Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a trial, Appellant was found guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine. The Department of Corrections (DOC) originally classified Appellant as a non-violent offender but later reclassified Appellant as a violent offender, which changed Appellant’s parole eligibility and sentence expiration dates. The DOC modified Appellant’s status based on the 2006 amendment to Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401. Appellant filed a declaration of rights petition in the circuit court arguing that the 2006 amendment to Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401 constitutes an ex post facto violation. Appellant also moved to vacate, set aside or correct the judgment pursuant to Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42 or, in the alternative, Ky. R. Crim. P. 60.02. The trial court denied relief. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s Rule 11.42 motion and otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s petition for declaration of rights, holding that the 2006 amendment to section 439.3401 does not constitute an ex post facto law; but (2) reversed the denial of Appellant’s Rule 60.02(f) motion, holding that Appellant was denied due process of law when he proceeded with a jury trial under the false pretense that, if convicted, he would be treated as a non-violent offender. Remanded. View "Pate v. Dep’t of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery and first-degree assault. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of ten years for the former offense and eighteen years for the latter offense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not commit reversible error by instructing the jury with respect to both offenses; (2) Defendant’s sentences for both assault and robbery did not violate constitutional and statutory provisions against double jeopardy, as Defendant was not punished twice for the same offense; and (3) Defendant’s trial was not rendered unfair when a police officer referred to an unauthenticated phone company record in violation of the rule against hearsay because any such violation was harmless and was not a ground for relief. View "McNeil v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of wanton murder and sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not commit reversible error by (1) instructing the jury on the charge of wanton murder or, alternatively, failing to direct a verdict on the wanton murder charge, as the evidence was sufficient to support the charge of wanton murder; (2) declining to elaborate on the meaning of the word “wantonly” as used in the jury instructions; (3) excluding evidence of the victim’s previous participation in a robbery; (4) instructing the jury on the issue of self-protection; and (5) denying Appellant’s request for a first-degree manslaughter instruction based upon extreme emotional disturbance. View "Holland v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree escape and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Defendant’s sentence was enhanced from five years in prison on the escape conviction to twenty years in prison as a persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for directed verdict on second-degree escape; and (2) did not err in refusing the instruct the jury on third-degree escape, a lesser-included offense of second-degree escape, as there was no evidence that would support such an instruction. View "Lackey v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellant pleaded guilty to one felony count of receiving stolen property. In exchange for Appellant’s guilty plea, the prosecutor promised not to pursue revocation of Appellant’s conditional discharge from his 2008 sex offense. The Parole Board, however, ordered Appellant to serve out the discharge period, concluding that, notwithstanding the plea bargain, Appellant’s new conviction provided probable cause for the revocation of his discharge. In 2012, Appellant filed a motion for habeas corpus relief from the 2011 judgment, alleging that defense counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in advising him to plead guilty on a promise that the prosecutor was not authorized to make. The trial court granted the petition. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy under the circumstances. While Appellant’s appeal was pending, his sentence expired, rending his case moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to establish the inadequacy of more usual forms of relief, and thus his resort to habeas corpus was properly denied. Due to the mootness of Appellant’s claim, this conclusion had no practical effect for Appellant, but this Opinion will provide guidance as to the proper mode of challenging an an alleged plea-bargain breach by the Commonwealth. View "Muhammad v. Ky. Parole Bd." on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of three counts of first-degree robbery, two counts of second-degree robbery, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and being a persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to a mistrial for alleged prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument because the Commonwealth’s improper closing argument statements did not result in manifest injustice; (2) the trial court did not err by striking a juror for cause; (3) the admission of prior offenses exceeding the scope of the truth-in-sentencing statute was not palpable error; and (4) the trial court did not err in this case by “trifurcating” the trial into two guilt phases and one consolidated penalty phase in lieu of separately trying the handgun charge before a different jury. View "Wallace v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine, first-degree possession of a controlled substance, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Defendant’s convictions for the offenses of manufacturing methamphetamine and first-degree possession of a controlled substance, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to allow Defendant’s girlfriend to testify about certain out-of-court statements uttered to her by a declarant whose unavailability at trial was not shown; and (2) reversed the PFO conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the PFO verdict. View "Moore v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were two death-row inmates who filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment seeking an order requiring the Governor and/or the Department of Corrections and/or the Kentucky Parole Board to adopt constitutionally adequate procedures regarding clemency petitions. Appellants further sought an order requiring the Parole Board to adopt administrative procedures governing the ways in which the Board must conduct clemency investigations. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that because Section 77 of the Kentucky Constitution vests the power to grant pardons in the Governor it would violate the separation of powers for the courts to dictate to the Governor the procedures he should employ in considering pardons. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs’ petition failed to state a claim for relief. View "Foley v. Beshear" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and first-degree sodomy. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) flawed jury instructions denied Appellant his constitutional right to a unanimous verdict, and the error required reversal of Appellant’s conviction; (2) a certain out-of-court statement was not subject to the hearsay rule and, therefore, was not admitted improperly; and (3) the Commonwealth did not improperly elicit testimony from a police officer that bolstered the credibility of the victim. Remanded for a new trial. View "Ruiz v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty years’ imprisonment for the trafficking charge and assessed a $500 fine for the drug paraphernalia charge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commonwealth impermissibly introduced an incriminating oral statement that had not been disclosed to Appellant in violation of Ky. R. Crim. P. 7.24(1), and the error required reversal; and (2) the trial court erred when it allowed testimony commenting on Appellant’s pre-arrest silence. Remanded. View "Trigg v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law