Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and transported to a corrections facility for a court admissible breathalyzer test. Defendant submitted to the breathalyzer test, which registered a blood-alcohol content of more than twice the legal limit. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of his breathalyzer test, arguing that his statutory right to attempt to contact and communicate with an attorney was violated subsequent to his arrest. The district court denied the motion to suppress. The circuit court reversed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commonwealth did violate Defendant’s statutory right to attempt to contact and communicate with an attorney under Ky. Rev. Stat. 189A.105(3); but (2) because of Kentucky’s implied consent law as set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 189A.103 and the potential penalties attendant thereto, suppression of Defendant’s breathalyzer test results was an inappropriate remedy in this case. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Bedway" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty but mentally ill of murdering Lisa Tackett and Alan Tackett and of the first-degree wanton endangerment of the victims’ four children. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions and remanded the case for a new trial on all charges, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the four first-degree wanton endangerment counts; (2) the trial court erred in admitting very graphic and gruesome crime scene and autopsy photos of the victims, as the probative value in admitting the photographs was substantially outweighed by the undue prejudice created by the photographs; and (3) the trial court did not err in denying directed verdicts on the four charges of first-degree wanton endangerment. View "Hall v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of the murder of her husband and of tampering with physical evidence for hiding the gun used in the shooting. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant’s convictions, holding (1) the trial court erred by preventing Appellant from testifying that her husband had a prior felony conviction and abused its discretion by not allowing Appellant to testify about “threatening, commanding, and questioning” statements allegedly made by her husband just before, during, and after the shooting; and (2) these errors infringed on Appellant’s right to due process of law and were not harmless. View "Daughtery v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of complicity to first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the jurors, during deliberations, to use the Commonwealth’s attorney’s laptop computer to review an audio recording of a controlled buy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in permitting the jury to review the recording at issue using the Commonwealth’s laptop; (2) the trial court did not err when it denied Defendant’s motion for directed verdict; (3) the admission of portions of a law enforcement officer’s testimony interpreting and narrating the recording was improper, but the admission of that testimony did not amount to palpable error; (4) the admission of the officer’s testimony concerning the confidential informant in this case amounted to improper character evidence, but the admission of the testimony did not amount to palpable error; and (5) the trial court did not err in admitting the confidential informant’s testimony regarding Defendant’s guilt and mental state. View "Commonwealth v. Wright" on Justia Law

After a trial, Appellant was found guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine. The Department of Corrections (DOC) originally classified Appellant as a non-violent offender but later reclassified Appellant as a violent offender, which changed Appellant’s parole eligibility and sentence expiration dates. The DOC modified Appellant’s status based on the 2006 amendment to Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401. Appellant filed a declaration of rights petition in the circuit court arguing that the 2006 amendment to Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401 constitutes an ex post facto violation. Appellant also moved to vacate, set aside or correct the judgment pursuant to Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42 or, in the alternative, Ky. R. Crim. P. 60.02. The trial court denied relief. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s Rule 11.42 motion and otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s petition for declaration of rights, holding that the 2006 amendment to section 439.3401 does not constitute an ex post facto law; but (2) reversed the denial of Appellant’s Rule 60.02(f) motion, holding that Appellant was denied due process of law when he proceeded with a jury trial under the false pretense that, if convicted, he would be treated as a non-violent offender. Remanded. View "Pate v. Dep’t of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery and first-degree assault. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of ten years for the former offense and eighteen years for the latter offense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not commit reversible error by instructing the jury with respect to both offenses; (2) Defendant’s sentences for both assault and robbery did not violate constitutional and statutory provisions against double jeopardy, as Defendant was not punished twice for the same offense; and (3) Defendant’s trial was not rendered unfair when a police officer referred to an unauthenticated phone company record in violation of the rule against hearsay because any such violation was harmless and was not a ground for relief. View "McNeil v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of wanton murder and sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not commit reversible error by (1) instructing the jury on the charge of wanton murder or, alternatively, failing to direct a verdict on the wanton murder charge, as the evidence was sufficient to support the charge of wanton murder; (2) declining to elaborate on the meaning of the word “wantonly” as used in the jury instructions; (3) excluding evidence of the victim’s previous participation in a robbery; (4) instructing the jury on the issue of self-protection; and (5) denying Appellant’s request for a first-degree manslaughter instruction based upon extreme emotional disturbance. View "Holland v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree escape and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Defendant’s sentence was enhanced from five years in prison on the escape conviction to twenty years in prison as a persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for directed verdict on second-degree escape; and (2) did not err in refusing the instruct the jury on third-degree escape, a lesser-included offense of second-degree escape, as there was no evidence that would support such an instruction. View "Lackey v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellant pleaded guilty to one felony count of receiving stolen property. In exchange for Appellant’s guilty plea, the prosecutor promised not to pursue revocation of Appellant’s conditional discharge from his 2008 sex offense. The Parole Board, however, ordered Appellant to serve out the discharge period, concluding that, notwithstanding the plea bargain, Appellant’s new conviction provided probable cause for the revocation of his discharge. In 2012, Appellant filed a motion for habeas corpus relief from the 2011 judgment, alleging that defense counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in advising him to plead guilty on a promise that the prosecutor was not authorized to make. The trial court granted the petition. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy under the circumstances. While Appellant’s appeal was pending, his sentence expired, rending his case moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to establish the inadequacy of more usual forms of relief, and thus his resort to habeas corpus was properly denied. Due to the mootness of Appellant’s claim, this conclusion had no practical effect for Appellant, but this Opinion will provide guidance as to the proper mode of challenging an an alleged plea-bargain breach by the Commonwealth. View "Muhammad v. Ky. Parole Bd." on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of three counts of first-degree robbery, two counts of second-degree robbery, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and being a persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to a mistrial for alleged prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument because the Commonwealth’s improper closing argument statements did not result in manifest injustice; (2) the trial court did not err by striking a juror for cause; (3) the admission of prior offenses exceeding the scope of the truth-in-sentencing statute was not palpable error; and (4) the trial court did not err in this case by “trifurcating” the trial into two guilt phases and one consolidated penalty phase in lieu of separately trying the handgun charge before a different jury. View "Wallace v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law