Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants were arrested and charged with drug-related and firearm-related offenses and booked into the county jail. A district judge ordered that the men were not to be released without the posting of a bail bond, and arraignments were scheduled for the next day. The next morning, however, a different district judge ordered that Defendants be released on their own recognizance and postponed their arraignments for four days. The Commonwealth moved to have second judge’s order set aside and the original bond order for Defendants reinstated, asserting that recorded jail telephone conversations indicated that someone “pulled strings” to bring about Defendants’ release and that the release of the two men was improper. The judge to whom the case was assigned denied the Commonwealth’s motion to reinstate the cash bonds set in the original order. The Supreme Court denied the Commonwealth’s request to certify the law but employed its discretionary authority to issue a general writ of prohibition to “exercise control of the Court of Justice,” holding that judges are prohibited from engaging in ex parte communications to change the conditions of a defendant’s release after the initial fixing of bail. View "Commonwealth v. Carman" on Justia Law

In two separate incidents, Appellant’s dog, Franklin, attacked other dogs. In the second incident, Franklin attacked another dog while under the supervision of Appellant’s mother. The district court found Appellant was not liable for the first incident. With regard to the second incident, the court found Appellant guilty of a Class A misdemeanor for “failing to restrain a dangerous dog” in violation of Chapter 91 of the Louisville Metro County Code of Ordinances. The trial court ordered Appellant to pay a fine and serve a jail sentence that was conditionally discharged, and provided animal services with the discretion to euthanize Franklin. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ky. Rev. Stat. 83A.065(2) is unconstitutional and invalid to the extent that it authorizes Chapter 91 of the Ordinances or similar ordinances which provide for a penalty of incarceration, and Chapter 91 of the Ordinances was invalid to the extent it provides such a penalty; and (2) section 83A.065(2) is valid only to the extent that it vests local governments with the authority to enact penal violations that impose monetary fines. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a methamphetamine precursor, second offense. Defendant was sentenced to a ten-year prison term and placed on supervised probation for a period of five years. While on probation, Defendant was given a drug test that revealed a positive result for the use of methamphetamine. The trial court subsequently revoked his probation pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3106(1). The court of appeals reversed, concluding that section 439.3106 required the trial court to make specific findings regarding the risk posed to prior victims or the community and whether Defendant could be managed in the community. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 439.3106 requires trial courts, before revoking a probationer’s probation, to find that the probationer’s failure to abide by a condition of supervision constitutes a significant risk to prior victims or the community and that the probationer cannot be managed in the community; and (2) the trial court exercised its discretion consistent with statutory criteria in revoking Defendant’s probation in this case. View "Commonwealth v. Andrews" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder, assault in the first degree, two counts of assault in the fourth degree, driving under the influence of intoxicants, and tampering with physical evidence. Appellant was sentenced to life in prison for the murder conviction. During jury selection, fifty jurors were excused for cause. On Appellant’s appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Appellant was entitled to a new trial because of possible interaction between jurors and the murder victim’s mother. On remand, the trial court concluded that Appellant was not entitled to a new trial on this issue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in failing to strike one of the jurors for cause because she had three associations with Appellant, and there were reasonable grounds to believe that the juror could not render a fair and impartial verdict. View "Sluss v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of sixty-seven counts of possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor. The convictions arose from the discovery upon a forensic examination of partially downloaded child-pornography videos on Appellant’s personal computer and still images in an inaccessible cache on the computer. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the evidence related to the still images found in the thumbcache of Appellant’s computer was insufficient to sustain those convictions; but (2) Appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict on the charges related to the videos. View "Crabtree v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to life without the possibility of probation or parole for twenty-five years. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions and sentences, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that the victim had been previously exposed to allegedly pornographic material on the internet; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in granting the Commonwealth’s motion to strike a juror for cause over defense objection. View "Basham v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error in the admission of a state police detective’s testimony regarding Appellant’s invocation of his right to an attorney was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court did not err by refusing to allow Appellant’s forensic expert witness to sit with defense counsel during the testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert witnesses; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s request for an instruction on first-degree manslaughter based upon extreme emotional disturbance; and (4) Appellant was not entitled to a new penalty phase trial even though the sentencing protocols as provided for in Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.025(3) were not followed in this case, as this deviation from the statutory procedure did not affect the ultimate sentence or jeopardize Appellant’s right to due process of law. View "Spears v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of third-degree terroristic threatening, other firearm-related offenses, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, that a Batson violation occurred as a result of one of the peremptory strikes made by the Commonwealth. The Supreme Court vacated Appellant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) a Batson violation occurred when the prosecutor struck an African-American juror from the jury pool and failed to provide a cognizable race-neutral reason for striking the juror; and (2) therefore, the trial court’s overruling of Appellant’s Batson challenge was an abuse of discretion. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellant was convicted of first-degree wanton endangerment, first-degree fleeing or evading police, and second-degree burglary. Appellant was sentenced to concurrent sentences. The Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant’s conviction for second-degree burglary, concluding that he was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on that charge; and (2) affirmed the remaining convictions and sentences. On remand, Appellant moved for a new penalty phase on the affirmed convictions, arguing that the sentencing evidence related to the now-reversed reversed burglary conviction necessarily tainted the jury’s consideration of sentencing for the other offenses. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Appellant in conformity with the original sentence on the remaining convictions. Appellant appealed, arguing that he was entitled to a new penalty phase. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Appellant was barred from seeking amendment of his sentence because the trial court was bound by the Court’s mandate specifically affirming the sentences and because Appellant was not entitled to raise the issue of possible reversal of the burglary conviction because it was not raised in the initial appeal. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of second-degree manslaughter for killing her husband. Appellant was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a recorded conversation between Appellant and a police detective in which Appellant was consistently silent in the face of accusatory questions. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the admission of the recording violated Appellant’s due process rights by using her silence against her, and the admission of the tape was not harmless error. View "Bartley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law