Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of second-degree assault. A public defender from the local Department of Public advocacy (DPA) office was appointed to represent Defendant. Prior to trial, counsel advised the trial court that another attorney in the local DPA was representing the alleged victim in an unrelated matter. Defendant requested the appointment of new counsel. The trial court denied the request, concluding that there was not conflict of interest, and ordered the trial to proceed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court’s refusal to appoint new counsel violated his right to conflict-free counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The court of appeals ultimately concluded that Defendant had not shown that his lawyer had an unconstitutional conflict of interest during her representation of him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a public defender’s conflict of interest is not necessarily imputed to all other public defenders in the same Public Defender office; and (2) Defendant was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel in this case. View "Samuels v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 1993, Appellant was convicted in a state court of multiple crimes and sentenced to a total of forty-two years’ imprisonment. In 1994, a federal district court sentenced Appellant to 152 months’ incarceration for separate crimes. At the time of Appellant’s federal sentencing, he was in the custody of the Kentucky Department of Corrections (DOC). The Federal Bureau of Prisons issued a detainer in order to obtain custody upon Appellant’s release from state custody. In 2001, the Kentucky Parole Board (KPB) paroled Appellant to his federal detainer, after which Appellant was transferred from state custody to federal custody. In 2012, Appellant was released from federal supervision. In 2013, after obtaining new criminal charges, the KPB revoked Appellant’s parole. In 2015, Appellant, then a prisoner at the Northpoint Training Center, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the DOC permanently surrendered jurisdiction over his sentence when it transferred custody to federal authorities. The circuit court denied Appellant’s petition. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in accordance with Commonwealth v. Hale, the DOC did not forfeit its right to require Appellant to satisfy the remainder of his sentence upon his return to the Commonwealth. View "Murrell v. Bottom" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree sodomy, first-degree sexual abuse, and use of a minor in a sexual performance. Appellant was sentenced to a total of thirty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court erred by failing to direct a verdict of acquittal for first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse; (2) two of Appellant’s remaining arguments concerning his first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse convictions were moot; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s request for a sexual misconduct jury instruction; (4) the prosecutor made improper remarks during closing argument, but the misstatements were not so egregious that they constitute flagrant misconduct undermining the essential fairness of Appellant’s trial; and (5) there was no cumulative effect of multiple errors that would justify reversal. View "Murphy v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession a handgun as a convicted felon, possessing marijuana, and operating a motor vehicle on a suspended license. Appellant appealed the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence found in the vehicle he was driving at the time of his arrest. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record contained substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s findings of fact; (2) warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject to a few well-established exceptions, such as inventory searches; and (3) under the circumstances of this case, the police acted reasonably in seizing Appellant’s vehicle and performing the subsequent inventory search of its contents. View "Cobb v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a trial, Appellant was convicted of eleven crimes. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not err in determining that Appellant had waived his right to counsel; (2) the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the search of Appellant’s person; (3) admission of evidence that the confidential informant’s work resulted in convictions in other cases was not palpable error; (4) the trial court did not err in denying a directed verdict; and (5) the trial court properly allowed Appellant’s sentence to be enhanced as a subsequent offender. View "Lamb v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted for burglary. Appellant moved in limine to exclude from the evidence any testimony about a surveillance video that no longer existed. In place of the actual video recording, the Commonwealth planned to present testimony of a police detective who had watched the video. The trial court ruled that testimony describing the contents of the missing video could not be introduced at trial. The Commonwealth subsequently moved to dismiss the case without prejudice. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The order of dismissal memorialized the earlier rulings that excluded testimony describing the burglary video. The Commonwealth then sought appellate review of the pretrial rulings. The court of appeals reversed the order of dismissal, concluding that the trial court erred in ordering the exclusion of the proffered testimony describing the contents of the missing video. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision and dismissed the Commonwealth’s appeal, holding that the entry of the order of dismissal rendered the interlocutory rulings of the trial court moot, and the Commonwealth had no right to appeal from the order of dismissal granted in its favor and at its own request. View "Newkirk v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of second degree assault, one count of fourth degree assault, and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant to seventeen years’ imprisonment and made a finding that Defendant’s actions constituted a hate crime under Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.031. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions but reversed the trial court’s designation of Defendant’s second-degree assaults as hate crimes, holding (1) section 532.031 is constitutional as written and as applied to Defendant; (2) there was sufficient evidence to prove that Defendant’s perception of one victim’s sexuality was a primary factor in his assaulting her; (3) there was insufficient evidence to support a designation of the other three assaults as hate crimes; (4) the trial court did not make prejudicially erroneous rulings on certain evidentiary issues; (5) any error by the trial court in denying Defendant’s request to conduct re-re-direct did not limit Defendant’s ability to effectively present a defense; and (6) any error in the jury instructions had no impact on Defendant’s substantial rights. View "Burke v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first degree robbery, first degree assault, reckless homicide, and tampering with physical evidence. Appellant was sentenced to a total sentence of twenty-five years. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions for first degree robbery, reckless homicide, and tampering with physical evidence but reversed his conviction for first degree assault, holding (1) Appellant was not denied a fair trial by the presence of courtroom spectators wearing t-shirts sympathetic to the victim; (2) Appellant was improperly convicted of first degree assault because Appellant’s first degree assault charge merged into his reckless homicide charge; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss four jurors for cause; (4) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s request for a voluntary intoxication instruction; and (5) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s request for a duress instruction. Remanded. View "Hammond v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine and first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance. Defendant was sentenced as a first-degree persistent felon to life in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) delays in bringing Defendant to trial - both the nearly five-year delay between indictment and trial and the more than 180-day delay following Defendant’s pro se speedy-trial motion - did not violate Defendant’s constitutional and statutory rights to a prompt disposition of his charges; (2) law enforcement officers’ warrantless entry of Defendant’s apartment did not violate Defendant’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches; (3) none of what Defendant claimed were evidentiary errors was reversible; and (4) the judgment should clearly reflect that Defendant’s twenty-year sentence runs concurrently with his life sentence. View "Goben v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth charged Defendant with felony theft. Defendant was acquitted of the charge by a jury at the conclusion of his trial. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in discharging the jury panel initially selected to try the case because of its racial composition and then proceeding with the trial after empaneling a second, more racially inclusive jury. Defendant’s acquittal and the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented the Commonwealth from retrying the case against Defendant, but the Supreme Court accepted certification of questions posed by the Commonwealth regarding the issues presented in this case. The Supreme Court answered (1) a trial judge does not have the discretion to dismiss a randomly selected jury panel despite its unrepresentative appearance when it was not shown to have failed to reflect a fair cross-section of the community and where its selection was otherwise lawful; and (2) a trial judge may not generally prohibit the parties during voir dire from examining or challenging a prospective juror with respect to statements made by the juror during a previous voir dire examination, although the judge may impose reasonable limitations on the inquiry. View "Commonwealth v. Doss" on Justia Law