Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of criminal facilitation of first degree assault. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, in part because it found that the jury instructions were prejudicially flawed. Both parties filed motions for discretionary review. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in its instructions to the jury; (2) did not err when it overruled Defendant’s motions for a directed verdict; and (3) properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from her cell phone. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery. Finding Defendant to be a persistent felony offender, the jury recommended a sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment. The trial court sentenced Defendant accordingly. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court was correct in denying Defendant’s request for the Kentucky State Police laboratory to test two bandanas for Defendant’s DNA; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Defendant’s proffered alternate perpetrator testimony; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant the opportunity to impeach a witness for an alleged inconsistent statement; and (4) the testimony of a parole officer regarding good-time credit did not rise to the level of palpable error. View "Geary v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and first-degree sodomy. The jury recommended a sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in refusing to disqualify the entire Commonwealth’s attorney’s office after Defendant’s former counsel withdrew from his representation before trial and took a job as an assistant prosecutor in the same attorney’s office; and (2) the trial court did not err in refusing to admonish the jury on a series of questions posed by the Commonwealth in cross examination of a defense witness. View "Calhoun v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant, a juvenile, was charged with misdemeanor sexual misconduct and felony possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor based on his sexual conduct with his also-underage girlfriend. Appellant entered an unconditional admission to amended charges. The district court subsequently entered an adjudication finding that Appellant committed the alleged conduct. The circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals denied Appellant’s motion for discretionary review. The Supreme Court initially granted discretionary review to address Appellant’s constitutional claims. However, because Appellant entered what amounts to an unconditional guilty plea, the Supreme Court remanded the matter with directions that the appeal be dismissed, holding that Appellant waived his right to an appeal in this case. View "B.H. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Biological parents Michael and Janie Young decided to look for a potential adoptional placement for their fifth child. When it was discovered that the Youngs accepted living expenses from two different sets of prospective adoptive parents, the Youngs were charged with theft by deception over $10,000. The Youngs entered into conditional guilty pleas to the charges. They then appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying their motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to state a crime and that the amounts paid by the two set of prospective adoptive parents could not be combined to elevate the theft above the $10,000 threshold to make it a Class C felony. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that no crime had been committed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the Youngs were properly charged with theft by deception in the indictment; and (2) thefts from different victims give rise to separate offenses and cannot be combined to elevate the level of the offense, and this error amounted to palpable error in this case. View "Commonwealth v. Young" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with two counts of first degree sexual abuse. Appellant filed a motion to suppress statements he made to police during a custodial interrogation in the absence of his appointed counsel. The trial court initially granted Appellant’s motion to suppress. The trial court reversed itself, however, and denied the motion after the United States Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Montejo v. Louisiana, which overturned long-standing Sixth Amendment precedent. Appellant entered a conditional Alford plea to two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed after declining to apply the Montejo rationale in the context of state right-to-counsel law, holding that the rationale of Linehan v. Commonwealth is the correct manifestation of the right to counsel under Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution. View "Keysor v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of “Engaging in Organized Crime: Criminal Syndicate by managing, supervising, and/or directing individuals to acquire retail merchandise including cell phones, by deception and/or fraud, with the intent to resell it.” The conviction arose from Defendant’s wholesale enlistment of homeless men as tools in a scheme to defraud cell-phone companies. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was entitled to a directed verdict. The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s conviction, concluding that there was insufficient evidence that Defendant and his co-conspirators collaborated under the “continuing basis” necessary to sustain an organized-crime conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant engaged in a continuing criminal operation, and therefore, Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict. View "Commonwealth v. Jones" on Justia Law

After a retrial, Defendant was convicted of wanton murder and fourth-degree assault following a car accident in which he was highly intoxicated. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. Defendant challenged his convictions under Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42, arguing that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals vacated Defendant’s convictions and remanded for another trial, concluding that Defendant’s counsel had been ineffective in failing to conduct his own investigation into the accident scene and in failing to object to the introduction of an emergency medical report. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in finding reversible ineffective assistance of defense counsel, the Court of Appeals applied the Strickland v. Washington standard incorrectly; and (2) Defendant failed to show a reasonable probability of a different result absent his counsel’s purported errors. View "Commonwealth v. McKee" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first-degree burglary, receiving stolen property in excess of $500, and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to twenty years in prison. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction for first-degree burglary and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the burglary conviction, and therefore, Appellant was entitled to a directed verdict on that charge; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting defense counsel from arguing that Appellant’s possession of an opened bar of soap showed he did not intend to commit a crime in the building. View "McGruder v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 1980, Appellant was convicted by a jury of three counts of capital murder and sentenced to death on each of the murders. The Supreme Court affirmed. In 2004, Appellant filed a post-conviction motion to set aside his death sentences on the grounds that he is intellectually disabled. The circuit court judge ordered the Finance and Administration Cabinet to pay up to $5,000 for a mental health evaluation by a private psychologist. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a showing that use of a state facility was impractical. On remand, the circuit court determined that the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC) was capable of conducting the necessary evaluations and ordered that any failure to cooperate would constitute a waiver of Appellant’s intellectual disability claim. After Appellant indicated that he would refuse evaluation by KCPC, the trial court determined that he had waived his intellectual disability claim and ordered that his case be dismissed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding that Appellant was not entitled to public funds for an expert of his choosing; and (2) reversed the judgment on the issue of waiver, holding that Appellant’s continued failure to submit to KCPC’s custody did not constitute waiver. Remanded. View "White v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law