Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant was tried and convicted on the handgun charge. After his trial on this charge, Defendant filed a motion to suppress, his second such motion. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant was subsequently tried on the trafficking charge. During trial, the Commonwealth elicited testimony from a police officer about Defendant’s testimony at the second suppression hearing. Defendant did not object to this testimony but elected not to testify in his own defense. Defendant was subsequently convicted on the trafficking charge. The court of appeals reversed the trafficking conviction, concluding that the use of Defendant’s suppression-hearing testimony violated his right not to incriminate himself and that the error was palpable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the requirement of an objection is a substantive aspect of the constitutional rule that bars palpable error review, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in resorting to that review. View "Commonwealth v. Taylor" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree manslaughter. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the language of the provocation qualification in the jury instructions was patently erroneous. On remand, a circuit court jury again convicted Defendant of second-degree manslaughter. Defendant appealed, and the Commonwealth cross-appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred by giving the provocation qualification to self-protection instruction because it was not supported by the evidence, and the error was not harmless; and (2) the trial court deviated from the guidelines found in the Court’s criminal rules in seating the jury, but the deviation was not substantial. View "Barker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendants Michael and Janie Young placed their unborn child up for adoption. Defendants received payments totaling $4,000 from Act of Love Adoptions of Boston, Massachusetts and $6,000 from Jeff and Tracey Scholen. When Defendants informed the Scholens that they did not want to proceed with the adoption, Defendants were charged with theft by deception over $10,000. Defendants were later indicted by a grand jury. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, which the trial court denied. Defendant subsequently entered into conditional pleas of guilty to theft by deception over $10,000, reserving the right to appeal the denial of their motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the charges should have been dismissed because no crime occurred. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals and the decision of the circuit court denying the motion to dismiss, as the Commonwealth stated enough in the indictment to proceed to trial; and (2) affirmed the court of appeals to the extent that it set aside Defendants’ conviction on the grounds of palpable error creating a manifest injustice, as it was improper to add the funds paid by Act of Love to reach the $10,000 amount where thefts from different victims give rise to separate offenses and cannot be aggregated. View "Commonwealth v. Young" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter, second-degree manslaughter, and other crimes. Before final sentencing, Appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel and that he relied on erroneous legal advice regarding time served when he entered his guilty plea. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Appellant may have received inaccurate advice from his trial counsel about jail-time credit but that Appellant was not prejudiced by counsel’s mistake. View "Greene v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol (DUI) after being stopped at a police roadblock conducted by the Kentucky State Police (KSP) at a highway intersection. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the evidence leading to Appellant’s conviction was unconstitutionally obtained because the procedures the KSP employed to set up the roadblock failed to comply with the procedures necessary to implement a suspicionless traffic stop. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the KSP did not comply with the factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Buchanon substantially enough to render this roadblock a reasonable seizure performed in the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion. View "Commonwealth v. Cox" on Justia Law

Appellant was driving her uninsured vehicle when she collided with another vehicle, allegedly causing $3,600 in damages. Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to the charged offense of Failure of Owner to Maintain Required Insurance. The district court sentenced Appellant to a two-year sentence, conditionally discharged, with “restitution to be determined.” Before the restitution hearing, Appellant appealed. The circuit court dismissed the appeal, concluding that it lacked appellate jurisdiction because there was no final action from the district court. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court was correct in concluding that its appellate jurisdiction was not properly invoked in this case. View "Dillard v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of intentional murder, two counts of assault in the first degree, and one count of wanton endangerment in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded Defendant’s plea agreement from evidence in the guilt phase; (2) the inclusion of a “complicity to the act” instruction did not deprive Defendant of a unanimous verdict; (3) the trial court did not err in the intentional murder instructions by failing to include a method by which the victims were killed; (4) the trial court did not err by admitting one victim’s dying declaration; (5) the Commonwealth’s statements during closing argument in the guilt phase did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct; and (6) the trial court did not err by excluding Defendant’s accomplice’s plea agreement during the penalty phase. View "Lewis v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and first-degree sodomy. Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years. The two jury instructions under which Appellant was convicted directed the jury not to consider a specific event but broadly referred to a five-month period. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that, upon application of Johnson v. Commonwealth, Appellant’s constitutional right to a unanimous verdict was violated because (1) at trial, the instructions given to the jury contained no distinguishing descriptions that would fairly apprise the jury of exactly which criminal episode it was charged to consider; and (2) the error was jurisprudentially intolerable. View "Ruiz v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse and sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion for a directed verdict on the sodomy charge; but (2) the trial court erred in admitting testimony from the Commonwealth’s investigating officer regarding the discredited theory of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome and that a local task force on child sex abuse recommended Appellant’s indictment improperly bolstered the alleged victim’s credibility, resulting in palpable error and manifest injustice. View "King v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree manslaughter. Defendant was sentenced to ten years in prison. On appeal, the court of appeals vacated Defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that impermissible trial testimony of a police sergeant constituted palpable error. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and reinstated the judgment of the circuit court, holding that although the sergeant’s contested testimony was impermissible, it did not threaten Defendant’s entitlement to due process of law, as the error was far from palpable. View "Commonwealth v. Rieder" on Justia Law