Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted for first-degree possession of a controlled substance. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence collected from the search of the bedroom of a residence that police officers entered while executing a valid police warrant. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) police may enter a suspect’s residence with a valid arrest warrant when they have reason to believe that the suspect lives in the residence and can currently be found inside; and (2) the officers in this case did not exceed the scope of a lawful search under Payton v. New York. View "Barrett v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree stalking, violation of a protective order, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Relying upon post-trial comments attributed to jurors implying that the jury had not agreed unanimously on all of the statutory elements of the crime of first-degree stalking, Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record in this case did not warrant departure from the historic rule prohibiting the use of post-trial juror statements to impeach a facially valid verdict. View "Maras v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Ronnie Lee Bowling, who is currently on Kentucky’s death row for two murder convictions obtained in 1992, was also convicted in 1996 of attempted murder. Bowling was sentenced to a twenty year term for the attempted murder conviction, to be served concurrently with the earlier sentence. The 1996 judgment failed to award Bowling his entitled jail-time credit that would mean he had served out that sentence in 2009. The Department of Corrections (DOC), however, treated the twenty-year sentence as though it had been served out at that time. In 2012, Bowling filed a petition for habeas corpus in a federal district court challenging his 1996 conviction. Before the federal court could exercise jurisdiction, it had to determine whether Bowling was “in custody” under the challenged conviction. The Supreme Court accepted certified questions from the federal court regarding the issue and answered (1) the DOC may award an inmate jail-time credit that was mistakenly left off the judgment of conviction and sentence entered when the trial court was statutorily commanded to award appropriate credit; and (2) whether the DOC properly did so in this case required fact-finding to be done by the district court. View "Bowling v. White" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and transported to a corrections facility for a court admissible breathalyzer test. Defendant submitted to the breathalyzer test, which registered a blood-alcohol content of more than twice the legal limit. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of his breathalyzer test, arguing that his statutory right to attempt to contact and communicate with an attorney was violated subsequent to his arrest. The district court denied the motion to suppress. The circuit court reversed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commonwealth did violate Defendant’s statutory right to attempt to contact and communicate with an attorney under Ky. Rev. Stat. 189A.105(3); but (2) because of Kentucky’s implied consent law as set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 189A.103 and the potential penalties attendant thereto, suppression of Defendant’s breathalyzer test results was an inappropriate remedy in this case. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Bedway" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty but mentally ill of murdering Lisa Tackett and Alan Tackett and of the first-degree wanton endangerment of the victims’ four children. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions and remanded the case for a new trial on all charges, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the four first-degree wanton endangerment counts; (2) the trial court erred in admitting very graphic and gruesome crime scene and autopsy photos of the victims, as the probative value in admitting the photographs was substantially outweighed by the undue prejudice created by the photographs; and (3) the trial court did not err in denying directed verdicts on the four charges of first-degree wanton endangerment. View "Hall v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of the murder of her husband and of tampering with physical evidence for hiding the gun used in the shooting. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant’s convictions, holding (1) the trial court erred by preventing Appellant from testifying that her husband had a prior felony conviction and abused its discretion by not allowing Appellant to testify about “threatening, commanding, and questioning” statements allegedly made by her husband just before, during, and after the shooting; and (2) these errors infringed on Appellant’s right to due process of law and were not harmless. View "Daughtery v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of complicity to first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the jurors, during deliberations, to use the Commonwealth’s attorney’s laptop computer to review an audio recording of a controlled buy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in permitting the jury to review the recording at issue using the Commonwealth’s laptop; (2) the trial court did not err when it denied Defendant’s motion for directed verdict; (3) the admission of portions of a law enforcement officer’s testimony interpreting and narrating the recording was improper, but the admission of that testimony did not amount to palpable error; (4) the admission of the officer’s testimony concerning the confidential informant in this case amounted to improper character evidence, but the admission of the testimony did not amount to palpable error; and (5) the trial court did not err in admitting the confidential informant’s testimony regarding Defendant’s guilt and mental state. View "Commonwealth v. Wright" on Justia Law

After a trial, Appellant was found guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine. The Department of Corrections (DOC) originally classified Appellant as a non-violent offender but later reclassified Appellant as a violent offender, which changed Appellant’s parole eligibility and sentence expiration dates. The DOC modified Appellant’s status based on the 2006 amendment to Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401. Appellant filed a declaration of rights petition in the circuit court arguing that the 2006 amendment to Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401 constitutes an ex post facto violation. Appellant also moved to vacate, set aside or correct the judgment pursuant to Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42 or, in the alternative, Ky. R. Crim. P. 60.02. The trial court denied relief. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s Rule 11.42 motion and otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s petition for declaration of rights, holding that the 2006 amendment to section 439.3401 does not constitute an ex post facto law; but (2) reversed the denial of Appellant’s Rule 60.02(f) motion, holding that Appellant was denied due process of law when he proceeded with a jury trial under the false pretense that, if convicted, he would be treated as a non-violent offender. Remanded. View "Pate v. Dep’t of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery and first-degree assault. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of ten years for the former offense and eighteen years for the latter offense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not commit reversible error by instructing the jury with respect to both offenses; (2) Defendant’s sentences for both assault and robbery did not violate constitutional and statutory provisions against double jeopardy, as Defendant was not punished twice for the same offense; and (3) Defendant’s trial was not rendered unfair when a police officer referred to an unauthenticated phone company record in violation of the rule against hearsay because any such violation was harmless and was not a ground for relief. View "McNeil v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of wanton murder and sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not commit reversible error by (1) instructing the jury on the charge of wanton murder or, alternatively, failing to direct a verdict on the wanton murder charge, as the evidence was sufficient to support the charge of wanton murder; (2) declining to elaborate on the meaning of the word “wantonly” as used in the jury instructions; (3) excluding evidence of the victim’s previous participation in a robbery; (4) instructing the jury on the issue of self-protection; and (5) denying Appellant’s request for a first-degree manslaughter instruction based upon extreme emotional disturbance. View "Holland v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law