Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was arrested and charged with trafficking in marijuana. Based on information given by Appellant’s son, Cody, a law enforcement officer completed an affidavit for a search warrant and presented it to the district judge, who issued the search warrant. The search of Appellant’s home led to his being charged with trafficking in marijuana in an amount greater than five pounds and related drug-related offenses. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence claiming that the affidavit violated Henson v. Commonwealth because it did not state when Cody had observed his father’s illegal activity. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed. Both courts declined to apply the bright-line rule of Henson and instead found that the affidavit was sufficient to support issuance of a warrant under the totality of the circumstances test. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the validity of a search warrant affidavit and resulting warrant is determined under the totality of the circumstances and is not controlled by Henson’s bright-line rule; and (2) the trial court did not err in overruling Appellant’s motion to suppress because the search warrant was adequately supported by probable cause. View "Abney v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with multiple drug-related criminal offenses. Defendant filed a motion to suppress all the evidence collected from his trailer, arguing that law enforcement officers unlawfully exceeded the scope of a warrantless knock and talk by entering the protected curtilage of his residence. The trial court denied the suppression motion. Defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to complicity to manufacture methamphetamine, complicity to possess marijuana, and complicity to possess drug paraphernalia. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the officers did not have the right to venture away from the front of Defendant’s house pursuant to a knock and talk and to invade the curtilage of Defendant’s residence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the totality of the factors set forth in United States v. Dunn, as well as the officers’ uncontroverted testimony, neither officer unlawfully encroached on the trailer’s curtilage. View "Commonwealth v. Dixon" on Justia Law

In 1992, Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to death. In 1996, Defendant was convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment, with that sentence being served concurrently with 1992 sentence. The judgment in the 1996 case failed to award Defendant substantial jail-time credit to which he was entitled. Had Defendant been granted the credit, he would have served out the 1996 sentence in 2009. Nevertheless, the Department of Corrections treated that sentence as though it had been served out at that time. In 2012, Defendant filed in federal district court a petition for habeas corpus challenging his 1996 conviction. Unable to determine whether Defendant was “in custody” under the challenged conviction, the district court certified two questions to the Supreme Court to resolve the question. The Supreme Court answered (1) the Department of Corrections may award an inmate jail-time credit that was mistakenly left of the judgment of conviction and sentence; and (2) whether Corrections properly did so in this case, and thus did not have Defendant in custody on that charge at the time he filed his habeas petition, requires additional fact-finding. View "Bowling v. White" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder for intentionally killing his parents and one count of tampering with physical evidence. Defendant was sentenced to a total of forty-five years’ imprisonment. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress Defendant’s confession made during protracted interrogation by sheriff’s detectives. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) Defendant’s confession was involuntarily extracted through interrogation techniques employed by law enforcement that were constitutionally unjustifiable; and (2) the trial court improperly excluded Defendant’s alternate perpetrator evidence at trial. View "Gray v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with murder. A jury acquitted Appellant on the murder charge but convicted him of first-degree manslaughter. Appellant was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected Appellant’s requested for a “no duty to retreat” jury instruction because Appellant was not entitled to such an instruction; (2) no palpable error occurred in the admission into evidence of Appellant’s prior juvenile adjudication in the penalty phase of trial; and (3) the comity previously accorded by the Supreme Court to Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.055(2)(a)(6) remains unchanged. View "Jackson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of two counts of rape of a minor. The rape resulted in the birth of a child, and a DNA paternity test was used as evidence against Appellant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in allowing the Commonwealth’s DNA expert to testify regarding a fifty percent prior probability of paternity in calculating the final probability of paternity, especially since the expert also testified about lesser prior probabilities; and (2) the expert did not invade the province of the jury by giving testimony that would assist the jury “to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” View "Ivey v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of four crimes, including two counts of first-degree robbery. Defendant was sentenced as a second-degree persistent felony offender to a total sentence of twenty-five years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s belated motion for a continuance; (2) even if the prosecutor violated Moss v. Commonwealth, the violation did not amount to a palpable error; and (3) the penalty phase of trial was not tainted by evidence improperly detailing Defendant’s prior offenses. View "Parker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Allen Lehmann, a former ordained pastor in the Assembly of God church, was indicted for multiple counts of first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse. Approximately one month after the indictment issued, the alleged victims filed a civil action against Lehmann and various Assembly of God entities based on essentially the same allegations covered by the indictment. The Commonwealth moved to intervene in the civil action and stay discovery. The trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion, determining that a stay of civil discovery until the completion of Lehmann’s criminal trial would promote justice and fairness. Lehmann sought a writ of mandamus seeking to have the trial court’s order vacated the civil discovery resumed. The court of appeals declined to issue a writ, concluding that Lehmann failed to prove he was without an adequate appellate remedy and that there was no genuine exigency meriting use of the court’s writ authority. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a writ in this instance was unnecessary, and therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in staying civil discovery pending the completion of Lehmann’s criminal trial. View "Lehmann v. Hon. Susan Gibson" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of second degree manslaughter, tampering with physical evidence, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant’s convictions, holding that the trial court erred by adding a “no duty to retreat” jury instruction to a general self-protection instruction and by inadequately instructing the jury on the justifiable use of force to protect against unwanted sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat and that the instructional errors were prejudicial. The Court addressed Appellant’s other claims of error only to the extent they were likely to recur on retrial or would bar his retrial. View "Ragland v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant was tried and convicted on the handgun charge. After his trial on this charge, Defendant filed a motion to suppress, his second such motion. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant was subsequently tried on the trafficking charge. During trial, the Commonwealth elicited testimony from a police officer about Defendant’s testimony at the second suppression hearing. Defendant did not object to this testimony but elected not to testify in his own defense. Defendant was subsequently convicted on the trafficking charge. The court of appeals reversed the trafficking conviction, concluding that the use of Defendant’s suppression-hearing testimony violated his right not to incriminate himself and that the error was palpable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the requirement of an objection is a substantive aspect of the constitutional rule that bars palpable error review, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in resorting to that review. View "Commonwealth v. Taylor" on Justia Law