Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Father and Mother had one child when they divorced. In its initial custody order, the family court granted the parties joint custody of the child, designated Mother as the primary residential custodian, and set child support and established a visitation schedule. A final decree of dissolution of marriage was entered three months later that incorporated by reference the initial custody order. Twenty-five months after the initial custody order but only twenty-two months after entry of the final judgment awarding joint custody, Father filed a motion to modify child custody so as to grant him sole custody of the child. After a hearing, the family court granted Father sole permanent custody of the child. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's order on the ground that the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Petrey v. Cain because Father's motion was made less than two years after the entry of the final decree awarding custody and was supported by only one affidavit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that subject matter jurisdiction of this matter was not contingent upon compliance with the affidavit requirement of Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.340. Remanded. View "Masters v. Masters" on Justia Law

Mother stipulated that she abused or neglected her children, including thirteen-year-old Kenny. The family court committed Kenny to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, and Kenny was placed in a therapeutic foster home. After the Cabinet determined that the goal of permanency would be adoption, Father filed a motion to obtain custody of Kenny. The family court denied the motion and subsequently terminated the parental rights of Father. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) Father was entitled to have an independent determination that Kenny was an abused or neglected child as specific to Father’s conduct and not based on Mother’s abuse or neglect; and (2) insufficient evidence supported the family court’s finding that terminating Father’s rights was in Kenny’s best interest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the family court made individualized findings that Father abused or neglected Kenny; (2) the family court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence; and (3) Father failed to show that the family court abused its discretion in terminating his parental rights. View "Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. K.H." on Justia Law

Appellant and her former husband filed competing domestic violence petitions against each other. Emergency protective orders were entered against each. Shortly after entry of the orders, Judge Larry Thompson recused from both cases. Judge Julie Paxton subsequently dismissed both of the domestic violence orders. Later, Appellant petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus against David Deskins, the circuit court clerk who entered the dismissal of the orders into the record, former Trial Commissioner Fred Hatfield, and Judge Thompson, contending that Judge Thompson was never removed from the case, and therefore, the orders entered by Judge Paxton were void ab initio. The court of appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel Deskins to remove the order from the court record; and (2) the petition for writ of mandamus against Judge Thompson and Commissioner Hatfield was properly denied. View "Mischler v. Pike County Family Court (Thompson)" on Justia Law

After the mother (“Mother”) of two minor children died, Appellants, Mother’s nephew and his wife, were awarded emergency custody of the children. Appellants subsequently sought permanent custody of the children. The circuit court awarded Appellants custody. The children’s biological father (“Father”) appealed. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment on the grounds that Appellants lacked standing, but the court did not address the issue of Father’s fitness as a parent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellants did in fact have standing to pursue the custody action under the comports of Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.800, et seq. Remanded. View "Coffey v. Wethington" on Justia Law

When Dorinda and Joseph, the parents of two children, decided to divorce, they entered into a temporary agreement entered by the trial court setting forth terms dealing with the custody and support of the two children. The agreement designated Dorinda as the custodial parent and determined the proportional share of support Joseph would pay to her. Nothing in the agreement took into account the amount of time the children were to spend with each parent. Joseph later filed a motion to modify child support based on the significant amount of time the children spent in his physical custody. The trial court concluded that the current situation remained in the children's best interests and ordered that the child support remain at the amount the parties agreed to in the temporary order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) while the trial court's consideration of parents' visitation or time-sharing arrangement in deciding the amount of child support to be paid is permitted, it is not mandatory; and (2) the trial court's failure to factor time-sharing into its decision in this case was not in error. View "McFelia v. McFelia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted review of this case to consider how to interpret Kentucky's grandparent-visitation statute consistently with the constitutional principles articulated in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, Troxel v. Granville, and whether the trial court in this case appropriately interceded to grant the grandmother visitation with the child despite the objection of the child's mother. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's grant, holding (1) a grandparent petitioning for child visitation contrary to the wishes of the child's parent can overcome the presumption that a fit parent is presumed to act in the best interest of the child only with clear and convincing evidence that granting visitation to the grandparent is in the child's best interest; and (2) the trial court here, in granting visitation to the grandmother, relied on pre-Troxel case law that inappropriately placed grandparents on equal footing with parents when determining visitation. Remanded. View "Walker v. Blair" on Justia Law

This case interpreted Ky. Rev. Stat. 620.050, which provides civil and criminal immunity to the reporters of suspected child dependency, neglect, and abuse. On the basis of that immunity, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants, Norton Hospitals, Neonatal Intensive Care Experts II, and Dr. Ketan Mehta, in a civil suit filed by Brandi Peyton for medical malpractice, negligence, and emotional distress, among other claims. Peyton alleged negligence in generating, interpreting, and reporting toxicology reports that showed Peyton had a high blood alcohol concentration the evening before giving birth to a baby. The court of appeals reversed, opining that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to who initiated the toxicology screening, which, in the court's view, affected the availability of immunity under sections 620.050(1) and 620.050(14). The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) the trial court did not err in finding that there was no issue of material fact as to whether Appellants acted in good faith under Ky. Rev. Stat. 620.030 in reporting the toxicology reports; and (2) Appellants were therefore entitled to immunity under section 620.050(1) as a matter of law. Remanded. View "Norton Hosps., Inc. v. Peyton" on Justia Law

Upon the dissolution of the marriage of Rachel Ford and Keith Perkins, the circuit court determined that money held in an individual retirement account (IRA) maintained by Keith was marital property and ordered the funds to be divided equally between Keith and Rachel. The court of appeals agreed that the IRA was marital property but reversed the circuit court on the issue of allocating the asset between the parties equally, and remanded with instructions to award Keith 100 percent of the IRA. The Supreme Court vacated the part of the circuit court's judgment dividing the asset and the opinion of the court of appeals, as the circuit court failed to make necessary findings of fact prior to dividing the asset under Kan. Rev. Stat. 403.190. View "Ford v. Perkins" on Justia Law

Kathy and Curtis Rice were married approximately four months before separating and filing for divorce. While they were separated but still married, Curtis died in a work-related accident. Jackie Griffin, Curtis's mother and the administratrix of his estate, claimed Kathy was barred by Ky. Rev. Stat. 392.090(2) from receiving an interest in Curtis's estate. The statute provides that a spouse who voluntarily leaves the other and "lives in adultery" forfeits his or her right to and interest in the other's estate and property. Based on Griffin's proof at trial that Kathy had sexual intercourse with another man the night prior to Curtis's death, the trial court held that Kathy forfeited her interest in Curtis's estate pursuant to section 392.090(2). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutory language "lives in adultery" requires more than a single instance of adultery. View "Griffin v. Rice" on Justia Law

The underlying case here was a divorce action between Appellant John Lee and Jill Stanley. Judge Stephen George of the family court heard the divorce proceedings. Because of Appellant's pattern of litigation, Stanley filed a motion to require Appellant to post a bond prior to any future motions being called. The court agreed and issued an order imposing a bond. Appellant then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition asking the court of appeals (1) to order Judge George to disqualify himself because he had not acted impartially and (2) to disqualify Stanley's counsel and the guardian ad litem because they had engaged in fraudulent activity and nefarious conduct. The court of appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a writ was not an available remedy for Appellant's claims that the trial court was biased against him and that the court erred in refusing to disqualify the guardian ad litem and opposing counsel; and (2) Appellant was not entitled to a writ regarding the bond order because Appellant did not clearly state the relief he was requesting and the grounds for that relief with sufficient specificity. View "Lee v. Family Court (George)" on Justia Law