Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

William Bennett was indicted for first-degree assault and first-degree wanton endangerment. Bennett moved for dismissal of his indictment contending that he acted in self-defense. Bennett also requested a hearing so that the trial judge could view a videotape of the encounter that led to the criminal charges. A senior judge denied the motion to dismiss. On reconsideration and without viewing the videotape or other evidence, Hon. Audra J. Eckerle (Respondent) set aside the senior judge’s order and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on immunity at which witnesses, including the victims, were to appear and testify. The Commonwealth sought a writ. The Supreme Court granted a writ, holding (1) Respondent erred in not considering the evidence of record to determine if there was probable cause to believe the force Bennett used was unlawful; and (2) a writ was appropriate under the circumstances of this case. View "Commonwealth v. Eckerle" on Justia Law

In a prosecution under the 2000 version of Ky. Rev. Stat. 508.032, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to fourth-degree assault, third or subsequent offense within five years. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred when it ruled that evidence of his prior assault convictions was admissible in the guilt phase of his trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that prior fourth-degree-assault convictions are not admissible in the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief in the prosecution of fourth-degree assault under section 508.032. View "Brewer v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In a joint trial, Defendants Jared Futrell and Kayla Lord were each convicted of wanton murder for having participated in the killing of Lord’s seventeen-month-old son. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in both cases, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to remove two unqualified jurors for cause, and in accord with Gabbard v. Commonwealth, at least one of the trial court’s two erroneous failures to remove for cause was prejudicial; (2) the jury instructions raised certain unanimous verdict concerns; (3) the trial court erred by allowing Defendants too few peremptory juror challenges; and (4) the trial court erred by disallowing diversion-agreement impeachment cross-examination. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Futrell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, first offense. Before Defendant was arrested, a police officer administered a preliminary breath test (PBT) but did not record the numerical level. The circuit court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the officer’s failure to preserve the PBT level was a Brady violation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s finding of a Brady violation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court’s finding of bad faith was erroneous because it was not supported by the record, and therefore, the circuit court and the Court of Appeals erred when they found a Brady violation. View "Commonwealth v. Parrish" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of murder and intimidating a participant in the legal process for shooting and killing Troya Sheckles. Appellant was sentenced to fifty-five years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the murder conviction but reversed the conviction for intimidating a participant in the legal process, holding (1) the evidence of Sheckles’s intentional murder did not support conviction on the intimidation-of-a-witness charge; but (2) Defendant’s argument that delayed disclosures of discovery material by the Commonwealth constituted unconstitutional arbitrary state action warranting dismissal of the charges against him was without merit. View "Pettway v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant’s two-year-old son died when she left him in the car overnight and into the afternoon. Appellant was convicted of wanton murder, second-degree criminal abuse, and first-degree wanton endangerment. The Supreme Court vacated Appellant’s conviction for wanton murder, reversed her conviction for first-degree wanton endangerment, and affirmed her conviction for second-degree criminal abuse, holding (1) while Appellant’s conduct historically would have supported a conviction for wanton murder, it cannot support such a conviction now, as the General Assembly, in 2000, amended the homicide statutory scheme to create a new type of second-degree manslaughter applicable to circumstances such as these; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for first-degree wanton endangerment. Remanded for a new trial on the homicide charge, conviction for which is capped at second-degree manslaughter. View "Shouse v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of five counts of trafficking in prescription blanks and being a first-degree persistent felony offender for securing and selling five forged prescriptions for a controlled substance. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in denying Appellant’s motion for a directed verdict, as the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; and (2) did not violate the bar on double jeopardy, as the separate trafficking convictions for each forged prescription did not violate Defendant’s double jeopardy rights. View "Early v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for first-degree possession of a controlled substance. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence collected from the search of the bedroom of a residence that police officers entered while executing a valid police warrant. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) police may enter a suspect’s residence with a valid arrest warrant when they have reason to believe that the suspect lives in the residence and can currently be found inside; and (2) the officers in this case did not exceed the scope of a lawful search under Payton v. New York. View "Barrett v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree stalking, violation of a protective order, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Relying upon post-trial comments attributed to jurors implying that the jury had not agreed unanimously on all of the statutory elements of the crime of first-degree stalking, Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record in this case did not warrant departure from the historic rule prohibiting the use of post-trial juror statements to impeach a facially valid verdict. View "Maras v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Ronnie Lee Bowling, who is currently on Kentucky’s death row for two murder convictions obtained in 1992, was also convicted in 1996 of attempted murder. Bowling was sentenced to a twenty year term for the attempted murder conviction, to be served concurrently with the earlier sentence. The 1996 judgment failed to award Bowling his entitled jail-time credit that would mean he had served out that sentence in 2009. The Department of Corrections (DOC), however, treated the twenty-year sentence as though it had been served out at that time. In 2012, Bowling filed a petition for habeas corpus in a federal district court challenging his 1996 conviction. Before the federal court could exercise jurisdiction, it had to determine whether Bowling was “in custody” under the challenged conviction. The Supreme Court accepted certified questions from the federal court regarding the issue and answered (1) the DOC may award an inmate jail-time credit that was mistakenly left off the judgment of conviction and sentence entered when the trial court was statutorily commanded to award appropriate credit; and (2) whether the DOC properly did so in this case required fact-finding to be done by the district court. View "Bowling v. White" on Justia Law