Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Donald Howard entered an open guilty plea to five counts of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, second offense. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment with a $1,000 fine on each count with two counts running consecutively for a maximum twenty-year total sentence. He appealed, arguing that the trial court's imposition of the statutory maximum sentence was unconstitutional and that the court erred by imposing a partial fee to the public defender and court costs. After review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in sentencing Howard, assessing court costs, or imposing a partial fee for the public defender. The Court agreed, however, that the trial court erred by imposing the criminal fines, so the criminal fines imposed in the judgment were vacated and the matter remanded back to the trial court for entry of a conforming judgment. View "Howard v. Kentucky" on Justia Law

Appellant David Jenkins appealed his convictions for first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy. A jury found appellant guilty and recommended twenty-year sentences for both crimes, to be served consecutively (for a total maximum term of forty years). On appeal, appellant argued: (1) the evidence presented against him at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdicts and that, accordingly, he was entitled to a dismissal of the charges; and (2) even if the evidence was not so lacking as to require a directed verdict, a number of trial court errors rendered the proceedings unfair and entitle him to a new trial. Agreeing with Jenkins that the jury's instruction on a single count of sodomy when the evidence reflected two such acts, did not comport with recent cases construing the Kentucky Constitution's unanimous verdict requirement, the Supreme Court reversed the sodomy conviction and the sodomy portion of Jenkins's sentence, and remand for additional proceedings. Finding no other reversible error, the Court affirmed appellant's rape conviction and corresponding twenty-year sentence for that crime. View "Jenkins v. Kentucky" on Justia Law

Appellant Kyle Sheets was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and two counts of first-degree sodomy. In a separate trial with a separate jury, he was convicted of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for the sexual-abuse conviction, forty years' for each sodomy conviction, and six years' for the handgun conviction, all to run consecutively, subject to the statutory maximum aggregate sentence of seventy years. Sheets appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to grant his motions for directed verdicts of acquittal; (2) the trial court violated his right to be free from double jeopardy; (3) the trial court violated his right to a unanimous verdict; (4) the Commonwealth erred when it introduced irrelevant evidence of legal sexual acts between Sheets and his wife; (5) the Commonwealth erred when it alleged Sheets' defense attorney acted immorally or illegally by investigating the allegations; (6) one of the Commonwealth's witnesses gave improper testimony on cross examination; (7) the trial court erred by failing to conduct an in camera review of Sheets's alleged victim's psychological counseling records; and (8) the trial court erred when it included an instruction on a definition of "constructive possession" on his possession-of-a-handgun-by-a-convicted-felon charge. The Kentucky Supreme Court concluded it did not have jurisdiction to review the possession-of-a-handgun-by-a-convicted-felon conviction and sentence on direct appeal because the sentence for that conviction was less than twenty years' imprisonment. Thus, the Court did not address Sheets' final claim of error. The Court reversed appellant's conviction with regard to the sodomy conviction, and remanded that for further proceedings. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Sheets . Kentucky" on Justia Law

In May and July of 2012, Jonathan McDaniel, David DeShields, and John Martin, all inmates at the State Reformatory in LaGrange, and all serving sentences for felony sex offenses, filed very similar pro se motions at their respective trial courts challenging the legality of the conditional discharge requirement of KRS 532.043, and sought to have the discharge period deleted from their sentences. All three trial courts denied the motion, and all three defendants appealed. The Supreme Court granted defendants' joint motion for discretionary review to address their concern that the Court of Appeals inappropriately characterized their trial court motions as having been brought pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42, and to address the Court's own concern that the Court of Appeals, "perhaps in its eagerness to try to calm the waters after the 2011 amendment to KRS 532.043," inappropriately ruled on a question not properly before it. After that review, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' ultimate affirmance of the trial court rulings denying relief, but "vacated" the Court of Appeals' opinion except as to the issue of whether Martin's and McDaniel's guilty pleas were subject to appellate review. View "McDaniel v. Kentucky" on Justia Law

After entering a guilty plea, the Appellant Bryan Russell sent a letter to the trial court complaining about the effectiveness of his counsel and the legality of the sentence to which he had agreed. The letter did not specifically ask for any relief, such as the setting aside of Russell's plea. The primary issue in this case was whether Russell's letter was sufficient to constitute a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea under Criminal Rule 8.10. Resolution of that issue turned primarily on whether the letter "set[s] forth the relief or order sought" as required under the Rule. After review of the letter, the Supreme Court concluded that because Russell's letter did not expressly ask for any relief, much less ask to withdraw his guilty plea, it could not be construed as a motion under Criminal Rule 8.14. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Russell v. Kentucky" on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellant Tracey Cassetty was charged with felony theft by unlawful taking. He entered into a diversion agreement with several conditions, including his entering a guilty plea with a recommended sentence of five years, paying restitution that day, and remaining drug free and subject to random testing. The court also entered an order of referral to drug court. Although the court's orders did not state that completion of drug court was a condition of his diversion, the judge's statements during the entry of the plea made this condition clear. Cassetty's drug-court program was presided over by Judge Tyler Gill. As part of that program, Cassetty entered a rehabilitation facility. Unfortunately, he had difficulty with the facility and was released from it. He also failed at least one drug screen. As a result, he was discharged from drug court, setting in motion the process to revoke his diversion. Cassetty moved to recuse Judge Gill from the revocation proceeding, citing his presiding over the drug-court proceedings. Although the judge's previous practice had been to recuse in such cases, he denied the motion. He noted that the Judicial Ethics Committee had issued an opinion, JE-122, stating that it was not a breach of the judicial canons for a judge to preside over a defendant's drug-court program and a revocation hearing based on a violation of the terms of that program, unless the judge learned information outside the court process. In light of this opinion, the judge concluded that recusal would violate Canon 3B(1) (a "judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which disqualification is required"). The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the notice of appeal, naming only an order denying a recusal motion and not the final judgment, substantially complied with the requirements of the Civil Rules so as to invoke the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction and avoid dismissal of the appeal. The Supreme Court concluded that it did not. "Simply put, a notice of appeal naming only an order denying a motion to recuse, and not a final judgment, is fatally defective. Neither the rule of substantial compliance nor its subsidiary rule of relation forward can salvage such a notice of appeal. As such, such a notice of appeal fails to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court, and the attempted appeal should be dismissed." Therefore, the order of the Court of Appeals dismissing Cassetty's appeal was affirmed. View "Cassetty v. Kentucky" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth appealed a Court of Appeals judgment remanding this case back to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on Appellee Douglas Rank's RCr 11.42 motion. Rank pled guilty to and was subsequently convicted of first degree assault for which he was serving a fifteen-year prison sentence when he moved pursuant to RCr 11.42 to vacate his conviction. Rank's motion included a request for an evidentiary hearing to establish that his guilty plea was not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntary and was, instead, the result of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, Robert Gettys, and to lesser degree, attorney Pat Hickey. The circuit court denied Rank's motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals concluded that he had raised issues of fact that required an evidentiary hearing and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the Court of Appeals' judgment and affirmed. View "Kentucky v. Rank" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to DUI, fourth offense, and driving on a DUI-suspended license, second offense. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an aggregate sentence of three years. The court probated Appellant’s three-year sentence for five years and imposed the mandatory-minimum sentence of 240 days. At the time he was sentenced, Appellant had committed to complete a minimum of eight months of in-patient alcohol treatment. Appellant urged the judge to allow him to serve the 240 days through home incarceration. The trial court preliminary ruled that Appellant did not qualify for home incarceration but stayed imposition of the 240-day sentence pending appeal. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Appellant was ineligible for home incarceration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant was eligible for home incarceration at the discretion of the trial court. View "Rice v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his right to confront witnesses against him by permitting the Commonwealth to introduce incriminating forensic test results at trial through the testimony of an expert witness under a hearsay exception. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the trial court violated the Confrontation Clause by not allowing Defendant to confront the lab analyst who conducted the test. Remanded. View "Manery v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts each of first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse. Defendant was sentenced to seventy years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to amend the indictment or, alternatively, in denying his motion for a continuance, and (2) the trial court submitted proper instructions to the jury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Commonwealth to amend the indictment; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant Defendant’s request for a continuance under the circumstances of this case; and (3) the trial court did not improperly instruct the jury to the level of reversible error. View "Herp v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law