Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine, first-degree possession of a controlled substance, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Defendant’s convictions for the offenses of manufacturing methamphetamine and first-degree possession of a controlled substance, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to allow Defendant’s girlfriend to testify about certain out-of-court statements uttered to her by a declarant whose unavailability at trial was not shown; and (2) reversed the PFO conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the PFO verdict. View "Moore v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were two death-row inmates who filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment seeking an order requiring the Governor and/or the Department of Corrections and/or the Kentucky Parole Board to adopt constitutionally adequate procedures regarding clemency petitions. Appellants further sought an order requiring the Parole Board to adopt administrative procedures governing the ways in which the Board must conduct clemency investigations. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that because Section 77 of the Kentucky Constitution vests the power to grant pardons in the Governor it would violate the separation of powers for the courts to dictate to the Governor the procedures he should employ in considering pardons. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs’ petition failed to state a claim for relief. View "Foley v. Beshear" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and first-degree sodomy. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) flawed jury instructions denied Appellant his constitutional right to a unanimous verdict, and the error required reversal of Appellant’s conviction; (2) a certain out-of-court statement was not subject to the hearsay rule and, therefore, was not admitted improperly; and (3) the Commonwealth did not improperly elicit testimony from a police officer that bolstered the credibility of the victim. Remanded for a new trial. View "Ruiz v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty years’ imprisonment for the trafficking charge and assessed a $500 fine for the drug paraphernalia charge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commonwealth impermissibly introduced an incriminating oral statement that had not been disclosed to Appellant in violation of Ky. R. Crim. P. 7.24(1), and the error required reversal; and (2) the trial court erred when it allowed testimony commenting on Appellant’s pre-arrest silence. Remanded. View "Trigg v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant, a member of a fraternity at the University of Kentucky, leased a room at the fraternity house. When a police detective learned that Appellant was selling marijuana at the fraternity house, he and two other detectives entered the fraternity house without a warrant. Upon knocking on the door to Appellant’s room, the officers were greeted by the strong smell of marijuana. Appellant was charged with one count of trafficking in a controlled substance within 1,000 yards of a school and other drug-related charges. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence discovered in his bedroom, arguing that the detectives unlawfully entered and searched the house in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. Appellant subsequently pled guilty to the trafficking charge. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and vacated Appellant’s guilty plea, holding that the detective were not welcome to enter the fraternity house at their own discretion, and therefore, the officers’ entry was unlawful. View "Milam v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol, third offense. Defendant moved to dismiss the DUI charge, claiming that the arresting officer violated Kentucky’s implied consent law by denying him a breathalyzer test and instead ordering a blood test. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the officer had the option as to which test may be given in a DUI case. The circuit court affirmed and Court of Appeals affirmed. Defendant petitioned for reconsideration in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Missouri v. McNeely. The Court of Appeals granted the petition, withdrew its earlier opinion, and reversed the circuit court’s holding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a driver is operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, that officer may request that the driver submit to a blood test in order to determine the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level, and the officer is not required to administer a breathalyzer test prior to the administration of the blood test. View "Commonwealth v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to murder. Defendant made numerous unsuccessful attempts to contact his attorneys to request their assistance in withdrawing the plea, but defense counsel never acknowledged Defendant’s requests. Defendant orally asked to be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, stating that he had entered the plea involuntarily as a result of the actions of his defense team. The court summarily denied the motion to withdraw. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant’s convictions and ordered the case remanded for a new trial, concluding that Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel when he sought to withdraw his guilty plea because his trial counsel refused or failed to file a motion to withdraw the plea on his behalf. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that Defendant’s request to withdraw his guilty plea was a critical stage of the proceedings; (2) Defendant was improperly denied the assistance of conflict-free counsel during that proceeding; and (3) Defendant’s remedy was the vacating of the judgment and remand for further proceedings as may be necessary. View "Commonwealth v. Tigue" on Justia Law

In 2010, Defendant was charged in the Warren District Court with driving under the influence (DUI) second offense. However, earlier in 2010, Defendant had twice been charged with DUI in the Barren District Court. Therefore, the Warren County Attorney requested that the Warren County charge be continued pending the outcome of the Barren County proceedings. After Defendant pled guilty to both of the Barren County Charges, the Commonwealth was given an indictment against Defendant in Warren County for DUI fourth offense, the two new Barren County convictions counting as Defendant’s second and third predicate convictions. The trial court concluded that Defendant could only be charged and convicted of DUI second offense. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendant’s two Barren County convictions were eligible predicate offenses because the convictions were entered prior to the resolution of the Warren County charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s Barren County DUI charges were eligible as predicate offenses should the Warren County proceeding result in a conviction. Remanded. View "Ballinger v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor and first-degree sexual abuse. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total of forty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not commit reversible error by (1) admitting into evidence Defendant’s statement to a detective that was translated by a translator who was not court certified and by admitting into evidence the detective’s testimony regarding that statement; (2) deciding to declare the jury deadlocked during the sentencing phase; and (3) denying Defendant’s motion to exclude prior bad acts evidence. View "Lopez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of various sex offenses and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, that his right to an impartial jury was violated when a probation and parole officer served on his jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s acceptance of the juror at issue waived his right to appellate review of the trial court’s failure to strike the juror for cause; (2) Appellant’s ineffective assistance claim was premature; (3) the trial court did not err in refusing to hear additional character testimony at final sentencing; and (4) the trial court did not err in failing to note Defendant’s presentence custody credit on the final judgment of conviction and sentence. View "Caraway v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law