Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Patrick Darcy and his codefendant, Randy McCleery, Jr., were separately indicted for crimes arising out of the burglary of a residence but were scheduled to be jointly tried. Twelve days before the scheduled trial date, private counsel filed a motion seeking a continuance to enable him to substitute his services for those of the Department of Public Advocacy (DPA), who represented Darcy at all pre-trial proceedings. Darcy’s motion was denied in order to protect McCleery’s statutory right to a speedy trial. After a trial with the DPA continuing to represent Darcy, Darcy was convicted of first-degree burglary, first-degree fleeing or evading the police, and theft by unlawful taking of property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a continuance of a joint trial requested by a defendant, so long as it is reasonable, is included within the “elastic” clause of Ky. Rev. Stat. 500.110, thus allowing the extension of the statutory speedy-trial time period; and (2) the trial court in this case erred by denying Darcy’s motion for a continuance because its action was based on a seeming misinterpretation of section 500.110. View "Darcy v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of the murder and repeated sexual assault of his girlfriend. On appeal, Appellant argued, among other things, that the evidence against him, particularly the contents of his cell phone depicting him sexually assaulting his girlfriend, should have been suppressed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) refusing to suppress evidence against Appellant, including the videos found on his cell phone; (2) refusing to sever the charges for the sexual assaults on January 15 from those for the sexual assaults and murder on January 16; and (3) ruling that recorded statements of the victim’s children regarding their mother’s purported assailant could not be introduced at trial. View "Hedgepath v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of criminal attempt to commit murder and first-degree criminal assault. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence for attempted murder and reversed and vacated Appellant’s conviction and sentence for the lesser offense of first-degree assault, holding that both convictions violated statutory restraints on double jeopardy; (2) concluded that the trial court did not err in showing to the jury a news reporter’s interview with Appellant; and (3) affirmed the trial court’s order imposing court costs and an arrest fee but vacated the imposition of a partial attorney’s fee. Remanded. View "Spicer v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but remanded for a new sentencing trial. After a retrial, the jury again returned a death-penalty verdict. Appellant was sentenced in accordance with that verdict. Appellant appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial and his death sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s murder conviction, to the extent it was challenged on appeal, and sentence of death, holding that (1) Appellant’s claims of error were either without merit or did not require reversal; and (2) the jury’s verdict was factually substantiated, and the sentence was valid. View "St. Clair v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of burglary, three counts of theft by unlawful taking of a firearm, one count of theft by unlawful taking of property having a value of $500 or more, and of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing admission of detailed evidence of Defendant’s past domestic violence, as the evidence became an expose of Defendant’s extensive domestic misconduct, and the probative value of the evidence was clearly outweighed by its prejudicial nature; (2) Defendant’s convictions on the three separate counts of theft by unlawful taking of a firearm violated Defendant’s double jeopardy rights; and (3) the evidence was not sufficient to support the first-degree burglary conviction. View "Wilson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to several offenses, including manufacturing methamphetamine while in possession of a firearm and being a first-degree persistent felony offender, and received a maximum sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment. Based on his convictions, the Department of Corrections classified Appellant as a violent offender, which required Appellant to serve a greater part of his sentence before reaching parole eligibility. Appellant sued the Department in circuit court to block the violent-offender classification’s application to him, arguing that his convictions were all non-violent drug offenses. The circuit court dismissed Appellant’s suit, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Controlled Substances Act operates to enhance the conviction, not simply the sentence; and (2) the firearm-enhancement provision of the Act served to elevate Appellant’s conviction for manufacturing methaphetamine from a Class B to a Class A felony conviction, which qualified Appellant for classification as a violent offender. View "Mills v. Dep’t of Corr. Offender Info. Servs." on Justia Law

After a jury convicted Appellant of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to various other charges. On appeal, Appellant challenged the trial court’s exclusion of prior-bad-acts evidence and hearsay testimony. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court erred by excluding the evidence but that Appellant did not properly preserve the issue for appellate review. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence, holding (1) counsel’s offer of proof about the excluded testimony was insufficient to preserve appellate review; and (2) regardless of any preservation misstep, the trial court’s exclusion of the testimony was harmless. View "Henderson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to charges of murder, abuse of a corpse, and tampering with physical evidence in connection with the shooting death of her husband, as well as several counts of forgery. Appellant was sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court committed two errors in its decisions regarding her sentencing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in concluding that Appellant was not entitled to the victim-of-domestic-violence exception to the parole eligibility requirement for violent offenders established by Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401; and (2) if the trial court erred in failing to consider probation as a sentencing alternative, the error was harmless. View "Gaines v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary in the first degree, assault in the fourth degree, and for being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by refusing to dismiss the entire jury venire after certain statements by a prospective juror instead of issuing an admonition; (2) erred in allowing the narration of security footage by witnesses, but the error was harmless; (3) improperly allowed speculative testimony regarding Defendant, but the error was harmless; and (4) did not err in finding Defendant to be a persistent felony offender in the first degree. View "Boyd v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant’s charges in this case stemmed from a search of his residence by his parole officers and local sheriff’s deputies. Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to manufacturing methamphetamine and being a second-degree persistent felony offender and was sentenced to fifty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) denying Appellant’s motion to suppress the products of the search of his home, as Appellant consented to the search and there was no indication that the consent was invalid; and (2) denying Appellant’s motion to suppress the results of lab testing on the products of the search, as the lab results were clearly admissible. View "Helphenstine v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law