Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of first degree robbery, first degree assault, reckless homicide, and tampering with physical evidence. Appellant was sentenced to a total sentence of twenty-five years. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions for first degree robbery, reckless homicide, and tampering with physical evidence but reversed his conviction for first degree assault, holding (1) Appellant was not denied a fair trial by the presence of courtroom spectators wearing t-shirts sympathetic to the victim; (2) Appellant was improperly convicted of first degree assault because Appellant’s first degree assault charge merged into his reckless homicide charge; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss four jurors for cause; (4) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s request for a voluntary intoxication instruction; and (5) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s request for a duress instruction. Remanded. View "Hammond v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine and first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance. Defendant was sentenced as a first-degree persistent felon to life in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) delays in bringing Defendant to trial - both the nearly five-year delay between indictment and trial and the more than 180-day delay following Defendant’s pro se speedy-trial motion - did not violate Defendant’s constitutional and statutory rights to a prompt disposition of his charges; (2) law enforcement officers’ warrantless entry of Defendant’s apartment did not violate Defendant’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches; (3) none of what Defendant claimed were evidentiary errors was reversible; and (4) the judgment should clearly reflect that Defendant’s twenty-year sentence runs concurrently with his life sentence. View "Goben v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth charged Defendant with felony theft. Defendant was acquitted of the charge by a jury at the conclusion of his trial. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in discharging the jury panel initially selected to try the case because of its racial composition and then proceeding with the trial after empaneling a second, more racially inclusive jury. Defendant’s acquittal and the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented the Commonwealth from retrying the case against Defendant, but the Supreme Court accepted certification of questions posed by the Commonwealth regarding the issues presented in this case. The Supreme Court answered (1) a trial judge does not have the discretion to dismiss a randomly selected jury panel despite its unrepresentative appearance when it was not shown to have failed to reflect a fair cross-section of the community and where its selection was otherwise lawful; and (2) a trial judge may not generally prohibit the parties during voir dire from examining or challenging a prospective juror with respect to statements made by the juror during a previous voir dire examination, although the judge may impose reasonable limitations on the inquiry. View "Commonwealth v. Doss" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 1980, Appellant was convicted of three counts of capital murder, three counts of first-degree robbery, and one count of burglary. Appellant was sentenced to death for each of the murders. After he was sentenced, Appellant was subjected to a psychological evaluation, which revealed that he had an overall IQ score of 81. On appeal, Appellant’s psychological evaluation was not raised. The Supreme Court affirmed. In 2004, Appellant filed a motion to set aside his death sentences on the grounds that he was intellectually disabled. After two remands, the trial judge (1) ordered that Appellant was not entitled to state funds for a psychological evaluation; (2) determined that, because Appellant indicated that he would refuse evaluation by the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC), he had waived his intellectual disability claim; and (3) ordered that Appellant’s case be dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to public funds for an expert of his choosing; but (2) Appellant did not waive his intellectual disability claim. Remanded to the trial court to order the KCPC to perform a psychological evaluation of Appellant. View "White v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Robert Guernsey and Trustin Jones were indicted for murder and first-degree robbery. The Commonwealth subsequently filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty against Guernsey and Jones, identifying murder committed in the course of first-degree robbery as the statutory aggravator. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court entered an order excluding the death penalty as disproportionate. The Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s order excluding the death penalty and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) the circuit court erred by concluding prior to trial that the death penalty would be disproportionate in this prosecution for murder and first-degree robbery; and (2) the Commonwealth did not forfeit the right to interlocutory review of the issue presented. View "Commonwealth v. Guernsey" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of theft by unlawful taking of property worth more than ten thousand dollars, second degree burglary, third degree burglary, and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate sentence of twenty years in prison. Appellant appealed, raising four allegations of error. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant’s convictions, holding that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to impeach Appellant with his failure to disclose his alibi and his alibi witness to the police or prosecuting authorities prior to trial, and the error required reversal. Remanded for a new trial. View "Cunningham v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of fifteen counts of first-degree sodomy, thirteen counts of first-degree sexual abuse, and two counts of witness tampering. Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of seventy years imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever Count No. 33 of the indictment from the remaining charges; (2) the trial court did not err by consolidating for a single trial the sexual offenses and the witness tampering charges; (3) the jury instructions did not violate Appellant’s right to a unanimous verdict; and (4) Appellant waived any objections to deficiencies in the form of the indictment by failing to object. View "Elam v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his right to a public trial when it cleared visitors from the courtroom during the victim’s testimony and when it denied his motion to suppress an out-of-court photo identification. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on both issues, holding (1) because Defendant failed to object to the courtroom closure, he waived his argument that his right to a public trial was violated; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the out-of-court identification was valid. View "Crutcher v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant waived his right to indictment by a grand jury and agreed to enter a guilty plea based upon an information filed by the Commonwealth charging him with four counts of second degree burglary. Before Appellant formally entered his guilty plea to the original charges, further negotiations took place, resulting in a different plea agreement, under which the Commonwealth agreed to amend each count of second degree burglary to third degree burglary. Appellant was subsequently convicted of four counts of third degree burglary and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment on each count, to be served consecutively. Appellant appealed, arguing that the circuit court lost jurisdiction to adjudicate his case when the original charges were amended. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant provided no persuasive basis to invalidate the circuit court’s judgment and to revert to the original plea agreement. View "Pursley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was required to register as a sex offender in Michigan because he was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for a sex offense. Defendant later moved to Kentucky, where he was charged with failing to register under the Kentucky Sex Offender Registration Act. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge. The court of appeals affirmed on appeal, concluding that Defendant was required to register under the plain language of the Act. Defendant appealed, claiming that he was not required to register under the Act because he was a juvenile and was not “convicted” of any crime. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute requires registration in the state of Kentucky of any person who was required to register in another state upon that person’s relocation; and (2) because Defendant was required to register in Michigan, he was also required to register in Kentucky. View "Murphy v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law