Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Wife filed a domestic violence petition against Husband. Following a hearing, the family court entered a domestic violence order (DVO) against Husband, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that acts of domestic violence or abuse had occurred and may occur again. Husband appealed, arguing that the family court erroneously relied on domestic violence “lethality factors” rather than the standard set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.702 and 403.750 when entering the DVO. The court of appeals affirmed the DVO. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the family court adhered to the proper standard and that its reference to lethality factors did not indicate otherwise. View "Pettingill v. Pettingill" on Justia Law

In 2008, Dr. Daniel Bailey and Katherine Bailey began divorce proceedings. In 2010, two of Daniel’s former patients and their spouses (collectively, the Intervening Parties) filed medical negligence claims against Daniel. The Intervening Parties moved to intervene in the Baileys’ divorce action for the purpose of trying to unseal portions of the divorce record that had previously been sealed. The circuit court granted the motion to intervene and ordered the divorce record unsealed. Daniel filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the enforcement of the trial court’s order. The court of appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although intervention was improper, a writ of prohibition was unavailable in this case because Daniel had an adequate remedy by way of appeal. View "Bailey v. Hon. Bertram" on Justia Law

An Indiana court entered a decree dissolving the marriage of Mother and Father. The parties then entered into an agreed order signed by the Indiana court resolving property matters, including tax exemptions for the parties’ children, that had not previously been decided. Mother and the children subsequently moved to Kentucky, followed by Father. A Kentucky family court later altered the duration of the original child support order and modified the award made by the Indiana court of the federal dependent-child tax exemption. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the family court had authority to take these actions under the Uniform Instate Family Support Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the duration of a support award is not modifiable; and (2) awarding a tax exemption as part of a support order is modifiable, but further awards of the tax exemption require finding an actual nexus to support of the child, which the trial court did not do in this case. View "Adams-Smyrichinsky v. Smyrichinsky" on Justia Law

The trial court in this case ordered that Father get a dollar-for-dollar credit against his monthly child support obligation for any monies his dependent child received as a result of Father’s Social Security retirement benefits. In reaching this result, the court concluded that the Social Security retirement benefits should be treated no differently than disability benefits are treated under Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.211(15), which expressly allows a credit for disability payments but says nothing about retirement benefits. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Father was not entitled to a credit under section 403.211(15), and because he was not entitled to a credit, he was also not entitled to recoup any previous support payments. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the order of the circuit court, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion under the circumstances of this case in awarding Father a credit against his child-support obligation for Social Security retirement benefits paid to the child; and (2) did not violate the no-recoupment rule by ordering Mother to reimburse Father for support payments made during the period in which the child was eligible for Social Security benefits that were later paid as a lump sum. View "C.D.G. v. N.J.S." on Justia Law

In 2007, the circuit court entered a decree of dissolution dissolving the marriage of Lydia and Kevin Addison. The decree provided that Lydia have sole custody of the parties’ two children, with Kevin having reasonable parenting time. Kevin later filed a motion for sole custody and for Lydia’s parenting time to be supervised. After a hearing, the court ordered that custody be transferred to Kevin and that Lydia have supervised visitation. The court of appeals reversed, holding, inter alia, that the trial court (1) improperly placed a time restriction on the hearing without considering the admissibility or exclusion of the evidence, thereby denying Lydia the opportunity to present testimony, and (2) erred in not permitting the children to testify. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion in limiting the hearing to six hours; (2) did not err in refusing to permit the children to testify; (3) did not err in retaining jurisdiction; (4) properly applied the best interests of the child standard to each child; (5) properly ruled that each party was responsible for his or her own attorney’s fees; and (6) did not err in denying Lydia’s motion that Kevin participate in an evaluation with Lydia’s expert. View "Addison v. Addison" on Justia Law

Dr. Daniel Bailey (Appellant) and his wife, Katherine, began divorce proceedings in 2008. Because the file included sensitive information, the trial court ordered that the file be sealed. In 2010, two of Appellant's former patients and their spouses (the Intervening Parties) filed medical negligence claims against Appellant. The Intervening Parties subsequently moved to intervene in the Baileys’ divorce action for the purpose of trying to unseal portions of the divorce record. The circuit court granted the motion to intervene and ordered the divorce record unsealed. Appellant filed a petition for writ of prohibition against the enforcement of the trial court’s order. The Court of Appeals denied the petition after noting that there was no adequate remedy by appeal and reaching the merits of the claimed error. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different ground, holding that the writ was correctly denied because Appellant had an adequate remedy by appeal, and therefore, the remedy of a writ was unavailable to him. View "Bailey v. Hon. Bertram" on Justia Law

In this custody modification action involving former spouses, the trial court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for the parties’ younger daughter, A.G., to investigate the situation and file a report summarizing his findings. The GAL ultimately recommended that A.G. be allowed the opportunity to live with her father. After a hearing, the family court entered an order awarding Father primary custody of A.G. Mother appealed, challenging the trial court’s denial of her request to cross-examine the GAL. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that any error that may have arisen from the GAL’s conflicting roles as both advisor to the court and representative of the child was harmless. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and the final order of the circuit court, holding that the trial court erred by allowing the GAL to serve as both an investigator for the court and an attorney for A.G., and the error infringed upon Mother’s right to due process. View "Morgan v. Getter" on Justia Law

After a trial, the circuit court dissolved the marriage of Kaven Rumpel and Kathie Rumpel, restored to the parties their non-marital property, apportioned between them the marital debts and assets, and awarded Kathie maintenance and attorneys’ fees. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part the trial court’s judgment and vacated Kathie’s award of attorneys’ fees, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorneys’ fees as a discovery sanction for a party’s refusal to admit a fact genuinely in dispute; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by substantially amending, in response to Kathie’s post-trial motion, its judgment regarding the value of the principal marital asset, as such a post-judgment motion is not available for the assertion of claims that could have been asserted prior to judgment; and (3) the award of attorneys’ fees must be readdressed by the trial court. View "Rumpel v. Skaggs" on Justia Law

Appellant and her former husband filed competing domestic violence petitions. Emergency protective orders (EPOs) were entered against each. Judge Larry Thompson recused from both cases, and Judge Julie Paxton was appointed to preside over the cases. Judge Paxton entered orders dismissing both of the domestic violence orders. Appellant subsequently petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus against circuit court clerk David Deskins, claiming that he should not have entered the EPO dismissal orders because Judge Thompson was not properly removed from the case, and therefore, the orders entered by Judge Paxton were void ab initio. Appellant also claimed that Trial Commissioner Fred Hatfield was not properly qualified and had impermissibly issued the EPOs. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, concluding that it had no authority to issue a writ of mandamus against Deskins or Hatfield because they were not judicial offers, that Judge Thompson had properly recused, and that the dismissal orders were valid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the circuit clerk to remove an order from the court record; and (2) the petition for writ of mandamus against Judge Thompson and Commissioner Hatfield was properly denied. View "Mischler v. Hon. Larry Thompson" on Justia Law

In this divorce action between Michael and Mary Bell, the trial court set the amount of Michael’s monthly child-support obligation by deducting unreimbursed business expenses from Michael’s gross income rather than making an appropriate adjustment in the guideline award as allowed by Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.212. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by deducting Michael’s unreimbursed business expenses from gross income because Michael was not self-employed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in order to deduct unreimbursed business expenses from gross income, a trial court must find the parent is self-employed; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in this case by deviating from the statutory method of determining gross income when calculating child support. Remanded.View "Bell v. Bell" on Justia Law