Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error in the admission of a state police detective’s testimony regarding Appellant’s invocation of his right to an attorney was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court did not err by refusing to allow Appellant’s forensic expert witness to sit with defense counsel during the testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert witnesses; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s request for an instruction on first-degree manslaughter based upon extreme emotional disturbance; and (4) Appellant was not entitled to a new penalty phase trial even though the sentencing protocols as provided for in Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.025(3) were not followed in this case, as this deviation from the statutory procedure did not affect the ultimate sentence or jeopardize Appellant’s right to due process of law. View "Spears v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of third-degree terroristic threatening, other firearm-related offenses, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, that a Batson violation occurred as a result of one of the peremptory strikes made by the Commonwealth. The Supreme Court vacated Appellant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) a Batson violation occurred when the prosecutor struck an African-American juror from the jury pool and failed to provide a cognizable race-neutral reason for striking the juror; and (2) therefore, the trial court’s overruling of Appellant’s Batson challenge was an abuse of discretion. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellant was convicted of first-degree wanton endangerment, first-degree fleeing or evading police, and second-degree burglary. Appellant was sentenced to concurrent sentences. The Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant’s conviction for second-degree burglary, concluding that he was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on that charge; and (2) affirmed the remaining convictions and sentences. On remand, Appellant moved for a new penalty phase on the affirmed convictions, arguing that the sentencing evidence related to the now-reversed reversed burglary conviction necessarily tainted the jury’s consideration of sentencing for the other offenses. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Appellant in conformity with the original sentence on the remaining convictions. Appellant appealed, arguing that he was entitled to a new penalty phase. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Appellant was barred from seeking amendment of his sentence because the trial court was bound by the Court’s mandate specifically affirming the sentences and because Appellant was not entitled to raise the issue of possible reversal of the burglary conviction because it was not raised in the initial appeal. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of second-degree manslaughter for killing her husband. Appellant was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a recorded conversation between Appellant and a police detective in which Appellant was consistently silent in the face of accusatory questions. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the admission of the recording violated Appellant’s due process rights by using her silence against her, and the admission of the tape was not harmless error. View "Bartley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of the second-degree rape of a twelve-year-old girl and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, Appellant argued, among other things, that a photograph of the victim lying in a hospital bed the day after she gave birth to Appellant’s child was improperly introduced at trial because the photograph was irrelevant to the case, highly prejudicial, and lacked any probative value. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the photograph into evidence, and the error was not harmless. View "Hughes v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree sexual abuse and three counts of first degree sodomy of two victims, Sarah and Nicholas. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error that occurred by the admission of hearsay testimony from two of the Commonwealth’s witnesses was not palpable; (2) there was not palpable error in the introduction evidence that Appellant argued was impermissible Ky. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence; (3) Appellant was not unduly prejudiced by the testimonies of Sarah, Nicholas, and other witnesses; (4) any error in the the admission of a picture Nicholas drew in elementary school was not palpable; (5) the trial court did not violate Appellant’s right to a fair trial by failing to excuse a juror; and (6) Appellant was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. View "Tackett v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was taken into custody after a warrantless search of his vehicle. Defendant was subsequently indicted for handgun- and drug-related offenses. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his vehicle. The court of appeals vacated the circuit court’s order suppressing the evidence, concluding (1) the Commonwealth’s appeal was timely filed; and (2) although the search was unlawful, the exclusionary rule did not require suppression because the police officer who searched Defendant’s car followed existing precedent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commonwealth’s notice of appeal was timely filed; and (2) the search in this case was unconstitutional under Arizona v. Gant and Rose v. Commonwealth, but because the search was conducted by an officer in objectively reasonable reliance on clearly established precedent, the exclusionary rule did not apply to exclude the contraband discovered in Defendant’s vehicle. View "Parker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Patrick Darcy and his codefendant, Randy McCleery, Jr., were separately indicted for crimes arising out of the burglary of a residence but were scheduled to be jointly tried. Twelve days before the scheduled trial date, private counsel filed a motion seeking a continuance to enable him to substitute his services for those of the Department of Public Advocacy (DPA), who represented Darcy at all pre-trial proceedings. Darcy’s motion was denied in order to protect McCleery’s statutory right to a speedy trial. After a trial with the DPA continuing to represent Darcy, Darcy was convicted of first-degree burglary, first-degree fleeing or evading the police, and theft by unlawful taking of property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a continuance of a joint trial requested by a defendant, so long as it is reasonable, is included within the “elastic” clause of Ky. Rev. Stat. 500.110, thus allowing the extension of the statutory speedy-trial time period; and (2) the trial court in this case erred by denying Darcy’s motion for a continuance because its action was based on a seeming misinterpretation of section 500.110. View "Darcy v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of the murder and repeated sexual assault of his girlfriend. On appeal, Appellant argued, among other things, that the evidence against him, particularly the contents of his cell phone depicting him sexually assaulting his girlfriend, should have been suppressed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) refusing to suppress evidence against Appellant, including the videos found on his cell phone; (2) refusing to sever the charges for the sexual assaults on January 15 from those for the sexual assaults and murder on January 16; and (3) ruling that recorded statements of the victim’s children regarding their mother’s purported assailant could not be introduced at trial. View "Hedgepath v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of criminal attempt to commit murder and first-degree criminal assault. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence for attempted murder and reversed and vacated Appellant’s conviction and sentence for the lesser offense of first-degree assault, holding that both convictions violated statutory restraints on double jeopardy; (2) concluded that the trial court did not err in showing to the jury a news reporter’s interview with Appellant; and (3) affirmed the trial court’s order imposing court costs and an arrest fee but vacated the imposition of a partial attorney’s fee. Remanded. View "Spicer v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law