Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals vacating Defendant’s sentence as a persistent felony offender (PFO) in the first degree to ten years’ imprisonment in connection with his conviction of third-degree assault on the grounds that Defendant’s second trial violated his rights against double jeopardy, holding that Defendant’s retrial was barred by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 13 of the Kentucky Constitution.After a mistrial, the Commonwealth indicted Defendant as a PFO, first-degree. After a second trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of third-degree assault. The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s retrial was barred by both the United States and Kentucky Constitutions because jeopardy had clearly and unrefutably attached in Defendant’s case and there was no manifest necessity for a mistrial. View "Commonwealth v. Padgett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of first-degree assault, first-degree sexual abuse, and first-degree unlawful imprisonment and sentence of sixty years as a persistent felony offender, holding that any error in the proceedings below was harmless.Specifically, the Court held (1) Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated; (2) the trial court did not err in failing to appoint Defendant substitute counsel; (3) the trial court did not commit reversible error in advising Defendant of the right to or appoint stand-by or hybrid counsel; (3) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (4) any error in the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence under the Rape Shield Law was harmless; and (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in advising Defendant of his right to recall a witness. View "Henderson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the Commonwealth’s petition for a writ to prohibit enforcement of a trial court’s order authorizing the use of public funds for the procurement of private-expert assistance in William Meece’s post-conviction proceedings under Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the use of public funds.Meece moved to vacate his judgment of conviction under Rule 11.42. Meece requested the use of private experts in proving his motion. The trial court granted in part and denied in part Meece’s public-funding request after holding an ex parte hearing. The Commonwealth then filed this petition for a writ of prohibition, arguing that the trial court erred in authorizing the use of public funds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in holding the ex parte hearing to determine whether Meece was entitled to the requested state funds; and (2) the circuit court’s hearing to determine whether Meece was entitled to public funds for the procurement of private experts was not premature. View "Commonwealth v. Honorable John R. Grise" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s conviction of first-degree murder but affirmed his remaining convictions and sentences, holding that several errors on the trial court in this case affected the propriety of Defendant’s murder conviction and demanded reversal of this conviction.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence and in admitting other evidence and inappropriately handled the characterization of missing evidence. The Court then found that these errors constituted harmless error as to all of Defendant’s convictions, with the exception of the first-degree murder conviction, but that the errors did affect the propriety of Defendant’s murder conviction. View "Tigue v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of two counts of murder, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, tampering with physical evidence, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender, holding that the trial court did not commit reversible error.After a jury convicted Defendant, the trial court accepted a total effective sentence of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no reversible error in the trial court’s admission of certain evidence at trial and that the errors that did occur in this case did not rise to the level of reversible cumulative error. View "Mason v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, holding that a conflict of interest did not exist when Appellant’s counsel represented him on the motion to withdraw the plea and that Appellant was not coerced into entering a guilty plea.Appellant entered a guilty plea to four counts of first-degree robbery and related crimes. Before he was sentenced, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his plea based on his alleged misunderstanding regarding his sentence. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record did not support either Appellant’s argument that his counsel had a conflict of interest at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea or that Appellant was coerced to enter the plea. View "Dorsey v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s first-degree robbery conviction and sentence, vacated his persistent felony offender (PFO) conviction and sentence, which was predicated upon the underlying first-degree robbery conviction, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that the trial court erred when it failed to direct a verdict on the first-degree robbery charge.After a jury convicted Defendant of first-degree robbery Defendant pleaded guilty to the PFO charge. The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the trial court did not err by failing to dismiss the indictment for an alleged violation of Defendant’s right to a speedy trial; (2) the trial court erred when it denied Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the first-degree robbery charge; and (3) the trial court should have conducted further review of Defendant’s request to make opening and closing statements himself. View "Lang v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions of two counts of murder and sentence of life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by proceeding with voir dire without Defendant present.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court improperly conducted voir dire when Defendant was unable to be present and that the court erred when it failed to grant immunity pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 503.085(1). The Supreme court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to be present at jury selection pertaining to thirty-one jurors that were questioned in his absence, and the error was not harmless; and (2) the trial court did not commit reversible error when it failed to grant immunity pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 503.085. View "Truss v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this criminal case, the Supreme Court held that even though evidence of a previous conviction may be prohibited to allow a general attack on the witness’s credibility under Ky. R. Evid. 609(b), evidence of the witness’s lifetime parole status stemming from the conviction may be admissible to allow a more specific attack on the witness’s credibility by showing bias or motive to lie under the broader scope of Ky. R. Evid. 611.Defendant was convicted of fourth-degree assault. The court of appeals reversed, holding that evidence of a witness’s lifetime parole status was admissible under Rule 611 and that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding such evidence. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a witness’s status as a parolee is admissible on cross-examination as impeachment evidence pursuant to Rule 611 despite a provision in Rule 609(b) that would render evidence of a more than thirty-year-old conviction upon which the witness’s parole was based as presumptively too remote in time. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Defendant from cross-examining the witness about his motive or bias but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Commonwealth v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of kidnapping with serious physical injury and other offenses, holding that the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury on the crime of kidnapping with serious physical injury.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court’s jury instruction on the crime of kidnapping with serious physical injury was improper because the serious physical injury suffered by the victim was inflicted before the kidnapping occurred. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury because the victim did suffer a serious physical injury “during the kidnapping” because Defendant’s infliction of the serious physical injury could be said to be the “first step of the kidnapping.” View "Malone v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law