Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant David Hoff was convicted by a jury of eight counts of first-degree rape and eight counts of incest and was given a life sentence. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding (1) because the extensive use of inadmissible hearsay and the impermissible bolstering of the victim's testimony was highly prejudicial to Appellant and rose to the level of manifest injustice, reversal was required; (2) it was error to allow a detective to testify that the victim's testimony at trial was consistent with her previous statements; and (3) it was error to admit evidence of Appellant's uncharged crimes or bad acts without proper notice or proper showing of relevance. Remanded. View "Hoff v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A jury found Appellant Rachel Blackburn guilty of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court vacated Appellant's forty-year sentence, holding (1) Ky. Rev. Stat. 533.060(2) modifies Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.110(1) so that subsequent offenses run consecutively may exceed the maximum aggregate duration allowed by section 532.110(1)(c); and (2) in this case, the trial court incorrectly entered a total sentence of forty years based on the jury's earlier recommendation that Appellant's sentences should all run consecutively because, pursuant to Kan. Rev. Stat. 532.080 and 532.110(1)(c), Appellant's consecutive sentences could not exceed twenty years. Remanded for resentencing. View "Blackburn v. Commonwealth " on Justia Law

Kenneth Williams pled guilty to possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, and loitering. Before trial, Williams moved to suppress the handgun seized from him, asserting that it was the product of an unconstitutional stop and patdown of his person. When police detained Williams, he was among a group of nine people, some of whom the police observed openly engaging in illegal drug activity and some of whom police found in possession of handguns. Williams argued that the group's activities did not create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity particularized to him to justify a Terry detention. The trial court denied Williams' motion to suppress, finding that Williams was part of a distinct group whose conduct aroused sufficient reasonable suspicion for the officers to detain Williams. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling on Williams's suppression motion, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the trial court's factual findings; and (2) the Terry stop was constitutional because police had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity among the group that justified an investigatory stop of its members. View "Williams v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Lawrence Stinnett was convicted of murder and kidnapping and sentenced to life in prison without parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) properly failed to dismiss the kidnapping charge pursuant to the kidnapping exemption statute even though the court's analysis in refusing to apply the exemption was flawed; (2) properly instructed the jury on the crime of intentional murder; (3) properly denied Appellant's request to remove his attorneys and allowed him to represent himself; (4) properly denied Appellant's request to compel the attendance at trial of an out-of-state witness, a psychologist who had previously examined Appellant; and (5) did not abuse its discretion by permitting the Commonwealth to use a letter written by Appellant's prior attorney because the letter did not violate the attorney-client privilege, and the hearsay testimony elicited from counsel was harmless error. View "Stinnett v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Brian Moore was convicted of the robbery, kidnapping, and murder of Virgil Harris and sentenced to death. After the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, Appellant unsuccessfully sought to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence at both the state and federal levels. Appellant then pursued post-conviction DNA testing under Ky. Rev. Stat. 422.285 in the circuit court. Appellant came before the Supreme Court seeking additional DNA testing beyond that ordered below or, in the alternative, to vacate his conviction and sentence for several reasons, including the post-trial loss of evidence that was to be tested for DNA. The Commonwealth cross-appealed as to several issues. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the orders of the circuit court, holding (1) the Commonwealth's cross-appeal was without merit; and (2) although Appellant did not demonstrate that his conviction and sentence should be vacated, the circuit court erred in reading its power to order independent DNA testing to be limited by statute. Remanded. View "Moore v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Sean Noakes was convicted of murder, attempted murder, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellant was not entitled to a complete acquittal on the murder charge, the trial court did not err by denying his motion for a directed verdict on the murder charge; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by including the language of Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 504.020(2) in its insanity instruction; (3) because Appellant tendered the first-degree manslaughter instruction based on extreme emotional disturbance, Appellant was barred from arguing it as a basis on this appeal to reverse his conviction; and (4) the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct throughout the trial. View "Noakes v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Jeremy Lawton was convicted of escape in the second degree and of being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was (1) whether Appellant was entitled to a directed verdict on the charge of second-degree escape, (2) whether the instruction for second-degree escape was flawed and constituted palpable error, and (3) whether the evidence presented supported an instruction for third-degree escape. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals on the issues of the motion for directed verdict and the instruction for third-degree escape, but (2) reversed Appellant's conviction for second-degree escape because an essential element was missing from the jury instruction for second-degree escape such that it actually established a different, uncharged crime, and therefore, the instruction constituted palpable error. Remanded for a new trial. View "Lawton v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Christopher Chavies of manufacturing methamphetamine, receipt of stolen property, and being a second-degree persistent felony offender. Chavies was sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court upheld Chavies's convictions and sentence, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Chavies's motions to suppress evidence seized during a search of his vehicle; (2) the trial court did not err by denying a directed verdict for the offense of manufacturing methamphetamine; and (3) the trial court erred by allowing the introduction of Chavies's amended and dismissed charges in the penalty phase of the trial, but the erroneous introduction of the charges did not seriously affect the fairness of the proceeding and therefore did not rise to the level of palpable error. View "Chavies v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Peter Bard was charged with murder but was determined to be incompetent to stand trial. Appellant was involuntarily institutionalized for treatment for a total of 1,449 days while he was charged. After he had regained competency, Appellant was found guilty but mentally ill of first-degree manslaughter. The circuit court imposed a twenty-year sentence after addressing Appellant's presentencing custody credit, which was calculated at 3,086 days. Six years later, Appellant was released from custody but reincarcerated after the Department of Corrections (Department) discovered the alleged error in the calculation of Appellant's custody credit and concluded that Appellant should not have been discharged. The circuit court judge then approved and signed an amended time credit sheet prepared by the Department that reduced Appellant's presentencing custody credit to 1,449 days. Appellant filed a motion requesting that the trial court deem the judgment against him satisfied. The court denied the motion, finding that the Department had the authority to modify Appellant's presentencing custody credit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department lacked the authority to modify the amount of presentencing custody credit awarded to Appellant in the trial court's sentence because the alleged error in this case was judicial. View "Bard v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Thomas York was found guilty of burglary in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) York's Fifth amendment right to remain silent was not violated where he was required to recite a neutral phrase before the jury so the victim could make an in-court identification of York's voice; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying York's motions for a mistrial where (i) certain testimony during the trial did not taint the jury or unduly prejudice York, and (ii) any prejudice resulting from misstatements made during the penalty phase were cured from the judge's admonitions. View "York v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law