Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of second-degree burglary and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to a total sentence of fifteen years. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Appellant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the identification made during a photo lineup and the in-court identification made at trial were impermissible. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in the pre-trial identification procedure or in a witness's identification of the Appellant in trial; and (2) the testimony given about the fingerprints lifted off a piece of evidence was not erroneously admitted. View "Barnes v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with third-degree burglary, first-degree criminal mischief, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, and being a persistent felony offender. Defendant requested that he represent himself in the jury trial. The trial court appointed standby counsel for Defendant despite his objection. At trial, the court restricted the range of Defendant's self-representation by barring him from all bench conference and allowed only standby counsel to participate. After the trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment as a persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's restriction of standby counsel at bench conferences in lieu of Defendant himself or hybrid counsel violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights by leaving Defendant unrepresented at these critical stages in the trial proceeding. View "Allen v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Loretta Glover filed a domestic violence petition alleging that Phillip Sitar had sexually abused Glover's daughter. The trial court subsequently entered emergency protection and domestic violence orders (EPO and DVO) restraining Sitar from having any contact with Glover and her daughter. More than sixty days after entry of the DVO, Sitar filed a Ky. R. Crim. P. 60.02(e) motion asking that the order be declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion, concluding there was sufficient evidence to support the EPO and DVO. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed without addressing the merits of the issues raised by Sitar, holding that Sitar failed to timely file an appeal, and therefore, the issues raised by Sitar were not properly before the court of appeals. View "Sitar v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony incest for having sexual intercourse with his daughter, a minor under the age of twelve. Defendant was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court issued erroneous jury instructions on his incest charge that denied him a unanimous verdict. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) an error in the jury instructions deprived Defendant of his right to a unanimous jury verdict; and (2) Defendant's retrial for felony incest was not proscribed by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Remanded. View "Rodriguez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container with the intent to use or manufacture methamphetamine, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to thirty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress evidence obtained by a warrantless search of the house at which Appellant was found carrying methamphetamine precursors, as Appellant lacked sufficient standing to challenge the validity of the warrantless search; and (2) Appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict based on the Commonwealth's failure to disprove entrapment, as no reasonable juror could have concluded that Appellant was entrapped and not guilty of the crimes charged. View "Mackey v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to charges of murder, first-degree burglary, and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. After a sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced Defendant to death. Defendant subsequently filed a Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42 motion collaterally attacking his sentence and conviction, claiming that his guilty plea should be set aside as involuntary because he believed the trial judge had agreed to sentence him to life without parole and because his trial counsel bullied him into entering the guilty plea. The trial judge denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing on whether there was judicial interference in the plea process and whether Defendant was coerced by his counsel. After an evidentiary hearing on remand, the trial judge denied Defendant's motion for relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the proof showed no judicial interference in the plea process and that Defendant's counsel did not threaten or otherwise coerce him into pleading guilty. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee, an inmate, allegedly assaulted another inmate. After a disciplinary report was submitted against Appellee, the Adjustment Committee (Committee) determined that Appellee was guilty of the infraction and sentenced Appellee accordingly. Appellee appealed the decision and filed a petition for declaration of rights, arguing that the Committee's reliance on information obtained from confidential informants violated his constitutional due process rights. After a rehearing, the Committee again declared Appellee guilty of the infraction. The trial court ultimately dismissed Appellee's petition, concluding that the Committee did not violate Appellee's due process rights. The court of appeals reversed, determining that there was insufficient evidence of the disciplinary charge against Appellee to pass the "some evidence" standard pronounced in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Wadpole v. Hill. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Committee, relying solely on the confidential informants' information, failed to supply some evidence to support its finding that the confidential informants and their information were credibl; and (2) accordingly, Appellee's due process rights were violated. View "Haney v. Thomas" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of tampering with physical evidence, possession of drug paraphernalia, criminal littering, and carrying a concealed deadly weapon. The court of appeals reversed and remanded Defendant's criminal littering conviction but otherwise affirmed. Defendant sought discretionary review, challenging the constitutional validity of the initial traffic stop, the pat-down of his person, and the vehicle search which led to the evidence supporting his convictions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) Defendant was arrested after the officer conducted an unlawful Terry pat-down of his person, resulting in the discovery of a bag of marijuana; and (2) therefore, the vehicle search incident to the unlawful arrest was also unlawful. View "Frazier v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree burglary. Defendant was placed on probation, which was later revoked due to Defendant's noncompliance with the terms of the county's drug court program. Defendant appealed both his burglary conviction and his probation revocation. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's conviction, concluding that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a Faretta v. California hearing to inquire into Defendant's desire to serve as his own attorney. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant did not unequivocally request to dispense with counsel and to proceed pro se, the trial court was under no obligation to engage Defendant in a Faretta colloquy. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Martin" on Justia Law

In 1992, Defendant pled guilty to illegal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree. In 2010, Defendant filed a motion to void her felony conviction, which the circuit court granted. Thereafter, Defendant moved to expunge the newly voided felony conviction. The Commonwealth opposed the motion, asserting that neither Ky. Rev. Stat. 431.076 nor Ky. Rev. Stat. 431.078 provide for expungement of a voided conviction. The trial court expunged Defendant's record pursuant to Ky. R. Civ. P. 60.02(f), which permits a court to relieve a party from its final judgment for any reason of an extraordinary nature that justifies such relief. The court of appeals affirmed but on different grounds, concluding that Defendant's voided conviction amounted to the underlying charge being dismissed with prejudice, thereby qualifying for expungement under section 431.076. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court lacked authority under section 431.076 to expunge Defendant's newly voided conviction, as voiding Defendant's conviction was not the same as her charges being dismissed with prejudice; and (2) the use of the catch-all provision found in Rule 60.02(f) was error. View "Commonwealth v. Jones" on Justia Law