did not lack jurisdiction to issue the DVO and that it properly followed statutory requirements for the issuance of the DVO. Remanded. View "Daugherty v. Telek" on Justia Law

Appellants Mother and Father were the natural parents of Child. Child was removed from home in 2004 and committed to the custody of the Cabinet for Health and Human Services after an abuse petition was filed. The district court adjudicated that physical abuse and neglect had occurred. Child was returned to his parents' home on certain conditions but was later removed. The district court once again adjudicated that Child had been physically abused. At a termination hearing, the trial court declined to terminate parental rights to the child, finding that the Cabinet had not met its burden of proving that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of Child and that there was no evidence Child would be abused in the future. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the circuit court, holding (1) there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision; and (2) in reversing the trial court's decision, the court of appeals improperly substituted its judgment for that of the trial court. View "D.G.R. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

After Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services found Appellee Patrick O'Conner's children in filth, unsanitary living conditions, and misery in Appellee's home, Appellee was indicted by a grand jury for three counts of first-degree criminal abuse. Specifically, the grand jury charged that Appellee intentionally abused his three children, each of which were under the age of twelve at the time, by placing them in a situation that could have caused physical injury or which was cruel confinement or cruel punishment. Appellee was convicted as charged. The court of appeals reversed, declaring there was insufficient evidence to indicate that Appellee's criminal actions were intentional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals did not properly defer to the jury its proper fact-finding role in this case, as the jury had sufficient evidence to reasonably conclude that Appellee was guilty of first-degree criminal abuse. Remanded for reinstatement of the trial order and judgment. View "Commonwealth v. O'Conner" on Justia Law

Kathleen and Richard Mitchell divorced in 1990. In 2008, Richard filed a motion to modify spousal maintenance. In 2009, Kathleen filed a motion for attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of defending Richard's motion. On June 30, 2009, the family court entered an order finding there were insufficient grounds to support Richard's motion. The order, however, did not mention Kathleen's motion. On September 16, 2009, the family court granted Kathleen's motion and awarded her $19,161 in attorney fees. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the family court did not have jurisdiction over Kathleen's motion. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the order denying Richard's motion to modify maintenance did not terminate the family court's jurisdiction as to Kathleen's motion for fees and costs. Remanded. View "Mitchell v. Mitchell " on Justia Law

Father and Mother were awarded joint custody of their two children by the family court. The original divorce decree provided that if either party relocated to a different country or state, the parties would move for an order of modification. The children resided primarily with Mother. When Mother sought to relocate and filed a motion to modify the parents' parenting time, the family court judge ruled that the decree would be modified so the children would live primarily with Father. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the family court's order failed to reflect any consideration of the factors set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 403(2) relating to custody determinations. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed with respect to the inadequacy of the order because of its failure to include written findings in support of its custody determination; (2) concluded that adequate findings were made from the family court bench; but (3) further remanded with specific directions for the entry of a new order that complies with the Court's recent decision in Anderson v. Johnson, which requires that trial court opinions affecting child custody state the court's findings in support of its decision in writing. View "Keifer v. Keifer " on Justia Law

The Cabinet for Health and Family Services filed a motion to hold Renee Ivy in contempt after Ivy fell behind in her child support payments. At the hearing on the motion, Ivy presented evidence that her sole source of income was a federal benefit under the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI). The trial court reduced Ivy's support obligation and held her in contempt for having failed to pay the past due amount. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the contempt finding and the order to pay even reduced child support could not stand because evidence showed Ivy did not have the ability to pay. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals' decision to the extent that it suggested that a SSI recipient-parent's present inability to pay precludes even the assessment of child support; (2) vacated the existing order and remanded for the family court to determine if the guidelines-based amount would be unjust or inappropriate pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.211(2); and (3) affirmed the holding that a contempt finding was inappropriate here where there was essentially uncontroverted evidence that Ivy's failure to provide child support stemmed only from her inability to do so. View "Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. Ivy" on Justia Law

The Family Division of the Jefferson Circuit Court granted a divorce to Saeid and Denise Shafizadeh pursuant to a decree of dissolution, which incorporated an order of custody in which Saeid and Denise agreed to share joint custody of their two minor children. The family court later granted Denise's motion to relocate to Louisiana with the children and entered an order modifying the parenting schedule. Saeid moved the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition and emergency relief, arguing that the family court proceeded outside of its jurisdiction. The court denied the motion, determining that Saeid had failed to meet the threshold requirements for the issuance of a writ, and denied the motion for emergency relief as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the family court had jurisdiction to entertain Denise's motion, and therefore, the petition for the writ was properly denied. View "Shafizadeh v. Jefferson Circuit Family Court" on Justia Law

After Suzanne Anderson and Joseph Johnson divorced, the family court entered an order awarding joint custody of their daughter which stated that timesharing would be on an equal time basis. Anderson subsequently filed a motion to modify the timesharing schedule to allow her to move with the child to Kentucky. The family court denied the motion, determining that it was not in the child's best interests to relocate. Anderson appealed, asking that the case be remanded for specific findings of fact. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that findings of fact are not necessary when the court denies a modification motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's order, which included no findings of fact to support its conclusion, violated Ky. R. Civ. P. 52.01. Remanded to the family court to make specific findings of fact and separate conclusions of law. View "Anderson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Appellant, a mother of an infant child, appealed a decision denying her petition for a writ of prohibition where she sought the writ to bar appellee from proceeding with the adjudication of an action filed in family court by real party in interest, C.H.E., to determine the paternity of the child. At issue was whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a claim brought under KRS Chapter 406 to establish the paternity of a child born to a married woman and conceived while she maintained sexual relations with her husband. The court held that the allegations of C.H.E.'s pleadings were supported as a preliminary matter by evidence that satisfied the jurisdictional threshold of KRS Chapter 406 and vested him with standing as a putative father under KRS 406.021 with the right to plead and an opportunity to prove that he was the father of the child. The court also held that the trial court was acting within its subject matter jurisdiction and properly denied appellant's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of appellant's petition for a writ of prohibition.

The parties were divorced in September 2005 by the circuit court which incorporated into the judgment a settlement agreement awarding maintenance to appellee. Appellant's motion to modify the maintenance award in July 2008 was denied by the trial court and appellate court pursuant to Dame v. Dame. At issue was whether the twenty-year-old Dame case should be overruled where the Dame court stated that it had no jurisdiction to modify an agreement fixing a set amount of maintenance to be paid either in a lump sum or in a specific amount over a definite period of time. The court overruled Dame and held that a maintenance award in a fixed amount to be paid over a definite period of time was subject to modification under KRS 403.250(1). Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of appellant's motion to modify the maintenance award and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.