Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant appealed from his convictions of first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse for which he received a total sentence of life imprisonment. Appellant raised numerous assignments of error, most of which were not preserved by trial counsel, for which appellant requested palpable error review under RCr 10.26. The court held that the admission of an egregious amount of inadmissible hearsay required appellant's convictions to be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Appellant was convicted of multiple sex crimes against his daughter which occurred over the course of fifteen years. Appellant raised numerous issues on appeal. The court held that appellant's conviction on Count 6 was reversed where the Commonwealth conceded that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the rape described due to the absence of testimony that sexual intercourse had begun by that point. The court also held that all other convictions were affirmed and the case was remanded for modification and re-entry of judgment.

Appellant Troy Tunstull appeals his conviction on four counts of second-degree robbery and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender, for which he was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. Appellant was tried on five counts of first-degree robbery in connection with five bank robberies in the Louisville area between April and October, 2006. The trial court granted Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on one of the five counts, and rejected his request for jury instructions to support lesser charges. The jury was ultimately instructed on lesser charges for several of the robberies, and convicted Appellant of second-degree robbery on four counts, and acquitting him of the fifth. On appeal, Appellant alleges a number of trial errors. Finding no reversible errors, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision. View "Tunstull v. Kentucky" on Justia Law

Appellant Prince Wilbert Woolfolk was convicted of first-degree rape. On the jury's recommendation, he was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. In 1984, the victim was seventeen years old and an active member in her church's choir. On the date of the crime, the victim learned from her mother that Appellant, the pastor of the church, had called to say he would pick her up from school and take her to church, presumably for a choir activity. According to the victim, Appellant took her to his office and raped her. Twenty-three years later, the victim attempted suicide. Believing that the rape may have played a part in the attempt, the victim's mother contacted police about the 1984 incident. On investigation, Appellant admitted to police that a sexual encounter with the victim occurred. In 2008, Appellant was indicted for first-degree rape. During a lunch break at trial, Appellant's defense counsel conferred to discuss how to best cross-examine the victim about her claim; to counsel's surprise, and contrary to all prior statements Appellant had made on the subject, Appellant told his counsel he raped the victim. Counsel became concerned on his ethical duty to the court should Appellant take the stand and deny the rape. Counsel contacted the Kentucky Bar Association and requested an ex parte in camera conference with the court. Counsel moved the court to order a competence examination of Appellant, and to delay proceedings pending such an examination. The court denied both requests. On appeal, Appellant claims: that the trial court erred by discouraging Appellant from exercising his constitutional right to testify; that the trial court erred by failing to order a competency evaluation; and that there was a violation of his right to a speedy trial because of the twenty-four year lapse of time between the crime and the bringing of the indictment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order a competency hearing; and though constitutional error occurred in the trial court's effort to discourage Appellant from testifying falsely, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court affirmed the lower court's conviction and sentence.

While incarcerated in different penal systems, Appellants Joe Jones and Michael Hallum each filed RCr 11.42 motions for post-conviction relief. Following denial of these motions by the trial court, each Appellant filed a notice of appeal along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The appellate court dismissed both appeals due to each Appellant's respective failure to file the motion within the mandatory 30-day time period. Appellant Joe Jones placed his notice and motion in the prison mail system three days prior to the deadline; the motion was not filed nor the notice marked tendered until a day after the deadline. Appellant Michael Hallum placed his notice and motion in the prison mail system three days prior to the deadline; the motion was filed and notice marked tendered eight days after the deadline. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review, consolidated Appellants' cases and reversed the appellate courts' decisions. State law codifies a "prison mailbox rule" in RCr 12.04(5): if an inmate files a notice of appeal in a criminal case, the notice shall be considered filed if its envelope is officially marked as having been deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. RCr 12.04(5) was not in effect at the time Jones or Hallum delivered their motions to prison officials. The Supreme Court in its reversal of the appellate courts' decisions retroactively applied the prison mailbox rule, and remanded the cases to the trial courts for further proceedings.

Appellant Douglas Hall appeals his conviction of second-degree manslaughter, first-degree assault, first-degree burglary, first-degree robbery and a sentence of forty-five years' imprisonment. Contending that various errors occurred from the indictment stage through the penalty phase of trial, Appellant argues that his convictions should be reversed and his case remanded for a new trial. On review of the record, the Supreme Court reversed Appellant's first-degree assault conviction due to the lower court's erroneous refusal to instruct the jury on facilitation of assault, but held that Appellant is not entitled to any further relief for other alleged errors as he "received a fundamentally fair trial with any [other] errors being so minor that even their cumulative effect does not demand reversal."

Appellant-Defendant Ronald Birdsong received a twelve-year sentence following a jury conviction for robbery, second-degree and first-degree persistent felony offender. At trial, Appellant did not assert an innocence defense; rather, he argued that he did not use force or threaten the use of force during the crime to any person as required by law. Appellant moved for a directed verdict; the trial court denied it. On appeal, Appellant argued that he injured no one, and his physical aggression toward inanimate objects were not a "threat to use physical force against another person." On review, the Supreme Court granted discretionary review to decide whether aggression against objects is sufficient force to constitute second degree robbery. Finding it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to find Appellant threatened the use of force against others, the Court upheld Appellant's convictions.