Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to twenty years in prison. On appeal, Appellant argued that that his incriminating utterance to police during his arrest should have been suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search, seizure, and arrest because the policy unlawfully located and identified him during the course of a protective sweep at a Louisville residence, which led to his unlawful arrest and incriminating statement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that suppression of Appellant’s spontaneous utterance was not required because the police officers’ initial entry into the residence was consensual, the scope of the protective sweep was reasonable, the seizure of Appellant was lawful, and Appellant’s incriminating statement was spontaneous and not the product of custodial interrogation. View "Simpson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of seven counts of first-degree robbery. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a total of twenty-four years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions and corresponding sentences, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless global positioning system tracking of a vehicle Appellant drove; (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for a directed verdict as to some of his charges; and (3) did not err in failing to fully grant Appellant’s motion to sever. View "Thornton v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of murder and was sentenced to forty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s conviction, holding (1) Appellant’s responses to the police’s questions at the scene were not properly admitted, but the error was harmless; (2) the introduction of hearsay content of the testimony of one of Appellant’s cellmates that Appellant allegedly had with another cellmate was error, but the error was not reversible; (3) the prosecutor, by introducing his own interaction with the cellmate in an attempt to impeach that witness, was error, but the error was not palpable; (4) the trial court erred in allowing the victim’s niece to repeat the victim’s statement of why she not longer had a gun, but the error was harmless; and (5) statements about the victim’s plan to move to Indiana were properly admitted. View "Dillon v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

William Bennett was indicted for first-degree assault and first-degree wanton endangerment. Bennett moved for dismissal of his indictment contending that he acted in self-defense. Bennett also requested a hearing so that the trial judge could view a videotape of the encounter that led to the criminal charges. A senior judge denied the motion to dismiss. On reconsideration and without viewing the videotape or other evidence, Hon. Audra J. Eckerle (Respondent) set aside the senior judge’s order and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on immunity at which witnesses, including the victims, were to appear and testify. The Commonwealth sought a writ. The Supreme Court granted a writ, holding (1) Respondent erred in not considering the evidence of record to determine if there was probable cause to believe the force Bennett used was unlawful; and (2) a writ was appropriate under the circumstances of this case. View "Commonwealth v. Eckerle" on Justia Law

In a prosecution under the 2000 version of Ky. Rev. Stat. 508.032, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to fourth-degree assault, third or subsequent offense within five years. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred when it ruled that evidence of his prior assault convictions was admissible in the guilt phase of his trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that prior fourth-degree-assault convictions are not admissible in the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief in the prosecution of fourth-degree assault under section 508.032. View "Brewer v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In a joint trial, Defendants Jared Futrell and Kayla Lord were each convicted of wanton murder for having participated in the killing of Lord’s seventeen-month-old son. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in both cases, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to remove two unqualified jurors for cause, and in accord with Gabbard v. Commonwealth, at least one of the trial court’s two erroneous failures to remove for cause was prejudicial; (2) the jury instructions raised certain unanimous verdict concerns; (3) the trial court erred by allowing Defendants too few peremptory juror challenges; and (4) the trial court erred by disallowing diversion-agreement impeachment cross-examination. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Futrell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, first offense. Before Defendant was arrested, a police officer administered a preliminary breath test (PBT) but did not record the numerical level. The circuit court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the officer’s failure to preserve the PBT level was a Brady violation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s finding of a Brady violation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court’s finding of bad faith was erroneous because it was not supported by the record, and therefore, the circuit court and the Court of Appeals erred when they found a Brady violation. View "Commonwealth v. Parrish" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of murder and intimidating a participant in the legal process for shooting and killing Troya Sheckles. Appellant was sentenced to fifty-five years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the murder conviction but reversed the conviction for intimidating a participant in the legal process, holding (1) the evidence of Sheckles’s intentional murder did not support conviction on the intimidation-of-a-witness charge; but (2) Defendant’s argument that delayed disclosures of discovery material by the Commonwealth constituted unconstitutional arbitrary state action warranting dismissal of the charges against him was without merit. View "Pettway v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant’s two-year-old son died when she left him in the car overnight and into the afternoon. Appellant was convicted of wanton murder, second-degree criminal abuse, and first-degree wanton endangerment. The Supreme Court vacated Appellant’s conviction for wanton murder, reversed her conviction for first-degree wanton endangerment, and affirmed her conviction for second-degree criminal abuse, holding (1) while Appellant’s conduct historically would have supported a conviction for wanton murder, it cannot support such a conviction now, as the General Assembly, in 2000, amended the homicide statutory scheme to create a new type of second-degree manslaughter applicable to circumstances such as these; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for first-degree wanton endangerment. Remanded for a new trial on the homicide charge, conviction for which is capped at second-degree manslaughter. View "Shouse v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of five counts of trafficking in prescription blanks and being a first-degree persistent felony offender for securing and selling five forged prescriptions for a controlled substance. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in denying Appellant’s motion for a directed verdict, as the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; and (2) did not violate the bar on double jeopardy, as the separate trafficking convictions for each forged prescription did not violate Defendant’s double jeopardy rights. View "Early v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law